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THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO EU: RELIGION 
IS AN OBSTACLE? 
SUMMARY 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union is an ongoing process with its 
longstanding background. Cultural differences between Islam and Christianity are 
one of the several issues which are considered to be an obstacle in the way of 
Turkey’s full membership to the European Union. Even though objections to 
Turkey’s membership stressing the cultural difference was not a central issue in the 
beginning of the accession process, religious differences and the place of religion as 
a component of the European identity definitions have been discussed. On the one 
hand, objections based on religious differences has increased. On the other hand, the 
borders of “Europe” are questioned. More importantly, religious differences have 
become an issue more recently in parallel with the increasing visibility of religion, 
particularly Islam in an age of constant globalization with incredible technological 
innovations. This thesis aims to investigate the role of religion, whether it constitutes 
an obstacle all by itself between Turkey and the European Union. The main question 
tried to be answered in the thesis is “Can Turkey be a member of the European 
Union with a Muslim majority?” 
For the purposes of the thesis which is written assuming the accession process will 
go on, initially the role of religion in contemporary politics including debates on 
“resurgence” of religion, secularism, “soft power” will try to be comprehended. 
Secondly, the place of Islam in Europe “the European Union” - and what is called 
“Europe” or “European”- is analyzed in detail with an approach that Europe itself is 
an unfinished contested discursive construct. Following,  whether there is a common 
pattern of  “secularism” which can be offered to the candidate state will be 
questioned examining different state practices. Besides, there will be special focus to 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union including a brief history of relations, 
religion in Turkey which has a suigeneris characteristic and interfaith dialogue 
whether it provides reconciliation between different religions. Within this context, 
the thesis reaches a conclusion investigating if there is a possibility of integration. 
Consequently, the main argument is that religion all by itself could not be an obstacle 
in Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Integration can occur with changing 
stereotyped perceptions. To illustrate, dominant questions, such as “Does Turkey 
maintain membership to the European Union with its Muslim majority population?”, 
should be changed into “Does the European Union want to live together with a 
country which has a Muslim majority population on the condition that Turkey 
provide all criteria expected from a candidate state?” 
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TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NE ÜYELİĞİ SÜRECİNDE DİNİN 
ROLÜ: BİR ENGEL Mİ? 
 
ÖZET 
 
Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne üyeliği, hâlâ süregelen bir süreçtir. İslam ve 
Hıristiyanlık arasındaki kültürel farklılıklar, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne üyelik 
sürecinde engel teşkil edebilecek birkaç konudan biri olarak kabul ediliyor. Üyelik 
sürecinin ilk aşamalarında Türkiye’nin üyeliğine itirazlarda kültürel farklılıklar 
vurgusu merkezi bir rol oynamamasına karşın, dinî farklılıklar ve Avrupa kimliğinin 
bir parçası olarak din de bu süreçte tartışma konusu oldu. Bir yandan dinî 
farklılıklara vurgu yapan itirazlarda artış gözlemlenirken, bir yandan da “Avrupa”nın 
sınırları sorgulanmaya başladı. Daha da önemlisi, inanılmaz teknolojik yenilikler 
sayesinde sürekli ilerleme kaydeden küreselleşme çağında dinin ve özellikle de 
İslam’ın görünürlülüğünün artmasına paralel olarak dinî farklılıklar da sorun olmaya 
başladı. Bu tez, dinin rolünü ve Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği arasındaki ilişkilerde 
kendi başına bir engel teşkil edip etmediğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde 
cevaplanmaya çalışılan temel soru şudur: “Türkiye, çoğunluğu Müslüman olan 
nüfusu ile Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olabilir mi?”  
Üyelik sürecinin devam edeceği varsayımına dayanılarak yazılan bu tezde, öncelikle 
günümüz siyasetinde dinin rolü; dinin “yeniden canlanması”, sekülarizm ve 
“yumuşak güç” tartışmalarını da içerecek şekilde anlaşılmaya çalışılacaktır. İkinci 
olarak, Avrupa’da İslam’ın yeri, “Avrupa Birliği”- ne “Avrupa” veya “Avrupalı” 
diye tanımlanır-, Avrupa’nın henüz tamamlanmamış ve tartışmalı bir inşa sürecinde 
olduğu önkabulüyle incelenecektir. Bunu takiben, birliğe üyelik için başvuran 
ülkelere önerilebilecek bir “sekülarizm” modeli olup olmadığı, üye ülkelerdeki 
uygulamalar incelenerek sorgulanacaktır. Bunların yanısıra, AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinin 
kısa bir tarihi,  Türkiye’de dinin kendine özgü rolü ve dinlerarası diyalogun farklı 
dinler arasında uzlaşma sağlanmasına katkıda bulunup bulunmadığı incelenerek 
Türkiye’nin AB’ye üyelik süreci özellikle vurgulanacaktır. Bu bağlamda, tez 
entegrasyonun ihtimal dâhilinde olup olmadığını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Sonuç 
olarak, bu tez dinin tek başına Türkiye’nin AB’ye üyelik sürecinde bir engel teşkil 
etmeyeceğini savunmaktadır. Entegrasyon, basmakalıp algıların değişmesiyle 
mümkün olabilir. Örnekse, “Türkiye çoğunluğu Müslüman olan nüfusuyla Avrupa 
Birliği’ne üye olabilir mi?” gibi hâkim soruların yerini “Avrupa Birliği, nüfusunun 
çoğunluğu Müslüman olan bir ülkeyle birlikte yaşamayı ister mi?” almalıdır. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The 20
th
 century witnessed  radical changes in various areas. Political scene faced 
with many transformations of well accepted, predominant ideas and values in parallel 
with the world’s fast change in the process of globalization which has gained a rather 
more widespread character due to technological innovations. There is no doubt that 
religion, which has played a significant role in politics throughout centuries, cannot 
be set aside from this change. The crucial influence of religion, perhaps more than 
before, has been felt in the world. The role of religion in politics has become an issue 
in various discussions with an increasing interest especially since the last quarter of 
the twentieth century. On the one hand many arguments have been proposed to imply 
a conflict between different cultures, such as “clash of civilization” instead of an 
ideological conflict that occurred between The First World War and The Second 
World War. On the other hand, it has been suggested that religion has a positive 
political impact between various actors in politics. In fact, the changing idea is that 
religion, which was considered a “private” matter in the past, has played an effective 
role in public sphere on both positive and negative levels (Appleby, S., et all, 2010: 
5). In other words, “despite the continued ascendancy of science and technology, we 
are witnessing an extraordinary recovery of religious ways of understanding human 
experience” (Falk, 2001, p. 77). 
There has been an ongoing accession process between the European Union (the EU 
hereinafter) and Turkey with its longstanding historical background. Turkey’s 
application to the European Economic Community (EEC) for membership dated 
back to 1959. There are several issues which can be labelled as formal obstacles 
standing in the way of the membership of Turkey; such as Kurdish and Armenian 
issues, Cyprus, human rights, democratic shortcomings, and the argument that 
Turkey is not a fully-developed country in an economical manner. There are also 
other obstacles which can be called as “semi-formal obstacles”: Geography, 
demography, security and institutional factors. Yet, the most significant obstacles of 
all, standing in the way of the membership of Turkey, are the religious and cultural 
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differences which can also be referred to as “informal obstacles” (Bogdani, 2011, pp. 
37-43).  
Turkey’s membership has a given rise to disagreements among the EU member 
states since then; yet when it was announced at the European Council held in 
Copenhagen in 2002 that the EU was going to start membership negotiations with 
Turkey, there occurred a full-fledged discussion in the public spheres of France and 
the other member states  (Göle, 2009, p. 167). The representatives of the Christian 
Democratic Parties from six countries announced that the EU was a civilization 
project and Turkey had no place in it. This announcement concretes the base of 
objections based on cultural differences (Müftüler Baç, 2000, p. 21). 
These debates on the cultural features of Turkey mostly come from the fact that over 
95 per cent of its population is Muslim (Zürcher and Linden, 2004, p. 87).  Many 
people say that Turkey has different cultural roots -more specifically with its Muslim 
majority population-  and that its full membership to the EU is difficult, even 
impossible. The idea of religion as an obstacle for Turkey’s accession can be easily 
seen in one of the specific instances. According to Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, 
“Turkey’s entry into the EU would be ‘the end of Europe’ ” (BBC, 2002).  
Religious based oppositions obviously concrete the accumulating perception of 
collective memory. The general framework of discussion circles around the Christian  
heritage of the EU and Islam  “as Europe’s other” throughout centuries. This is 
related to the definition of identity question based on “selves and others”.  The 
enlargement of the EU towards the East and the debates on Turkey’s accession 
process has brought Europe’s characteristics and also its borders into question. 
According to Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, any “European” state could apply for 
membership to the EU. The enlargement process of the EU led to discussions about 
what “Europe” was, where it started and ended, or how a state was regarded as 
“European” and “Europeanness” of Turkey focusing not only on fulfillment of the 
Copenhagen criteria
1
, but also on cultural differences. 
 Walter Bryce Gallie (1956) introduces “essentially contested concept” in his article 
(pp. 167-198). The essentially contested concept refers to a concept which includes a 
                                                 
 
1
 The Copenhagen criteria are the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union focusing 
if a candidate state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a 
functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU. 
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variety of meanings.  Indeed, Europe itself, if it can be regarded as a concept,  is a 
contested one. It means that there is a “diversity of ‘Europes’ often found  in  the 
literature on the European identity formation”diversity (Levin, 2011, p. 164).  Within 
this context, “ ‘Europe’ itself  is a contested discursive concept which is successfully 
appropriated by the EU in recent decades (Keyman and Düzgit, 2007, p. 92). 
Similarly, finding a single, all-encompassing definition of “religion” is difficult, even 
impossible. In this thesis, “religion” basically refers to Islam and Christianity 
acknowledging the fact that these concepts do not have homogenous meanings. Both 
Islam and Christianity consist of several sects. However, the issue discussed in the 
thesis is more general, whether Turkey with its Muslim majority can integrate with 
the EU based on Christian heritage.  
However, religion was not an issue for Turkey’s accession to the EU at the beginning 
of the candidacy process. Even if it was a matter, this situation was not mentioned. 
Instead of religious differences, Turkey’s insufficiency has been investigated from 
other points, such as democracy, human rights and particularly economic 
development. What has happened to change the moderate atmosphere since Turkey 
placed its first application to raise so many objections emphasizing the cultural and 
religious factors in recent years? What has actually changed since then? Whilst there 
is no direct reference to the religious aspect of the organization in the EU founding 
treatments, what is the reason underlying the increasing political discourse on 
cultural differences? Is the EU going to be a Christian Club in the future as said by 
many people nowadays? Or is it going to embrace its multi-cultural discourse in 
accordance with the assumed European values? The main research question of this 
thesis is to investigate whether the religious difference, which is more and more 
emphasized in recent years, is an obstacle all by itself on the way to the membership 
of Turkey to the EU.  
After the end of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington wrote his famous article which 
can be taken as a basis for oppositions based on religion which was published in 
1993. Firstly, in his article and consequently in his book which was published in 
1996, he defended the idea that international relations (IR) were being shaped by 
cultural factors. According to Huntington’s view, the world is divided into seven 
large cultural blocs which are Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western 
and Latin-American. He claims that there is solidarity among similar civilizations 
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and antagonism towards other civilizations. Particularly, he predicts that major 
conflicts would occur between China, the West and Islam. The most significant idea 
underlining the core of oppositions is that “the West’s security, and by extension 
global order, is under attack by international Islamic militancy” (Haynes, 2007: 4). 
Some thought that it was the anti-Western Islamist regimes in Afghanistan and 
Sudan in the 1990s, the September 11 attacks and subsequent bombings in Madrid 
and London, not to mention the US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq 
(2003), which can be regarded as proof for Huntington’s thesis. One can argue that 
the relationship between Europe and Turkey, more specifically Europe and Islam, 
has entered into a new stage as a consequence of these events and recent geopolitical 
and socioeconomic circumstances. Maybe Huntington’s opinion provides a basis for 
comprehending religion based objections in the West. Moreover, one can think that 
Huntington’s view is exactly appropriate to today’s world. However, his ideas have 
some problematic arguments. For example, defining the clear territorial borders of 
civilizations is not an easy action. Or a concept of “civilization” is difficult to 
identify (Haynes, 2007, p. 5). Considering Huntington’s theory can provide a 
comprehension regarding the base of objections. However this theory just provides a 
one-sided glance to the accession process, since its emphasis about the impossibility 
of integration between different cultures. The idea endeavored to explore in this 
thesis is seeking whether an integration is possible between Turkey and the EU, 
despite religious differences. 
In today’s world, to grasp the relation between religion and politics more clearly 
requires taking into consideration some current concepts. I defend that Richard 
Falk’s typology provides a better understanding of not only the role of religion in 
contemporary politics, but also a way of evaluating historical progress. Richard Falk 
(2001) proposes both interpenetrated and contested designations of societal identity 
explore the changes which occurred in the 20
th
 century -pre-modern, modern and 
postmodern. In spite of the difficulties of such a categorization, it seems useful, even 
necessary. However, each one of these phases involves something from its 
predecessor and therefore cannot be taken as isolated periods of time; the modern 
and postmodern contains remnants of the pre-modern. In other words, there is an 
extraordinary unevenness of cultural circumstances throughout history. 
Understanding the argument of modernism is significant, because of the idea that 
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“implicit in dynamic of modernism was a process of Eurocentric globalization by 
way of colonialist extension and capitalist expansion” (p. 78). Thinking with the 
“modern” concept directly provides an acknowledgement about Europe. Today 
secular modernity – which is an inseparable part of European modernism- is no 
longer respected as undisputed and as the ultimate truth owing to the postmodern 
identity definitions. Contrary to what western policy makers envisaged (they said 
that religion belonged to the private sphere) today there have been many religious 
actors, such as religious communities and organizations taking part as influential 
forces not only in private sphere level, but also in the public sphere in politics. In 
fact, the influence of religion is like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the 
world has witnessed religiously inspired conflicts or terrorism. On the other hand, 
religion is used as a tool for peace-making. Moreover, it could be  used as a tool of 
“power”. 
When an issue investigated is religion or politics, if research subject is related to 
Europe and its Christian heritage and the “other” religion, perhaps the most 
significant concept which should be examined is “secularism” which was regarded as 
peculiar to European mindset. Almost all discussions occur within the scope of 
“secular” characteristic of the EU member states. Each member state is defined as 
“secular”. Basically, secularism refers to the marginalization of religion into the 
private sphere. In fact, it has more complicated definitions and process, as it will be 
elaborated in the second chapter. Shortly, all member states recognize and guarantee 
freedom of religion and conscience and provide an autonomy for both church and 
state, although they do not identify a common understanding of secularism.. 
It should be noted that there are three strands of scholarship which have contributed 
to the reconsideration of categories of religion and the secular. Three strands can be 
specified; the first one is “the sociopolitical philosophy of liberal secularism 
exemplified by Charles Taylor (and shared by thinkers such as John Rawls and 
Jurgen Habermas to an extent)”. The second is “postmodernist critiques of 
ontotheological metaphysics by radical theologians and continental philosophers who 
have helped to revive the discourse of ‘political theology’”. The last one, which is 
also providing a basis for the main approach employed in this thesis, follows the 
studies of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, the various forms of discourse analysis 
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focusing on genealogies of power most closely identified with the work of Talal 
Asad (Mandair and Dressler, 2011: 4). 
Charles Taylor is one of the leading scholars on the relationship between religion and 
politics. Taylor (1998) mentions two approaches: a common ground strategy which 
allows all religions to coexist peacefully, and isolated religion into the private sphere, 
creating an ‘independent political ethic’. Since it is not suitable for today’s world, 
Taylor suggests a new secular approach based on the idea of ‘overlapping 
consensus’, developed by John Rawls, which requires all members of a society to 
build a real free ethic (pp. 33-38).  According to A Theory of Justice, developed by 
Rawls, the neutral state is given a basic solution which European states have recently 
attempted to apply. However, this was not sufficient to conclude the debate, since the 
neutrality of the state would push all religions into the private sphere and ignore 
people’s demands for their religion to be equally concerned with moral, social and 
political spheres (Haynes, 1998, p. 2). Jurgen Habermas (2008) argues that this is the 
shifting from secular societies to post-secular ones (pp. 17-29). As distinct from 
Habermas, Taylor avoids using the concept of “post-secularism”. However, he agrees 
with Habermas’ analysis of religion in the contemporary world. Taylor proposes a 
revisionist explanation of secularism by analyzing the borders of secularist 
assumptions.  
Both liberal-secular and postmodern/post-secular schools seem to verify a specific 
concept of what comes after secularism (Mandair and Dressler, 2011, p. 5). As it is 
stated by Habermas, secularism was a modus-Vivendi until the mid-twentieth 
century. There can be three reasons claimed as a reason for the raptures of neutral 
status of a secularist society. Among these are the growing numbers of religiously 
inspired conflicts and the increasing effect of religion on the building of both public 
opinion and private morality. Also significant for this thesis is the increasing number 
of immigrants with different cultural, traditional values, particularly in Europe. Post-
secular society is characterized by the “continued existence of religious communities 
in an increasingly secularized environment” (p. 63). Post-secular society has two 
important conclusions: secularization does not essentially lead to the weakening of 
religious effectiveness and the increasing religious significance does not jeopardize 
the secularization process. It does not mean that there is no tension between religion 
and the secular. The idea should be taken into account within the framework which 
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implies that neither religion nor the secular outweigh one another; both of them 
regard the other as an equal opponent. 
The third school focuses on genealogical and discursive deconstruction, taking its 
cue from Foucault (Mandair and Dressler, 2011, p. 5). According to Foucault’s 
genealogical analysis, there seems to be a strong suspicion of religion as a universal 
category. It means that there are no universal concepts of “religion” or the “secular” 
(Mandair and Dressler, 2011: 17). The third school also provides a general 
framework to this thesis analyzing religion and Europe. 
In fact, a state or an association can be secular. This means that religious ideas are 
privatized. That is to say, within a general framework, religion is publicly 
marginalized. However, the question of whether different religions can coexist under 
same foundation pushed one to think also about different lifestyles. Maybe, one of 
the most important questions about Turkey’s accession to the EU is that whether all 
citizens under the same union can live together. This can be analyzed with the 
concept of “religiosity” as well as “religion”. Religiosity refers to how religious an 
individual is (Wimberley, 1989, p. 126). Besides, a discussion on the possibility of 
different religiosities can live together in a secular based state is gaining importance, 
in condition that states responsible for religious freedom. 
Before moving to the next chapter, it can be useful to give a brief summary about 
chapters. For the purposes of the thesis, various subjects will be focused within five 
chapters including an introduction and a conclusion. The second chapter aims to 
provide information about an understanding of how western secular viewpoint 
interprets incontestable impact of religion to politics.  In the second chapter 
following introduction, the role of religion in contemporary politics is investigated 
with both current and dominant concepts. There is an increasing view that there is a 
global resurgence of religion. This issue will be analyzed to provide an 
understanding of how western thinkers interpret “religious phenomenon”. However, 
the fact that defended is that religion gained more visibility particularly with the 
effect of the globalization process and technological innovations. To enlighten the 
issue of religion during Turkey’s accession, Europe and place of religion within 
discussions occurring in contemporary politics are investigated under the heading of 
“the resurgence of religion in Europe.” Religion will also be analyzed as a tool of 
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power with a concept of “soft power” and its utilization of the state actors and the 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) in this chapter. 
The third chapter which is shaped by the purpose of providing a clear comprehension 
on  Europe, consists of three main parts. In the first part, a place of Islam in Europe 
will be expanded and following this, Europe will be focused in detail. Two things 
should be kept in mind. Firstly, the concept of “Europe” is historically loaded with 
several constructions of essentializing narratives “that the mere equivalence itself 
alerts us toward the possibility of yet another essentializations with references to 
history, culture, and geography”. Secondly, as a logical consequence of the previous 
one, “this equivalence pushes us toward deconstructing the various meaning(s) given 
to Europe under the rubric of the EU” (Düzgit and Keyman, 2007, p. 92). 
Furthermore, it is useful to know several definitions of current “Europe” to 
comprehend different interpretations of Turkey’s membership to the EU. Yet, whilst 
the objections are based on religious differences, there are some people who think 
that Turkey can be a member of the EU. In the first section of the chapter, the title of 
“The idea of Europe” is mainly based on Talal Asad’s perspective. Talal Asad (2002) 
argues that the inability to comprehend the Islam would be understood by looking 
into how the notion of Europe was conceptualized by the Europeans (p. 209). That is 
to say, the concept of Europe is analyzed considering the “selves” and “other”, what 
or who a European and non-European is. İslamoğlu (1995) points out that there is a 
discourse, whose roots can be traced back to Hegel, that is based on the duality of 
Europe and non-Europe, or more dramatically west (occident) and east (orient) (p. 
10). At this point, Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) also provides a noteworthy 
contribution to the thesis. In the second part of this chapter, the religious structure of 
the EU and state practices will be analyzed focusing whether it is possible to talk 
about a common EU structure regarding religion and if there is a common pattern 
which can be a model for a candidate state. The issue of religion will be analyzed 
under the skin of secularism. It is obvious that there is no single practices of 
secularism which can be offered to candidate states, although there is a secular 
sensibility in a common ground. There is no single, fixed state practices with regard 
to secularism. The common practice is that the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion are integral parts of the basic rights in the member states. Different practices 
of states on secularism will be analyzed with two approaches. First one is using the 
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concepts of “Judeo-Christian secularism” and “laicism” used by Elizabeth Shakman 
Hurd (2007). The second is using the concepts of “passive secularism” and “assertive 
secularism” employed by Ahmet T. Kuru (2009). These different concepts are 
practical to differentiate and group different state practices. While secularism refers a 
neutral status of state towards any religion, laicism refers state control on religion. 
Assertive secularism clarifies an active role of state on religion, passive secularism, 
on the contrary of assertive secularism, indicates a passive stance of state on religion. 
In the fourth chapter, Turkey’s accession to the EU is pursued in detail. Firstly, a 
brief history of accession process will be given taking notice of year 2002. There are 
two reasons behind this choice. The first one is that 2002 is the year in which the EC 
announced that the negotiations would start with Turkey for membership after a long 
accession period. The second reason for this decision is that 2002 is nearly a turning 
point in the history of modern Turkey. During this year, Justice and Development 
Party (JDP hereinafter)
2
 won the elections in Turkey and a relation between Turkey 
and the EU has reached the highest level during the accession period with the effect 
of changing foreign policy of Turkey around “Strategic Depth” doctrine. 
Nevertheless, Turkey’s current government JDP is a matter of debate both in the EU 
and Turkey. The EU is questioning if Turkey has adopted a religious tendency which 
might end in burning bridges with the West. Relations have reached a peak point in 
its history with the policies and tendencies of this government. However, its 
“conservative democracy” has been an issue of discussions. There is also a conflict 
between Kemalist laicism and JDP’s approach on secularism in Turkey itself. In 
domestic politics of Turkey, JDP has some conservative policies such as prohibition 
of alcohol under some conditions in the public sphere, besides it also has more 
freestanding policies than oppressive Kemalism, such as the issue of the religious 
headscarf which was allowed in public spheres by the JDP. The clash of the secular 
and the religious is not only occurring between Turkey and the EU, it is also an issue 
of ongoing discussions in Turkey itself. 
The second section of the fourth chapter, the place of Islam in Europe and its 
accordance with democracy will be discussed in detail main research question. The 
                                                 
 
2
 It is a political party which has formed government in Turkey since 2002.  Its original Turkish name is Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi (AK Parti) and was established in 2001 by founders who are known their Islamic background. It will be analyzed in 
detail in the fourth chapter. 
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main purpose of the third section is to question whether religion is an obstacle 
focusing on the relationship between religion and state in Turkey. The place of Islam 
in Turkey will be investigated with respect to political Islam, potential use of religion 
as a soft power in foreign policy, the Gülen movement as an influential international 
non-governmental actor and surely The Presidency of Religious Affair (hereinafter 
Diyanet). Yet, Turkey has a sui generis characteristic. It is not the only but also the 
first laic
3
 Muslim country. It cannot be identified neither as Judeo-Christian nor as an 
Arab-Islamic country. And describing JDP with basically Islamist identity would be 
partly correct but also deficient. One can claim both that Turkey with its post Islamist 
government, while adopting some conservative  policies, also is building its own 
hegemonic discourse; yet on the other hand, stands closer to Western liberal 
democracy in comparison with the Kemalist laicism. Actually, no one can say what 
the future of Turkey within JDP will be; then again, how honest would it be to 
picture Turkey totally out of the EU’s values? In the last section of the fourth 
chapter, it will be investigated if it is possible to provide a common ground between 
Turkey with a Muslim majority and the Christian characteristics of the EU through 
interfaith dialogue. 
Finally the thesis reaches a conclusion discussing a possibility of finding different 
way /or ways of various viewpoints to Turkey’s accession. The conclusion is that the 
idea that religious differences all by itself cannot be accepted as a main obstacle 
barricading to full membership of Turkey, despite the existence of different 
perceptions accumulated in a collective memory. It should be clarified that the main 
argument of the approach to “Europe” matter is based on the constructivist approach, 
since it underlines the changeable and multiple nature of identity question and the 
ability to interpret the role of religion between Turkey and the EU in a broader 
perspective. 
On the other hand, neither Turkey nor Europe can be considered with only their 
cultural identities. They cannot be regarded outside of the global market economy. 
As is known, the EU was built around both political and economic purposes. 
Nevertheless, JDP also owes its success not only to its founders’ background or 
closeness to Islamic values contrary to Kemalist view, but also for setting the course 
                                                 
 
3 I prefer to use the word “laic” for Turkey instead of “secular”. This is because, as it will be seen in the fourth chapter in depth 
analysis, religion has been under state control instead of only privatized one. 
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to the Europe and the global economy with liberal policies. Religion should be taught 
as one of the components of the interaction of many factors. However, such a 
discussion requires a broader analysis and out of the scope of the focal point of this 
thesis. In this thesis the main question endeavored to respond focuses on how 
religion constitutes an obstacle in Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
Finally, it should be remembered that there are some limitations of this thesis. First 
of all, the extent of the subject is a very comprehensive study field. Each heading and 
section such as the concept of Europe, the history of Europe, history of the EU, 
European identity, Islam as European “other”, secularism, religion, religion and 
politics, religion in Europe, religion in Turkey, the history of relations between 
Turkey and the EU, interfaith dialogue can be a research subject in different studies 
with broader analyzes. In this thesis, they were all tried to investigate sufficiently to 
enlighten the main question, if religion was an obstacle during Turkey’s accession to 
the EU. Secondly, perhaps the most important difficulty of such a thesis is that it 
would be difficult to say ultimate or universal truths for social sciences. Following a 
historical background in each section is helpful to conceive the ideas which lay the 
groundwork for the current fact or subject. Nonetheless, the idea that Turkey and the 
EU can relate each other despite of cultural differences merely stays as a suggestion 
or interpretation. Yet, it does not provide a formula for the future. Political history of 
the world is changing or re-shaping due to alternating conditions. Aside from various 
discussions on the future of the EU itself, the future of the relationship between 
Turkey and the EU and how Turkey will shape its foreign policy in the future, this 
thesis is written assuming the Turkey’s long-standing process to the EU will go on. 
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2. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY 
POLITICS  
This chapter has a special focus on the role of religion in contemporary politics. It can 
be regarded as a general framework aimed to enlighten the main question in a broader 
context, showing the current position of religion in politics, before going into a further 
investigation about Turkey and the EU.  
2.1 Religion and Secularism 
It is obvious that “last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the return of religion 
to the mainstream of political life” (Gözaydın, 2010, p. 1) in the age of globalization. 
Religion has been one of the most debatable and frequently emphasized elements of 
today’s politics, particularly after the 9/11 attacks. It is playing a progressive 
influential role, not only positive but also negative, in the public sphere on many 
different levels. On the one hand, there are many religiously inspired conflicts and 
reactions to religious movements. The crucial role which religion plays in the 
emergence of new political actors, which are mostly shaped by cultural factors, cannot 
be overlooked. On the other hand, religion is also seen as a potential means for 
peacemaking in contrast with its contribution to wars and conflicts. However, the 
increasing role of religion is not only limited with the motives of the new political 
actors. Religion provides several advantages for state and non-state actors. Faith-based 
diplomacy has become crucial. Religion is also being increasingly addressed by many 
countries as a soft power in international relations. Furthermore inter-religious 
dialogue is becoming an element of conflict resolution and diplomacy.  
Before discussing “religion” phenomena, one should argue that what religion is. It is 
extremely difficult to make a precise and comprehensive definition of religion. 
Scholars tend to agree that it is difficult and even impossible to provide an all-
embracing definition of religion which is compatible with all religions, because “there 
cannot be a universal definition of religion, because the definition is the historical 
product of discursive processes” (Asad, 1993, p. 29).  
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There can be several points around the religion concept which help describe what we 
are talking about instead offering a single meaning. Marty (2000) states that religion 
focuses on our “ultimate concern”, “builds communities”, “appeals to myths and 
symbolism”, “is enforced through rites and ceremonies” and “demands certain 
behavior from its adherents” (cited in Haynes, 2007, p. 11). When these features are 
taken into account, religion may be referred to as a system of beliefs and practices -
often but not necessarily related to a supreme being or beings, or to the supernatural 
and / or that which is sacred in a society –that is, ultimate beliefs and practices which 
are inviolable (Ibid, p. 12).  
Starting from this point of view, religion, within the scope of the thesis Christianity 
and Islam, can be thought a type of social experience that binds people together with a 
certain cultural context and it is attached in everyday life. It is also one of the 
components of identity.  
However, finding out effect of religion is more significant than identify religion for the 
purposes of the thesis. Religion can influence the world in two basic ways: “by what it 
says that relates to religious doctrine and theology and by what it does –social 
phenomenon and mark of identity, that works through a variety of modes of 
institutionalization, including church and state relations, civil society and political 
society” (Ibid., p. 12). While the latter is more prominent than the first one in politics, 
although what it does is generally based on what it says. In Turkey’s accession to the 
EU, it does go on to be a “barrier”.  
It is necessary to differentiate between religion at the individual and group levels. In 
the sense of politics, religion is often evaluated on the group level whose claims and 
arguments are very often to some degree political in spite of the existence of 
individual religious figures, such as Pope John Paul II (Ibid., p. 12). This 
differentiation pushed into consider the concept of “religiosity”. Religiosity simply 
refers how religious an individual is. At an individual level, individual religiosity is 
considered as “private”. However, the main focus of this thesis is religion at group 
level which is not in the scope of “private”. The group religiosity is a determinant of 
the main discussion that highlight (in) consistency of different religions -Christianity 
and Islam- , as it is “a matter of collective solidarities and of inter-group interactions. 
Sometimes this focuses on cooperation with other groups; sometimes on tension and 
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conflict, concerned either with shared or contested images of the sacred, or on cultural 
and class concerns” (Ibid, p. 12).  
Although religion specifically refers to Islam and Christianity in this thesis, at the 
same time “religion phenomenon”, which is under discussion in the contemporary 
politics, states much more than that with its diverse and dynamic effect on society. The 
influence of religion in politics is always changing. In this context, the interaction 
between religion and politics cannot be investigated without “secularism” which is 
“one of the most important organizing principles of modern politics” (Hurd, 2008, p. 
23), especially a research subject is Europe. 
Secularism can be defined as “the state or quality of being secular, the end result of a 
process of secularization” (Haynes, 2007, p. 9). Although analytic differences between 
secular, secularism and secularization at first blush as if not so clear, they all need to 
be revealed following the Talal Asad’s perspective. While secular is depicted as an 
epistemic category, secularism signifies a political doctrine (Asad, 2003, p. 1).  
Secularism is a concept which was much employed in Western social science with 
concepts like “worldly” and “temporal for a long time. It “is normatively characterized 
by both universalist pretensions and a claim to superiority over each and every set of 
religious ideas (Haynes, 2007, p. 9). Secularism, if it is a doctrine, “demands the 
placing of the ‘religious’ in the former by ‘the secular’ “ (Asad, 2003, p. 8). 
Secularism needs religious ideas to be publicly marginalized in order to rule 
ideologically and searches to do this “by marking out the domain of the ‘secular’, 
characterizing it with normatively desirable attributes, such as tolerance, common 
sense, justice, rational argument, the public interest and public authority” (Haynes, 
2007, p. 9).  
The concept religious and secular employed to identify secularism require a deeper 
analyze. In spite of usage as if they refer a certain opposition, there is a limitation 
between the religious and the secular, and this type of differentiation should be done 
with caution. Both religion and the secular are created historically; different concepts, 
practices and sensibilities brought together out of randomly improvement makes this 
possible; and the law is involved in describing and protecting the uniqueness of social 
spaces in modern society, especially the determination of a  legitimate space for 
religion (Asad, 2006, p. 209). Furthermore, secular, although being posterior to 
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religion, is not continuous with it and is not just a deviation from it. Therefore, the 
secular and religion are closely connected on the ideal level and in the way they have 
emerged historically (Asad, 2003, pp. 22-25). This mode of thought, not only recasts 
but also contributes to the contemporary discussion about “Muslims” living in Europe 
and the “Islamic threat” posed by Europe harm secular environment of European 
public life. In other words, it means that the dissidence ceaselessly investigated 
between Europe and Islam is cannot be explained with an incompatibility of secular 
and sacred values.  
Before going on to investigate secularism in detail, it is beneficial to separate spouse 
categories of it. The social construction of secularism has taken two distinct paths in 
international relations (IR): a laicist one and Judeo-Christian secularist one (Hurd, 
2008: 23). In the context of this thesis, it is beneficial to distinguish “secularism” and 
“laicism”. Both refer to the separation of the political and religious spheres and they 
have been evaluated with terms “public” and “private”. However, secularism is 
followed by a neutral approach of state institutions toward to  religion while laicism is 
followed by state will to intervene in and control religion or pursue active antireligious 
policies. Nevertheless, there is no strong or necessary dividing line between these two 
concepts, both are not mutually exclusive (Ibid., p. 23). 
In each state in the EU there is a consensus on “secular principle” and they can be 
evaluated with both Judeo-Christian secularism of French laicism. Nonetheless, each 
state has different attitudes even if they all secular. That is to say, there is no uniform 
secularism in European states. However, all states are responsible to provide freedom 
of religion, thought and belief and a neutral status of state to religion even if some of 
them has state church. To identify similarities and differences in various states, I will 
use Ahmet Kuru’s conceptualization in the following chapter. According to Ahmet T. 
Kuru, “in secular states, ideological struggles to shape state policies generally take 
place between two different notions of secularism” (2009, p. 11), which he calls 
“assertive secularism” and “passive secularism”. Passive secularism is such that the 
state plays a passive role by allowing the public visibility of religion. Assertive 
secularism defends the idea that the state plays an assertive role to exclude religion 
from the public sphere and relegate it to the private sphere. It should be noted that he 
uses the metaphor of a ‘swinging pendulum’ to identify the swaying shifts of state 
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relations to religion, which represents a change based on the balance of power between 
opposing ideologies (Ibid, p. 11). 
Secularism is a great transformation in the traditional relationship between politics and 
religion in parallel with a chain of events such as a development of liberal thought, 
capitalism and a formation of a modern state. The dominant political role of the 
Papacy and the Catholic Church in medieval Western Europe changed with the 
consequence of various events. The dominance of the Pope, who is the most 
influential political figure in Europe, was challenged with the rise of the Protestant 
Reformation movement in the sixteenth century. The serial excessive conflicts 
between Catholics and Protestants led to the limitation of papal political and religious 
domination, and open a new discussion about the relationship between religion and 
politics. A matter of the protection of religious minorities that had become the main 
victims during the religious wars in the Reformation, was one of the major issues in 
the political agenda of liberal thought. John Locke considered that freedom of 
religious belief to be one of the essential human rights whose protection formed the 
base of state legitimacy. And, during the Enlightenment, one of the main questions 
was related to state and church relations at the European level and with the 1789 
French Revolution. Firstly France, and following the other European states applied 
secularization policies (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 96). That is to say, the liberal doctrine 
held by the nation states requires equality, neutrality and liberty as basic principles at 
the national level. It means the states allow any religious practice as long as it does not 
intervene with the others basic rights of others. The state does not take one religion as 
a superior to another, likewise, the state does not foster the religious over the non-
religious (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 358). This historical narration reveals that theological-
political distinctions are European devices and secularism is presented as the ultimate 
point that all modern, civilized and developed societies should be reached through 
realizing necessary and sequent social and historical development. 
In light of the idea that there is an interrelation between modernity and secularization, 
the secularization theory also points out to describe the universalism of European 
modernity. Yet, an expected decline of religion could not be universal. It is peculiar to 
Western Europe. A belief that all world will do what Europe did was not tenable in all 
regions. There are three features of secularization which highlights the European 
progress of modernity: the differentiation (separation) of state and church, the 
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marginalization of religion to the private sphere, and the decline of religious beliefs 
and practices (Casanova, 1994: p. 211). And Bogdani (2011) adds up two others to 
these features: “religious tolerance, and that the state cannot use its power to impose 
religious beliefs on individuals” (p. 9). 
Nevertheless, there is not single secularism which only peculiar to Europe and/or 
universal. It is obvious today it can be seen that many different secular systems in 
different national, cultural or religious concepts and among them are non-western 
secularisms like the ones in India and Turkey (Göle, 2012, p. 11). However, much 
identification of modernity is divided from the Enlightenment, our reasoning will be 
that open to the new form that modernity is gaining today and we will be able to see it 
in another light” (Ibid., p. 41).  
Secularization has been a subject of an academic literature which often based on the 
linkage between decrease of the significance the role of religion and modernization 
since the nineteenth century. In the 1960s, some academicians, such as Bryan Wilson, 
Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger, contributed to prove “secularization theory”. 
The key idea behind the theory can be traced back to the Enlightenment: 
modernization leads to a decline in religion, both in society and in the minds of 
individuals (Bogdani, 2011: 10). The secularization theory stepped forward and in the 
following years, the struggle to develop and renew it continued with these 
publications, which have also discussed the decline of religion and marginalize it from 
the public sphere to the private sphere.  
There have been an increasing interest in the role of religion in political affairs due to 
several events, especially in the period following the end of the Cold War. 1979 The 
Iranian Revolution, rapidly growing nongovernmental organizations -especially faith 
based organizations- and exclusively 9/11 attacks, Madrid train bombings in 2004, 
London bombings in 2005 are just a few of these events. As a result of these 
“dramatic” events, attention has turned to religion in the social sciences and literature 
has begun to flourish once again since the 1980s, particularly after the 1990s. 
Beginning from the last decade of the twentieth century, the role of religion in politics 
has been increasingly re-examined; and the secularization theory has been criticized. 
Today, there is a growing consensus on the idea that religion is one of the most 
significant and debated elements of the IR. One can argue that explaining politics 
without any reference to religion is almost impossible. As Micklethwait and 
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Wooldridge (2009) underlines in their book: “If you want to understand the politics of 
this century, you cannot afford to ignore God, whether you believe to Him or not” 
(cited in Bogdani, 2011: 6).  
It should be noted that actually very few events are related to religion entirely. Many 
events are much more complex and they cannot be explained only by religion. 
Religion is not the primary factor in international relations; like other elements, it is 
one of the several significant variables (Fox and Sandler, 2004,  pp. 163-179). 
With the increasing visibility of religion, it has been debated that “the return of 
religious discussion” in the political realm. The increasing number of religious 
movements worldwide today, makes it clear that religion has never been missing from 
the modern world and if there is a mutual understanding on this subject, it would be 
that the argument which holds there is a process from religious to secular on an 
uninterrupted course will no longer be accepted (Asad, 2007, p. 11).  
Arguments which counter modernization-secularization theory can be separated into 
two categories. The first one is that religion has always been an effective element, but 
the “prominence of modernization-secularization theory has caused many social 
scientists to ignore this” (Fox, 2008, p. 20-21). Indeed, religion has always been an 
important element in almost every aspect of the world. But it had been overlooked by 
the social sciences for a long time, particularly in the period following the 
modernization process involving secularization, in which the theory claimed religion’s 
influence decreased, or moved from the public sphere to the private one. At this point, 
secularization and modernization theory becomes a controversial issue as a general 
framework of discussion about the role of religion in politics, which needs to be 
analyzed carefully.  
Secondly, an increasing role of religion takes these evolutionary arguments one step 
further, putting forward the idea that modernization contributes to the revival or 
resurrection of religion, rather than causing its demise. According to this idea, 
processes including urbanization, literacy, science, the increasing significance of legal 
and bureaucratic standards of behavior, etc. are displaying signs which modernization 
and secularization theory predicted, which is these processes have urged religious 
groups and institutions to evolve in order to defend themselves against these modern 
processes. Consequently, religion has been undergoing a revitalization process (Ibid., 
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p.21). This viewpoint, namely “the resurgence of religion”, is a polemical issue in 
contemporary politics and it is the focal point of next section. 
In today’s world, as it stated before, religion’s influence is not declining in accordance 
with the claims of secularization theory; on the contrary its social and political 
influence in some cases, is growing in many parts of the world (Haynes, 2007: 19). 
After a secularization theory has been questioned, some scholars create a new 
argument called as “de-secularization theory” instead of it in the academic literature 
with an assumption about a decline of religion seems peculiar to Western Europe, not 
universal. Thus, the European experiment is exceptional. Nevertheless, some authors 
like George Weigel, Jose Casanova, Timothy Byrnes and Grace Davie defends the 
idea that Europe is less exceptional than often thought as a result of certain factors 
such as increasing religious belief and the EU enlargement (Bogdani, 2011: 13-15). 
Besides, other scholars, such as Richard Falk and Peter Berger claim that the 
secularization theory must be revised. According to Falk (2007), secularization should 
be revised for humane global governance On the contrary, others say that the 
secularization theory has lost its analytic significance. Jeffrey K. Hadden (1987) 
claimed that the secularization theory are converted into a doctrine or an ideological 
dogma rather than an unquestioned statement or theory (p. 587). Jonathan Fox (2008) 
claims that both secularization and sacralization are occurring simultaneously; religion 
while changing, is not undergoing a change of depletion (p. 13). Further, Rodney Stark 
and Roger Finke (2000) claim that the secularization theory should be sunken into 
history (p. 79). Fox’s claims may be right for its reference, yet still is a little 
problematic in the terms and the standpoint. What referred here as sacralization seems 
to stem from a western secularist approach at least in terms of “language”. Besides, I 
think that  it would be unrealistic to expect to say goodbye to the secularization theory. 
Such a claim is not only unrealistic but is also defective, since secularism is still an 
influential key term particularly in Europe. Yet, western type secularism is not 
immanent reality. 
In addition to the secularization and de-secularization arguments, there has been a 
great deal of talk in recent years suggesting that the world entered a “post-secular” 
age.  Habermas (2008) asserts that there has been an alteration in political and social 
conditions as well as an alteration in ‘consciousness’ which characterizes a post-
secular society. “Post-secular” basically refers to the idea that the western type of 
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secularism has come to an end. Post-secular society is characterized by “the continued 
existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment” (p. 
63). This definition specifies two significant consequents. Firstly, secularization does 
not essentially lead to a decrease in religious influence. Secondly, growing religious 
significance does not endanger the secularization process. Still, it should not be 
thought that would be no tension between religion and the secular.  
As a result, many events are more complicated than they seem. It is true that 
secularization lost its power in some regions. Indeed, far from losing its significance, 
religion has become more prevalent. On the other hand, studies show that secularism 
has a significant place in the western European mindset. Consequently, it would be 
wrong to evaluate the historical events as progressive. For this reason, both secular or 
post-secular does not include all reality which includes a nested but various processes. 
2.2 Religion and Politics 
The role religion can be seen in various ways. Firstly, religion is a significant source 
of political legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to a general rule that you and/or your cause 
are legally valid which also means morally correct and one should support you and/or 
your cause or at least should not oppose. Thus, legitimacy may be a powerful factor 
for foreign policy makers which can be aimed at diverse audiences. On the one hand, 
it may be used as a means of persuasion imposed by policy makers from other 
countries. On the other hand, it may also be used to undermine the opposing policy 
makers from other countries by provoking the masses of their countries. Moreover, “it 
can help to mobilize support for policies within your own state, both among the 
population and other policy makers” (Fox and Sandler, 2006:35). 
Religion has been always effective fore in politics. As it stated, under the influence of 
modernization and particularly the secularization process, religion lost its former 
effect. Nevertheless, even in modern times, religion plays its part in some cases, as it 
supports or challenges the status quo. For example, it can be utilized to support war or 
peace in countries. In sum, “even those who believe that the world is becoming secular 
and religion is becoming irrelevant in modern times concede that in those times and 
places where religion is relevant, it can legitimate a wide range of institutions and 
activities” (Fox and Sandler, 2006: 36). Both domestic policy and foreign policy can 
be legitimized by religion. Besides, another indication of the legitimacy of religion 
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attached to religious leaders of the media and the policy makers. Pope John Paul II, 
Dalai Lama in Tibet, and Bishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa are just a few of them 
(Fox, 2001: 66). Fethullah Gülen is also one example of prominent religion-oriented 
non-state actors with his “Cemaat” influential chiefly in Turkey and some other 
countries with his institutions.  
The second influence of religion to politics is related to decision-making. That is to 
say, state policies can be altered by the religious views and beliefs of the assigned 
policy-makers. Religious belief systems can affect foreign policies in two ways. 
Firstly, these belief systems affects the manner of conduct and outlook of the policy-
makers. According to Fox (2001), the Arab-Israeli conflict can be given as an 
excellent demonstration of this statement. In this case, both sides claimed the same 
territory on the basis of religion -at least partial (p. 62). Secondly, religion directly 
affects the decision-making process occurs when policymakers are restrained by 
widely accepted beliefs of the population they represent. Even in autocratic 
governments, policy-makers may need to take beliefs, values or morals which are 
widely-held by their constituents into account (Ibid., p. 63). 
Thirdly, many local religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, 
might spread across borders and may well become international issues. There are 
various ways for religious issues cross borders in today’s world. For instance, local 
religious and ethno-religious conflicts frequently advance to an international scale 
through the diasporas or lobbies of the population living in other countries. These 
populations don't only play a role in supporting the revolting minority but they can 
also be inspired to rebel by external forces. The Albanian uprising in Kosovo against 
the Serbian government is a specific example of this case. The violence in Kosovo 
spread to numerous Albanian minorities near the Macedonia border. Ethnic Albanians 
were also supported by Albania, as well as the other numerous Islamic countries and 
organizations. The second way of religion crossing borders involves the increasing 
efficiency of fundamentalist movements worldwide. These movements frequently seek 
to break the barrier between religion and the state where such barriers exist, in 
addition to their efforts to export their movements elsewhere (Fox, 2001, p. 67-68).  
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The other way in which religion gains international attention is related to human rights 
issues and religious freedom. According to the statement in the Article 18 in the 
United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948
4
, religious 
beliefs should be respected. Similarly, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966
5
 prohibits religious discrimination. The UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious 
Belief of 1981
6
 guarantees more specific religious rights, including the rights of 
worship, assembly, and the right to maintain places for these purposes, the right to 
establish benevolent and humanitarian institutions, the right to make and/or elect 
religious leaders, freedom to observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays, and the 
right to have access to national and religious communities. Moreover, several 
international issues, such as women’s rights and world population control strategies 
may overlap with local religious views. In addition, the world is becoming more 
interdependent. Local issues and problems can easily spread across borders or at least 
be more likely to receive international attention in a world where countries and 
economically dependent on each other for survival. This fact is related specifically to 
globalization and technological innovations, including Internet and news network 
which allow any idea voiced including religious ones (Fox, 2001, pp. 69-70). 
Religion also can be used as a tool for peace building. In recent decades, religious 
actors have been playing an increasing role in peace-building. Until very recently, 
religion was regarded only as a threat to the secular international order. Yet, religious 
actors who made an attempt to resolve conflicts between conflicting groups and made 
an effort to build peace are often referred to as “religious peacemakers” or as “faith-
based organizations” in the literature (Haynes, 2007, p. 178). 
Additionally, transnational religions phenomena took place in the religion’s influence 
on the international system (Fox and Sandler, 2006: 165). Transnational interaction 
can be defined as “the movement of tangible or intangible items across state 
boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an international 
organization” (Katzenstein and Byrnes, 2006, p. 683). Although transnational religion 
turns out to be a rather complex category, and included within that category is a very 
                                                 
 
4 URL, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18 
5 URL, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx 
6 URL, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm 
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diverse set of political actors (Ibid., p. 684). And particularly the EU enlargement to 
the East brings “three transnational religions including Catholicism, the Orthodox 
Church and Islam into a mutual plane, in addition to bringing them into close contact 
with the European project” (Bogdani, 2011, p. 7).  
In the case of Turkey’s accession to the EU, religion crosses state borders and 
becomes a transnational issue. For instance, the EU evaluates religious issues in 
Turkey and particularly the ones related to the domestic politics in some ways, in 
regular progress reports published by the European Commission (EC). These reports 
make an assessment about the religion, specifying the issue as ‘freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion’ under the subtitle of “Human Rights and The Protection of 
Minorities”. 
Religion, which was not recognized as a crucial factor by a secular understanding of 
political thought for years argued as exiled from the modern constitution of 
international relations for a long time Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (2003). To 
comprehend various causes of this situation, it is necessary to look why religion was 
overlooked in politics. There are several statements on the rejection of the influential 
role of religion in politics, and these statements not only explain why religion has been 
neglected as an international relations factor, but also provide with a resourceful 
profile on the processes which have shaped Europe and its frame of mind since the 
academic field basically formed by the European experience. 
The reasons behind the rejection of religion are closely related with the Westphalian 
legacy. The predominant international legal system has guided by international politics 
that originated in Europe since the 17th century. It dates back to the Treaty of 
Westphalia of 1648, one of the milestones marking of the medieval from the modern 
period in European history. The Treaty was created and signed in Europe by Catholic 
and Protestant leaders following the last and most devastating of the great wars of 
religion (the Thirty Years War) that had been haunting Europe for more than a century 
prior to 1648. While the causes of the conflict are complex, its results were disastrous 
with huge numbers of civilian casualties, and massive destruction of property, not to 
mention famines and widespread disease. The result was the defeat of the medieval 
attitude which had sought to promote the common good and the overwhelming contest 
for individual domination, mostly asserted by religious actors. A revolutionary change 
in the way European States interacted led Europe to rise from the ashes of the war. As 
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a result, Westphalia treaties created the grounds for a self-regulating system of 
sovereign and legally equal nation-states in a way that never existed before. Since 
then, the reality of decentralized, isolated and scattered power has been regarded as the 
legitimate mode of organization, first for the European and then the global system 
(Haynes, 2007, pp. 107-108). According to the Westphalian presumption, “religion 
must be disciplined by the state – privatized, marginalized, and nationalized as a form 
of order and social cohesion, or religion must be overcome by a global or 
cosmopolitan ethic as the basis of international order” (Thomas, 2005, 54). But, 
ironically “the origin of the Westphalian state system can be traced back to religious 
roots, even if those roots include the desire to regulate religion” (Fox, 2008, p. 21).7 
Since the order established after the treaty, “religion’s significance for international 
relations appeared to decline significantly, linked to the development of politically 
centralized, increasingly secular states – initially in Western Europe and then via 
colonialism too much of the rest of the world” (Haynes, 2007, p.31). It is widely 
believed that modernization and secularization, as correlative processes, contributed 
the rejection of religion in politics. It was widely believed that the combination of 
simultaneous developments in secular modernization and the rise of science and 
rationality would put the heat on religious faith, which would lead in its decline and 
pave the way for decidedly secular polities and societies around the globe (Ibid., 32). 
Secular ideologies, rationalism and science are considered to be the sources of a better 
life in the Enlightenment. Positivism, naturalism and materialism are the essential 
grounds leading to the rejection of religion in international relations. Positivism 
promotes the scientific method to study natural sciences and the physical world to 
study social sciences.  According to this theory, the world is about unconscious 
particles which are in mechanistic interaction. And this theory supports the idea that 
any event can be explained by empirical observatism. According to this approach, 
human beings can be studied apart from the physical and social world (Thomas, 2005, 
pp. 60-62). 
The modernization processes include economic development, urbanization, pluralism, 
modern social institutions, growing rates of literacy and education, in addition to 
                                                 
 
7 For more information, see Philpott, 2000. In this study, the main question is if the roots of secularization can be traced back to 
the Westphalian legacy and the main question is what are the roots of Westphalia? However, most of the studies on the religious 
resurgence take an account westphalian legacy. 
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scientific and technological advances. While the modernization literature was inclined 
to concentrate on ethnicity, it was also meant to apply to religion. Western political 
scientists widely adopted the modernization theory starting from the late 50s through 
the mid 70s (Fox and Sandler, 2006, p. 10). 
The first assumption of modernization theory states that a modern society can be 
clearly distinguished from a traditional society, and perhaps from a society in the 
process of modernization through economic development. And the second assumption 
is that modernization is conceived to be a linear, progressive conception of social 
change (Thomas, 2005,  p. 51).  
In this discussion on reasons how religion is overlooked in an academic field, 
secularization cannot be overlooked. Although it stated above, it needs to made 
unveiled more. Secularization denotes a decline in the influence of religion that 
assumed a secondary role under the impact of rational, secular and scientific criteria 
which have replaced religion. However, it is difficult to define secularization in a 
proper way. There is a lot of debate on secularization’s definition and the question of 
how much decline in religion constitutes secularization is controversial for those who 
support or describe this body of theory (Fox, 2001, p. 12). On the one hand, 
secularization is defined as the decline of religion at individual level which means that 
people are becoming less religious. On the other hand, secularization is defined as the 
decline in the influence of religion in the public sphere. In fact, these arguments face 
with a question stating that how much decline can end up with secularization. Besides, 
focusing only the West draws heavy criticism. While it is arguable that religion had 
declined in the West, it is rather difficult to make the same statement for the rest of the 
world (Fox, 2001, pp. 24-26). 
Similarly, Rodney Stark (1999) emphasizes some common points of different versions 
of the secularization theory. For example, there is an accord on the idea which states 
that modernization is the main driving force for the disappearance of religion. It 
asserts that the secularization doctrine has developed within the framework of 
modernization theories. Another point is that, it is usually suggested that the most 
important aspect of modernization that lead to the disappearance religion to 
disappearance is science. Secularization is also been as irreversible and universal 
although most of the discussions focus only on Christianity (pp. 249-273). 
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To enlighten a current situation of religion, “the global resurgence of religion” will be 
investigated. 
2.3 “The Global Resurgence of Religion” in World Politics 
Religion “is now back on the agenda of the political commentator” (Bruce, 2003, p. 2). 
Due to several events such as many religious disputes in the Middle East, North Africa 
and South Asia, The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the rise of Solidarity and the Polish 
Revolution, September 11 attacks in the United States of America Following the end 
of the Cold War, the role of Catholicism in the Sandinista revolution, and in the other 
political conflicts throughout Latin America, it seemed that religion cannot be ignored 
in the public sphere anymore. The return of religion to the political scene, as Haynes 
(2007) defined, is “something totally unexpected”: a near-global religious resurgence 
with important ramifications for international relations (p. 19). 
One can claim that it is “a renaissance of religious tradition” which is happening right 
now and across the globe (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2003, p. 107). Religion, 
however, has always been one the significant element throughout centuries. Under the 
effect of globalization and shifting social and political conditions, it became more 
visibility. This situation is interpreted as “the global resurgence of religion” by some 
scholars in contemporary politics (Thomas 2005; Johnston and Cox, 2003; Petito and 
Hatzopoulos, 2003; Haynes, 2007; Gopin, 2009; Chaplin and Joustra, 2010). In this 
context, the global resurgence of religion can be identified as the growing salience  
and persuasiveness of religion, which is also observable through the growing role of 
religious groups and individuals, non-state organizations, political parties with 
religious beliefs, practices and discourses in both personal and social life (Thomas, 
2005, pp. 21-45). 
The resurgence of religion is interpreted as a result of the failure of modernization by 
some scholars. Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) emphasizes the failure of modern secular 
ideologies. The resurgence of religion originates in the failure of modern secular 
ideologies like socialism, liberalism and fascism. Furthermore, the governments can 
be accused of being puppets of the west. This situation led to a crisis of legitimacy for 
these secular ideologies and gave way to the revitalization of religion. To summarize, 
a religious resurgence is a part of a greater crisis of modernity (Rinehart, 2004, p. 
273). It can be stated that the global resurgence of religion in developing countries can 
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be seen as a ‘revolt’ against the West. Consequently, a new era has begun in the 
politics of developing countries, which is “to indigenous modernity rather than to 
modernize traditional societies” (Thomas, 2003, p. 22). It underlines the resurgence of 
religion is an outcome of the failure of the modernizing and secularizing states which 
were supposed to establish a democracy in the Third World.  
In this sense, the resurgence of religion is identified on a global scale, since it is not 
limited to a specific region. Derrida (2002) considers the return of religion as the 
spreading of a multifaceted and over-determined incident;  and it is not a simple return 
because of its globality and unrivaled figures (p. 78). Moreover, the return of religion 
is directly related to the technological transformation and the intersection of cultures, 
societies, nations, and tokens of communication and exchange (Raschke, 2005, p. 13). 
New technological developments, including developed communication systems which 
eliminate the time-space limitations, newborn industries and inventions, and also 
societal and cultural interdependence, are all related to globalization. The current 
position of religion is altered due to the effects of these factors.    
There are some prominent points which need to be taken into account. The global 
resurgence of religion does not mean that religion is a new factor. After the 
Westphalian Settlement, the international system has been considered as an altogether 
secular system. As Philpott (2002) underlines, Westphalia was “a structure of political 
authority that was forged centuries ago by a sharply secularizing set of events and that 
has endured in its secular guise ever since” (p. 67). For this reason, religion has not 
been taken as an important element. Although the religion’s influence is prevalent not 
only in the political sphere but also in private and social spheres, it took religion a time 
to get back into the literature again. With the increasing intensity of religious 
movements, the perspective in which religion was interpreted also has changed. An 
empirical approach to the global resurgence of religion cannot be separated from a 
theoretical approach. It means that religion has always been a part of politics, because 
the concerns of religions are fateful echoes of what it means to be human. Scott 
Thomas (2005) states that a  social scientists are looking into the same phenomenon 
but with a different perspective, because they have taken off the kind of ideological 
blinders (p. 27-28).  
The turning point of the global resurgence of religion is usually related to Islamist 
movements. However, it should be noted that the chain of events called the global 
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resurgence of religion comprises not only Islamic movements but also Judaism, 
Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. The rediscovery of the divine is seen even in 
the Western scientific and intellectual circles (Ahmed, 2005: pp. 103-118). There have 
been many instances of militant Hinduism in officially secular India. Jewish religious 
parties currently serve in the government in Israel, while the Catholic Church has been 
a leading actor in the wake of democracy in Spain, Poland and in Latin America. In 
sum, there are various examples of religion’s involvement in politics in various parts 
of the globe (Haynes, 2006). Yet, the most important contemporary religious revivals 
are the Islamic and the Evangelical ones. Islamic fundamentalism is better defined 
since it has more obvious political implications and vast geographical scale (p. 4). 
Islamist movements are not the only, but surely the most prevalent of all compared to 
the others. 
Whilst to know this discussion is necessary to understand the contemporary politics, it 
should be investigate keeping in mind that there are some problematic in the idea of 
“the global resurgence of religion”. One critique of the global resurgence of religion 
made by Jeffrey Haynes is noteworthy. If there is a global resurgence, there is also a 
need to explain the concept of religion. Not only editors but also contributors seek for 
a sound definition of religion. That is because if there is no agreement on what is 
understood by this key term, how can we be a certain that all the contributors are 
talking about the same thing, understanding in the same way (p. 538). With this 
regard, it could be said that ‘the resurgence of religion’ is usually apprehended with 
reference to a secularist way of thinking which underlines the threat of religion’s 
spread into the public spheres. European secularist assumptions are the basis of the 
dominant understanding of religious resurgence It is employed to refer to activities, 
movements, and processes that challenge the authoritative secularist settlement of the 
relationship metaphysics, politics and state power (Hurd, 2008, p. 135). 
Jeffrey Haynes (2006) holds an all-inclusive historical analysis rather than taking 
particular events to account. That is convenient regarding the idea that the return of 
religion did not become evident suddenly. According to him four phases can be 
identified in the period starting from 1945, taking the Second World War as a 
milestone. The first phase is the two decades after the end of the war in which religion 
was used in anti-colonial struggles and in the service of indigenous nationalists in 
some countries such as Algeria and Indonesia (pp. 539-541). In this phase we observe 
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another transformation: from decolonization to new born states. As Piscatori (1986) 
underlines this period, after the decolonization period, the natives of these new states 
found themselves in an atmosphere in which governments were trying to modernize 
their societies along Western lines (pp. 22-39). However, such modernization did not 
occur right after the end of decolonization. Ernest Gellner (1992) emphasized that 
since the colonial period, developing countries have faced a dilemma: whether to 
follow the example of the West and refuse their culture to gain power, or to affirm 
their own religious and cultural traditions but remain materially weak (p. 1-40). 
Furthermore, the modernization efforts of these states mostly failed to maintain 
economic development and democracy (Thomas, 2005, p. 40-41).  
The second phase is in the late 1960s and 1970s which witnessed a period of conflict 
between Israel and Palestine and the Iranian Revolution (Haynes, 2005, p. 539-541). 
In addition to these events, the defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 war with 
Israel can be given examples  (Piscatori, 2005, pp. 22-39). In fact, religion has not 
been a sole reason for the Arab-Israeli conflict, just one of them. The government lost 
its credibility as a result of economic failure and political repression. And people 
praised other leaders and institutions. Therefore ethnicity and religion became more 
prominent (Rinehart, 2004, pp. 271-274). For many Muslims, Islam has been the 
alternative solution of the social and economic problems of Muslim society due to the 
failure of modernization. As a result of this idea, Khomeini led a successful Islamic 
revolution in Iran and Islamic fundamentalists gained prestige (Marguilles, 2006: pp. 
8-20). 
The first two phases took place in the period of the Cold War which was a competition 
of two secular ideologies: liberalism and communism. Although religion was brought 
back into the literature of international relations in the late 1980s, it was already an 
important element of foreign policies and international affairs. For example, in this 
period, the US supported or manipulated religious movements in the Middle East and 
Central Asia against the Soviet Union. Therefore, it would be fair to say that religion 
was an important element at that time, but that international relations did not regard it 
as a significant almost all academic fields of politics. 
Finally, the fourth phase was started with the September 11 attacks and the subsequent 
US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Haynes, 2005: 541). As Philpott (2002) 
underlines, the September 11 attacks brought the notion of religion -which scholars 
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had not paid much attention before- to the agenda of international relations are most 
recent and probably the most dramatic of the momentous events (66-67). The 
influence of religion is more prominent since the fourth phase was started.  
Consequently, in contrast to the western secular assumptions, religion is prevalent, 
moreover it is an influential factor in many aspects of life. With the recent 
technological advancements and the globalization process, the scope of religion has 
been increased rather than being reduced.  Yet, addressing this chain of events as a 
‘global resurgence’ would only be possible from a Western secularist perspective. The 
fact is that, nothing has developed in a linear way in history and relations between 
politics and religion cannot be interpreted with an idea based on as if there is a linear 
process.  
2.4 The Resurgence of Religion in European Politics  
Mirela Bogdani (2011) explains the subject of religion and politics under three 
headings. In addition to the general impact of religion on politics and the revival of 
religious discussion in world politics, she brings up another topic: the return of 
religious discussion in European politics (p. 1). Actually, in accordance with our 
study, Bogdani’s perspective must be analyzed for a better understanding of the role of 
religion in Europe.  
There are three main factors that explain the return of religious discourse in European 
politics. The first is an increasing number of Muslim population in Western Europe, 
and the challenges associated with this growing number. The second factor is the 
emergence of two independent countries, Bosnia and Kosovo, in Eastern Europe and 
their predominantly Muslim population and Turkey’s accession to the European 
Union. And the last one is that the resurgence of religion in European politics plays a 
part in the expansion process of the EU towards the East (Bogdani, 2011, p. 6).   
Wilfred Spohn (2009) also specifies three interrelated reasons to examine the 
debatable role of religion in Europe focusing on the period starting from 1989.  First, 
following the collapse of communism and the reunion of separated Europe, the 
enclosing cultural and structural pluralism of the European civilization motivated by 
different forms of religion and secularization patterns resulted in commutable impacts 
on nations, state, ethnic groups, and related collective identities. Second, European 
 32 
societies have gained a more multicultural and religiously more disparate structure due 
to the increasing international migration (pp. 358-359). 
In fact, the 9/11 attacks have had a worldwide impact on the discussion of religion. 
And in the following years, religion has become a focal point: Europe faced various 
Islam oriented events and controversies. New religious movements, Pim Fortuyn and 
Theo Van Gogh assassinations in the Netherlands, the publication of Danish cartoons, 
France’s burqa ban, London and Madrid bombings and of course an accession of 
Turkey to the EU  are just a few significant instances which would show Islam’s 
effects in Europe’s social and political atmosphere. Religion, which was once seen as 
marginalized in European politics, is now playing an important role in one of the most 
central political processes of modern European life (Katzenstein and Byrnes, 2006: 
679). 
As it seems, the global resurgence of religion in Europe is mainly associated with 
Islam and the Muslim population in Europe, that is significant to be familiar with the 
objections in the EU to the Turkey’s full membership. The Eurocentric point of view 
signifies that the integration problem of Muslim immigrants mainly originates from 
their religion’s interaction with the public realms and their rigid values which also lead 
to violence, intolerance and unease in European political and social domains. Religion 
has been regarded as the reason for violence and this was exactly how Islam became 
introduced to Western civilization. Again, specialists on “Islam”, “the Modern World” 
and “political philosophy” have been dressing the Islamic World down to its inability 
to adopt secularization and to take part in the modernization. It is clear that violence 
does not need any recognition provided by the Quran or any other holy book. It just 
did not need one when 30-40 thousand civilians were slaughtered in the rebellious city 
of Hama in 1982 at the direction of Hafız El Asad the secular president of Syria. It 
also stands for the Saddam Hussein’s poison gas attack on the Kurdish population and 
the Dujail massacre which led to thousands of civilian deaths. Western or not, no 
government or opposition needed the support or the justification from a holy book 
when civilians were attacked. Although, they have addressed the holy book in some 
cases where it serves the purpose, it still does not mean they had to do so (Asad, 2007, 
p. 22). 
In addition to all discussion, explaining the role of religion without any reference 
various concepts is even impossible. Two significant concepts which are used to refer 
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to the role of religion in politics both worldwide and in Europe: fundamentalism and 
Political Islam. A discussion about the role of religion in politics -international 
implications of religion, particularly with the scope of the EU and Turkey- cannot be 
completed without any reference to Political Islam (Fox, 2001, p. 70). There is an 
increasing emphasis on the concept of Political Islam. This brings up a specific 
question: What is the meaning of Political Islam? Political Islam is defined as “a form 
of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue 
political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by 
imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented 
concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition” (Denoeux, 2002, p. 61). 
The second concept which is important to describe religion and politics is 
fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is a sort of passionate religious movement and the 
desire to return to traditional sources of religious authority. In Islam, it aims to restore 
not only the Islamic beliefs, but also the Islamic lifestyles, which in many ways 
contradict modern ideas, including the boundaries between religion and the state, the 
role of women and moral codes of everyday behavior (Bogdani, 2011, p. 4). After all, 
fundamentalist events, if they are fundamentalist, are occurring in the world and are 
particularly overwhelming Europe. However, evaluating a secular country with a 
major Muslim population down by the fear of Islamic fundamentalism does not sound 
realistic. The government in Turkey is formed by Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP, hereinafter JDP),  known for its Islamist 
background yet holding close contact with the EU and making progress with the 
accession process. Therefore, several accord processes held nationally can be seen as 
an effort to take place in the Union rather than an “expansionist” fundamentalism. 
Even if there has been no close relations between Turkey and the EU in the last years 
and Turkey has started to evaluate with its “soft power”, it is clear that, at least now, 
fundamentalism is not convenient to interpret Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
After all investigations pursued above, the role of religion in contemporary politics 
will be more detailed around one of the current terms “soft power”. Today’s politics 
not only includes state to state interactions, but also non-state actors are becoming an 
effective with their influence in the political realm. Thus, soft power and religious 
actors will be examined in the next section before going to the third chapter. 
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2.5 Religion as a Soft Power and Religious Actors  
Power is one of the most significant and inseparable concepts in politics. Max Weber 
(1964) defines power as the opportunity or a chance –whatever the opportunity is 
based on-  to achieve one’s own will within in a social relationship against resistance 
of others as well (p. 152). Power concept is influenced by a realist school of politics. 
Hans Morgenthau (1960), an outstanding defender of what is now called as classical 
realism, clarifies that “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power” 
(p. 5). Power, cannot be thought without realist school’s opinions, however this school 
takes into an account just one dimension of power that is military and/or economic 
power. However, this is not enough to interpret current affairs. Today, there are many 
non state actors and religion is regarded as a kind of power. 
As a further analyze on power is beyond a scope of this thesis, related concepts to the 
thesis will be given in a shorter definitions. While hard power implies a form of power 
that adopted by states in order to maintain their political purposes by means of force, 
coercion, threat or military intervention, soft power is “the capability of an entity -
usually but not necessarily a government- to control what others do through attraction 
and persuasion” (Haynes, 2009: p. 296).  
The concept was pronounced in 1990 by Joseph Nye who sees religion as a persuasive 
power in foreign policy and international relations reserved for same-faith parties 
mentioning that utilizing religion as a soft power would have consequences depending 
on the person in charge of it (Gözaydın, 2010: 1). In Nye’s own words, “the coming 
century may see continued American preeminence, but the sources of power in world 
politics are likely to undergo major changes that will create new difficulties for all 
countries in achieving their goals (Nye, 1990: 155). According to Nye, the alterations 
in the nature of power that can be monitored in its general distribution, the alterations 
in the instruments and strategies of power and the complexity in world politics due to 
the emergence of new non-state actors and the new climate in accordance with this 
new complicated and interdependent structure resulted in less transferable, less 
coercive and less tangible dynamics of power.  
Thomas (2005) also argues that religion can become a form of soft power in the 
service of states and non-state actors in international relations if the intangible 
elements of power –which are contrary to hard power involving military and economic 
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power- can be put into use (p. 110). Religious groups attract others utilizing religion as 
a soft power. 
It is needed to identify who and/or what religious actors are in order to bring a clear 
understanding about the role of religion in international relations in politics. In 
addition to religion itself, religious actors, which are being analyzed with growing 
interest, are other overlooked elements in international relations. There are now 
religious actors in international relations, with various concerns that go beyond a 
narrow focus on religious fundamentalism and anti-modernism. On one hand, some 
encourage cooperation, for instance interreligious dialogue and greater religious 
engagement step forward in international development and conflict resolution. On the 
other hand, the rest is more concerned with competition, and occasionally with 
conflict, against both the other religious traditions and the other secular actors 
(Haynes, 2007, p. 33). They are divided into two main categories: state-related 
religious actors, and non-state religious actors. State-related religious actors are 
identified by Haynes in the following manner: 
State-related religious actors are while practically in close contact with governments, 
conceptually they are very distinct from it. The USA, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the 
paragons of this notion, while other governments like Israel or Palestinian National Authority 
at various times also have been influenced by religious actors. It is inevitable that when a 
government has foreign policies which are influenced by religious concerns to a great extent, 
it implies that significant domestic religious actors are able to influence that country’s 
international relations. (Ibid., p. 34). 
Non-state religious actors of various kinds comprise the second category. It is widely 
recognized that a range of non-state actors affect international relations, and it is 
possible through recognizing religious organizations or groups as one of non-state 
actors (Thomas, 2005: 98). There are many non-state religious actors defined as 
religious movements or individuals drawing on religious traditions which are active in 
international relations. They may meet each other as faith traditions in their concern 
with various global issues, including conflict resolution and human development; or in 
ways which are more characterized by competition or conflict (Haynes, 2007: 34). 
These actors can cross borders and are under the effect of globalization within many 
countries. Non-state religious actors were classified under three groups by Thomas 
(2005): sub-state religious actors, transnational religious actors and intergovernmental 
religious organizations. Sub-state religious actors include voluntary, non-
governmental and non-profit organizations. Many religious sub-state actors delineate 
to larger, formal, multi-purpose umbrella organizations which represent sects or 
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nationwide religious institutions, and constitute a major type of religious sub-state 
actor (p. 99). Some examples are, ‘The American Hindu Federation’, ‘The National 
Association of Evangelicals in the United States’, ‘The French Protestant Federation’. 
According to Thomas (2005), sub-state or sub-national actors act as pressure groups or 
domestic interest groups which will seek to influence a state’s foreign or domestic 
policies (p. 99).  
The second category of non-state actors is transnational actors which include profit 
and non-profit organizations as well as international non-governmental organizations, 
namely religious international non-governmental organizations. Transnational 
relations can be defined as the regular contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state 
boundaries by a variety of non-state actors that are not controlled by the states, or by 
foreign policy organs of governments, or by an international organization even though 
they are a part of international relations. And a religious transnational 
nongovernmental organizations can differ from the secular one because of “its mission 
statement explicitly refers to religious faith as a motivation for its work” (Thomas, 
2005: 101). At this point, the concept of transnational civil society cannot be ignored. 
This concept challenges the concept that states are always the sovereign economic and 
political actors in both domestic and international contexts (Haynes, 2007: 46) under 
the influence of globalization.  
The third category involves intergovernmental organizations or international 
organizations, such as The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
United Nations. The European Union and the Arab League are other instances of this 
category having a limited domain in a particular part of the world. They also “may 
have a sector rather than general interest, such as the global economy (WTO) or the 
security interests of military alliances (NATO)” (Thomas, 2005, p. 104). However, it 
is difficult to find any international organization which is based on religious values. 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference is a significant religious 
intergovernmental organization (Thomas, 2005: 104). 
In the scope of the thesis, “soft power” will provide a useful framework to clarify the 
role of religion in Turkey which led to a discussion in the way of its accession to the 
EU. Turkey has started to evaluate with soft power, as it is not an exception to 
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developments in international relations (Gözaydın, 2010, p. 2). Religion is used as a 
soft power at the state affairs level, via its state agencies and also the Diyanet
8
. 
Diyanet is also influential in various European countries in different immigrant 
organizations, namely the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation. Nevertheless, the 
administration also gets represented in as the councilors of religious services 
connected to the Turkish Embassies, and as the attachés of religious services 
connected to the Consulates General. The counselors of religious services are situated 
in European countries namely, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, 
Macedonia, and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Attacheships are found in 
Germany (Berlin, Düsseldorf, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, Cologne, 
Karlsruhe, Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Münster, Mainz), the Netherlands 
(Deventer), France (Lyon), and Romania (Constanta). In the European context, among 
the Diyanet’s activities are supported for mosque relations and spreading its own 
interpretation of Islamic knowledge in competition with some other Turkey-based 
religious groups like Süleymancılar (a religious group formed by students/followers of 
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (Gözaydın, 2010: 3). Gözaydın also unfolds the functions of 
Diyanet as follows: “The president also has been running various projects to help 
establish a firm and lasting peace between Muslims and other religious groups, based 
on common values and principles. So the presidency cherishes a firm belief in the 
natural prospect of the alliance of civilizations and human beings on the grounds of 
those common values and ideals” (Gözaydın, 2010, p. 3). 
In addition to state-related religious actors, there are non-state religious actors 
(nongovernmental organizations –NGOs) which are influential in Europe. Particularly, 
Fethullah Gülen who is the leader of a powerful community (Cemaat) of religious 
activists and his movement is known as the ‘Gülen movement’9 (p. 3). A brief 
information about Diyanet and Gülen movement can be regarded as an introduction to 
look them with a soft power concept and they will be analyzed in detail in the fourth 
chapter. 
                                                 
 
8 Established in 1924 as a unit of the secular state with the objective of handling religious affairs, Diyanet have been one of the 
most controversial foundations in Turkey. It will be discussed in the last chapter while analysing the religious structure of 
Turkey. For detailed information see Gözaydın 2008a; Gözaydın 2008b; Gözaydın 2009. 
 
9 I will study the Gülen movement at the last chapter on Turkey and the inter-faith dialogue in detail. Yet it is important to note 
that Gülen movement is a significant Turkey-based NGO. 
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The main question of the thesis is based on whether religion is an obstacle. 
Particularly after the enlargement process, under the “religious difference” debates, it 
started to be discussed that how the EU will (re) shaped pushed people to think about 
“Europe” and its borders, components of the European identity and religion. For this 
reason, in the following chapter, Europe and a common understanding of the EU 
member states on religion with regarding secularism will be focused before analyzing 
the role of religion in Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
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3. ON EUROPE 
This chapter aims to investigate European side, including three sections. In the first 
part, “Islam in Europe”, which can be regarded as an expanded introduction to the 
main discussion, will pursue whether religion is an obstacle. Following, Europe and 
religion in the EU will be focused. 
3.1 Islam in Europe: Is it an Obstacle?  
A current discussions on Islam will be looked in this section in order to comprehend 
anti-Islamism in Europe. Islam, with its relation to Europe’s current domestic and 
international concerns, focuses on the following issues; the impact of globalization 
on the religious, political and social position of Europe’s Muslim minorities since 
Islam is a significant base of identity, the fear inherent in Europeans of Islamic 
extremism which has increased particularly after the 9/11 and Muslim Turkey’s bid 
to join the European Union with its 70 million, mostly Muslim, population (Haynes, 
2007, p. 268).  
First of all, the presentation of Islam in the mass media is a weighty matter. Talal 
Asad (2003) argues that it is obvious that the European media misrepresents the 
Muslim people and the Muslim minorities have been treated unfairly and with 
prejudice (p. 159). It is clear that there is a significant interaction between religion 
and media. Such as most aspects of our lives, religion is also on-line with the media. 
Religion somehow engaged in and contributes to the extinguished force of a ‘radical 
abstraction’ but also marks the ‘tele-technological transcendence’ of a méechané that 
creates a virtual, cyber space-time which introduces the realm of the televisual and 
digital to religion (De Vries, 1999, p. 16).  Moreover, the relationship between 
religion and media provides an insight on the paradox of the ever more sophisticated 
negotiation between the private and public sphere. For this reason, contemporary 
studies can be criticized due to the rise of the new media that brushed aside in the 
revival of religion. In other words, the synchronic increase in new media 
 40 
technologies and their relation with religion and religion’s return as a political factor 
have been ignored.  
The debates on Islam in Europe certainly arise from the Eastward enlargement of the 
EU and in particular, Turkey’s accession to the EU. Indeed, the social and religious 
factors constitute the essential part of the European opposition (Hurd, 2008: 84). It is 
widely assumed that Turkey is out of the picture when Christian cultural heritage is 
the case.  
Mirela Bogdani (2011) suggests five potential factors causing European opposition 
towards Turkey; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism worldwide and its effects on 
Europe, the increasing Muslim population in the Western Europe, fear of the 
Islamization of Europe, along with a country of 70 million Muslims becomes a part 
of the EU, and Political Islam as a part of Turkey’s mainstream politics. 
There is no doubt that Turkey is a large country with a large population, and 
accompanied with its Muslim identity, this poses a problem. The question of Kosovo 
(almost 90 percent of the population is Muslim) should be given to candidate status, 
and Macedonia’s (25 per cent of the population is Muslim) ongoing candidacy 
process have been considered in terms of religion. Other examples of this are the 
potential candidates, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, there is no strong 
opposition based on religion, although these countries have a significant rate of  
Muslim population (Bogdani, 2011, p. 147). Therefore, it is clear that the oppositions 
originate from the fact that Turkey is a large country and it will have a voice or at 
least a vote in case of membership.  
Primarily, the Muslim presence in Europe certainly is an important reference point 
for the discussion based on religion in Europe. Maréchal (2003) distinguishes two 
types of Muslim presence in Europe, one being the Muslims that have migrated to 
Europe in the past thousand years and the other, the worker migrations of the 1960s 
(p. xvii). The first type of Muslim presence requires a deep investigation into the 
history and therefore will not be discussed in this study. Yet, it is important to note 
that the historical Turkish threat was not towards Europe, but was towards 
Christianity; for it cannot be imagined a Europe without Christianity back then 
(Asad, 2003, p. 163). It is important because, neither modern Turkey nor Europe and 
also their interactions originate from the 20
th
 century. Both Turkey and Europe and 
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also their interactions have a history. To illustrate, according to Grace Davie (2000), 
what happens now is the memories imprinted in European’s mind (p. 162). Similarly, 
Katzenstein and Byrnes (2006) emphasize that the accession of a Muslim country 
like Turkey to the European Union is derived from historical memories of the great 
battles that took place over European religious and cultural identity. It is perhaps no 
accident that opposition to Turkish accession to the EU is strongest in Vienna (pp. 
687-688). 
The second type of Muslim presence is related to Turkish labor migration to Western 
European countries started in the late 1950s and early 1960s and continued in the 
form of family unification (Küçükcan, 2007, p. 86). Austria, Belgium, Britain, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Romania and Spain are the primary countries which received labor 
migration. And Islam is usually associated with communities of fairly recent 
immigrant origin. Muslim immigration largely occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, in a 
time of tension between Muslims and the West due to Iran’s revolution and the 
European economic recession. Muslim numbers have continued to increase as a 
result of childbirths in recent years. Over time, many Muslims, especially second 
generation immigrants, have become politicized under the influence of globalization 
(Haynes, 2007, p. 271). “The ‘old’ Europe is being transformed by its encounter with 
contemporary Islam – an Islam that is re-appropriated, interpreted, and revitalized in 
political and cultural terms by a new generation of Muslim actors” (Göle, 2005, p. 
140). 
It is clear that Muslims are living in many European countries. While there are 
economic relations between Muslim and European countries, the presence of 
Muslims in Europe still proves polemical. Frankly, as stated by Asad (2003), 
“Muslims are clearly present in a secular Europe and yet in an important sense absent 
from it” (p. 159). On the one hand,  there are no fixed values or an established 
system to make it happen but a transforming texture due to the entrance of new 
actors, groups, and idioms on the public scene. On the other hand, both French 
Republicanism and Dutch multiculturalism, as two different forms of integration, fall 
short of providing a successful frame for reconsidering Islamic difference in 
European democracies. 
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Another important issue to be discussed in order to comprehend Islam in Europe is 
the impact of Islamic fundamentalism and globalization in Europe. The intrusion of 
various international events and concerns into the domestic scenes of many European 
countries –including the issue of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ following Iran’s 1979 
revolution is a result of the media reporting international issues in greater depth than 
before in a globalizing world (Haynes, 2007, p. 273). In addition to fundamentalism 
debate, “we define globalization as a convergence between once divided parts of the 
world, and one of the characteristics of today’s encounter between Islam and Europe 
is that it is built on the global communication networks”(Göle, 2005, p. 13). It can be 
argued that Islam and Islamic fundamentalism have replaced the former threats to 
western societies, fascism and communism, with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Especially since September 11, 2001, the rise of Islamic international terrorism has 
been considered a huge security threat by the West, hence Europe has joined the war 
against terrorism. The terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 were followed by a series 
of al-Qaida inspired terrorist attacks in Europe over the next few years: the March 
2004 train bombings in Spain, the brutal assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh in the Netherlands, the London bombings in July 2005. Moreover, there has 
been an increase in terrorist attack attempts in European countries, including Britain, 
Germany, Denmark and Austria as a British MI5 report 2007 confirms. Lewis, with 
good reason, says that most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most 
fundamentalists are not terrorists; nonetheless, most present-day terrorists are 
Muslims, and proudly identify themselves as such. In contrast, Irish or Basque 
terrorists do not identify themselves as ‘Christian’ (Bogdani, 2011, pp. 105-109). 
Yet, it is not right to label Turkey as fundamentalist whether governed by a party 
having roots in the fundamentalism but not particularly having fundamentalist 
purposes. Thus, the Istanbul bombings of the British Embassy, HSBC Bank and two 
Synagogues in 2003 are worthy of investigation in this context. The situation in 
Turkey is also interesting, on the contrary the idea which relates Turkey and 
terrorism, since “terrorism was aimed at Turkey’s pluralist and modern aspects. The 
targets were picked as a response to Turkey-Israel treaties and alliance with the USA 
and Britain -whether Turkey was a part of the Iraqi War or not. Beyond that, it was 
aimed at Turkey’s peculiar form of Islam which is different from the one that El 
Qaida or the “clash of civilizations” theory supporters had” (Göle, 2009, pp.176-
178). However, due to many events that occurred in Europe, the discussion is no 
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longer only about Islamic fundamentalism, but also about Muslims and Islamic 
values (Bogdani, 2011, p. 109). 
Following the September 11 attacks, there has been an increasing phenomenon 
known as Islamophobia against all Muslims in Europe. However, the reasons behind 
Islamophobia are not solely because of the increase of Islamic fundamentalist 
activity but also the growing fear among Europeans of an ‘Islamic culture invasion’, 
which is being perceived as a threat. The Turkey’s accession to the EU, this would 
seriously undermine the Christian and secular nature of the European continent, 
given the country’s population of around 70 million (almost all of them Muslim), 
combined with the 17 million Muslims already living in the EU. Islam could become 
the dominant religion in Europe with a population growth up to 20 per cent. The fear 
of the Islamization of Europe also contributes to the revival of far-right-wing parties 
in Europe and to the introduction of tougher immigration policies. Anxieties and fear 
about the ‘Islamization of Europe’ were clearly seen in two recent bans of minarets 
in Switzerland, and the burka ban in France; mosque and minaret construction 
projects in several European countries, namely Sweden, France, Italy, Austria, 
Greece, Germany and Slovenia have been met by protests. 
As a result, it is an indisputable fact that Europe’s Christian identity is facing off 
against Islam today. Related discussions necessarily involve the concept of 
democracy. The presence of Muslims in Europe along with their claims, as well as 
the Turkish claim for membership in the European Union, arouse anxiety and raise a 
series of public debates, which generally address Western cultural values of 
democracy (Göle, 2005, p. 140).  
It is thought that modern western civilization is represented by western values which 
are often described as “universal” values, such as democracy, pluralism, tolerance, 
fundamental freedoms, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, the separation 
of church and state, individualism, liberalism, and constitutionalism. Modern western 
societies base their philosophical principles, political and economic institutions and 
social structures on the values of liberal-democracy; therefore, all social, political 
and economic structures of these societies embody the values of tolerance, pluralism 
and individual freedoms. The embedding of these values has made western societies 
successful, politically, economically and intellectually. In accordance with Charles 
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Taylor’s argument that “religion is part of the moral basis of Western civilization” 
(cited in Bogdani, 2011, p. 50).  
On the other hand, Islam tends to be considered as a representative of a different 
civilization and not compatible with democracy. The incompatibility may be the 
reality in terms of Islam and Islamic law; yet it is not a one way street as far as 
Turkey is concerned. Turkey has been governed by a democracy rules though it 
experienced some interruptions and in a developing process, and it is not a secret that 
the current government emphasis pluralist democracy. 
It is true that one of the main differences between most Muslim countries and 
western democracies is the separation between religion and politics, or church and 
state. There is no doubt that Islam has a totally different affair with secularization 
than the European experience. Ernest Gellner argues that Islam is immune to 
secularization. According to Gellner, “Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds 
that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of 
men, which defines the proper ordering of society… These rules are to be 
implemented throughout social life” (cited in Kuru, 2009, p. 30). Yet again, the 
Turkish Republic is not ruled by the canon law, moreover secularization has an 
important place in the country. Ahmet T. Kuru (2009) argues that “secularism is not 
a necessary condition for democracy. Similarly, secularism co-exists with both 
democracy and authoritarianism. Thus, secularism is not a sufficient condition for 
democracy either” (p.32) and Turkey is a typical example of this with its interrupted 
democracy process.  
A modern Turkey has been a laic country (more of a repressed religion rather than 
freedom of religion delivered by Diyanet). Therefore, it would prove problematic and 
inadequate only to monitor Islam when discussing the incompatibility of Islam and 
secularism in the context of Turkey. It takes a thorough investigation to comprehend 
the religion in Turkey. Still, Turkey is governed by democratic elections even though 
it has a problematic issue compared to the western understanding on democracy. 
That is to say, holding elections is not an indication of democracy by itself. Nilüfer 
Göle (2006) mentions four concrete instances to illustrate Turkey with European 
democracies: the first tension in the Turkish political system is between authoritarian 
laicism and democracy, the second example is the abolition of the death penalty in 
2002, the third crucial moment came when the Turkish parliamentary vote denied the 
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US request to attack Iraq from Turkish soil, the last topic concerns the Armenian 
question (pp. 256-259). 
Mirela Bogdani (2011) collects the oppositions based on Turkey’s democratic and 
secular identity being different than the one Europe has under four titles; two of them 
are in line with Göle’s estimations. The first one is the secularization of the state 
being guarded by the military. Secondly, secularism was imposed by the state. 
Thirdly, Turkey is a secular country but a Muslim society; it was secularized at the 
official level, but religion has always remained a strong force at the public level. 
Fourthly, Turkey has difficulties even at the stage of the Copenhagen criteria (pp. 43-
47).  
Even so, the facts about Turkey listed above require analyzing the structure of 
Turkey. And it would be useful to understand Europe before analyzing Turkey. 
Because the issue of understanding Islam in Europe is directly connected with 
understanding how the notion of Europe is conceptualized by Europeans (Asad, 
2003, p. 159). For this reason, following sections of the chapter are related to Europe. 
3.2 Ongoing Discussion: What is Europe? 
The EU can be analyzed with two different approaches. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that the EU traces its beginnings in the years just after World War II and 
possibly also to several economic and political developments during the interwar 
period. On the other hand, it also be stated that today’s EU has a much more distant 
origin with the help of Emile Durkheim’s notion of “collective representations”, that 
called us as “the idea of a Europe” (Swedberg, 1994, p. 378), and the main approach 
of this thesis based on the second one. This chapter aims to investigate how “Europe” 
has been (re)shaped throughout the centuries, what place Christianity has in 
European identity, and the current position of religion in the EU to find out whether 
there is a common pattern which is stringent in each member state.  
Particularly with an enlargement process of the EU, the characterization of “Europe” 
and “European” has gained further importance. Today, Europe seems to be “torn” 
between different and rivalry ideological visions about the formation of European 
identity (Keyman and Öniş, 2007, p. 92). Europe, if it is a concept, is one of 
essentially contested concepts. This comprehension corresponds with the range of 
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“Europes” which often found in the literature on the formation of European identity 
(Levin, 2011, p. 164). This variety also illustrates where Turkey situates within a 
European mindset. 
Starting from this point, an approach to “the idea of a united Europe” inspired by 
Talal Asad’s perspective. Talal Asad (2003) states that the comprehension of Islam 
in Europe is associated with consideration of how Europe is being conceptualized by 
Europeans (p. 158). In this context, the concept of “Europe” has, in fact, been 
continually changing patterns and dynamics which are historically fictionalized 
(Delanty, 1995, p. 4) What significant is in this thesis, that it would appear that 
“Europe” as a contested discursive construct successfully employed by the EU in the 
recent decades (Keyman and Öniş, 2007, p. 92). In the postwar era, the EU has been 
progressively used interchangeably with Europe (Risse, 2004, p. 255). Within this 
context, Europe has geographical, historical and political meanings (Balibar, 1999, p. 
3). 
The Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome clarifies that any “European” state could 
apply for membership of the EU. However, what or who “European” is not 
conclusively defined. “European” concept stands out an identity definition which can 
be inclusive or exclusive    based on “self” and “other”. Yet, to be “European” is a 
contentious concept which underlines various components of identity, especially 
evaluating candidate states with it. Moreover, “European identity” is also a “matter” 
from the point of member states. There are many differences with an existence of 
several cultural identities and this led to difficulties in the construction of the EU 
identity (Öner, 2011, p. 51). Here, a significant question becomes the main topic of 
the main discussion, “What holds Europe together?”. And this question is a lodestar 
to investigate the role of religion in the Turkey’s accession to the EU. The focal point 
is grounded on Europe and its perception of Turkey, more specifically Christianity 
and Islam as Christianity’s “other”. Therefore, one should initially comprehend the 
European perception. How can Europe be identified? What are the components of the 
European perception?  
The discourse of Europe is paradoxical, because it does not always stand for unity 
and inclusion. It is also about construction which underlines differences based on 
exclusion and norms of exclusion (Delanty, 1995:1). Othering can be seen in the 
discussion on different religions, in the case of Turkey’s accession. Therefore, 
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defining Europe and finding a certain meaning for it is almost impossible.. The term 
‘Europe’ has a long history, but the idea of Europe is a recent phenomenon. Until the 
end of the twentieth century, Europe was a concept with some assumptions. 
Linguistic usages in various historical contexts suggest a certain European self-
awareness, that is to say, an awareness of being part of Europe and of Europe being 
the discriminating element, but the term itself has covered a variety of meanings, 
which have been changed with the changing historical circumstances (Wilson and   
Dussen, 1995: 13). Moreover, “although European identity, as a part of an elite 
culture, has existed since the 16th century, it has not existed until the end of the 18th 
century as part of individual identity” (Ibid., pp. 8-9). Therefore, Europe should be 
analyzed in accordance with its perpetual meaning which has been reconstructed in 
history. 
There are many confusing questions here, what do we refer to when we are talking 
about Europe? What do people understand from it? Does Europe have a simple and 
single definition? Is it a concept which only refers a geographical region? Does it 
have a purely subjective meaning? Or is it an idea/concept which is being 
reconstructed beyond a region in a historical process?  
Klaus Held (2002) tries to define Europe which is an ambiguous concept. First of all, 
the concept of Europe is used as a geographical perception which refers to a specific 
region of the globe. The second one is a certain form of culture (p. 81). Despite the 
fact that it could be described as a region, it cannot be analyzed only within territorial 
borders. Yet, drawing up a definite territorial boundary has always been a 
problematic issue in Europe. Its borders are being constantly reconstructed by 
Europeans. Europe, however, has been redefined in connection with its neighboring 
states and world politics. Europe, as a geographical region, does not define borders 
between states. Especially, this argument is clearly made out by the current 
boundaries of Eastern Europe. 
Considering Europe only as a geographical region would be incomplete. It is 
undeniable that Europe is more than this, “it is for sure that Europe is more than a 
region and polity; it is an idea and identity…” (Delanty, 1995, p. 2). People primarily 
tend to think of certain features which characterize a unique continental culture. In 
this framework, several things may be identified as European and for instance, 
several people indicate that democracy is a European invention (Held, 2002, p. 81).  
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In addition these two meanings of Europe, thinking Europe within historical context 
can provide a broader framework. Lila Leontidou (2004) underlines three regional 
narratives for Europe. The concept of Europe was generated from the polytheistic 
mythology of Ancient Greece as a cultural formation around the Mediterranean 
before the historiographical period. During the Middle Ages, the concept of Europe 
shifted to address the North West of Europe as colonial and cultural constitution of 
Christianity, before the formation of nation states. Finally, the integration of Europe 
which originated from the catastrophic World Wars in the 20th century not only 
close the borders between people in the context of globalization after the collapse of 
the bipolar world system, but also brings new and different bureaucratic and 
institutional hierarchies. In this pattern there are three main terms: Antiquity, 
Christianity and the European Union. These three narratives need to be clarified in 
detail for a better understanding of the sociopolitical constructions of Europe and its 
boundaries and the places of the neighboring and declared candidate countries of the 
European Union (p. 593-617).  
As it stated Leontidou’s argument, Christianity is a significant “reality” in Europe 
and the main argument shaped objections to Turkey’s membership related to cultural 
difference, even though the EU has no formal specific policy with references to 
Christianity. Why do many states and people assert that Christianity and Islam are 
incompatible with each other? What is the role of Christianity in European history? 
The ‘Europe’ concept does not exist in the Bible (Wilson and Dussen, 1995:19), 
however, it became a Christian notion or at least a part of Christian way of thinking. 
How did it happen? 
Before going to investigate Europe and Christianity in historical context, I mention 
how an approach of this thesis to this spesific issue inspired. Micheal Foucault 
(2005) states that people’s manner of action and reaction is related with a way of 
thinking and so, this way of thinking is normally related to a tradition (p. 103). 
Political and social processes which paved the way to regularize western European 
societies are familiar parts of perspective which were used to. Political and social 
processes, which paved the way to regularize Western European societies, are used 
in parts of the perspective. These political and social processes are not clear, since 
they were used out or forgotten. According to Foucault, the subject could gain 
individuality through displaying the fact that many things, which are the parts of 
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accustomed appearance and accepted as universal, are the distinct products of 
historical changes (Foucault, 2005: 100). 
There is one more significant concept which is a basis of my approac: invented 
tradition. Many traditions were invented in many cases throughout history. “Invented 
tradition” is taken as a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain 
values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity 
with the past” (Hobsbawm, 1993, p. 1). Traditions have played an important role in 
the perception of Europe throughout history. For example, as mentioned above, state-
building also includes many invented symbols and traditions. Therefore, the 
viewpoints of Foucault and Hobsbawm are significant to trace historical context. 
Nonetheless, the concept of Europe, as a strong power, could not be minimized to 
any idea, identity or reality. The fact is that the discourse in which historical facts 
were constituted, also shaped the ideas and identities (Ibid., p. 5). 
In the light of information given above, the concept of Europe will be analyzed under 
the title of “the idea of a United Europe” which refers to a historical background. 
Beyond being a unique regional unity established in the 20th century, as Europe is 
“an idea and identity, a historically fabricated reality of ever changing forms and 
dynamics” (Delanty, 1995, p. 3).  
3.2.1 The Idea of a United Europe: Historical Background 
In this section, ideas and events which promote the idea of a United Europe with a 
historical context will be examined. This historical analysis traces the historical 
accumulations of building Europe as an identity and the perception of  “the other” 
considering periods of Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, the mutual cultural 
heritage of Christianity and Islam, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the French 
Revolution, the foundations of the Modern State and finally the EU. In these various 
periods, Europe has been re-identified for many reasons. Yet, Europe history is much 
more comprehensive and full of many events and details. This section regarded as a 
glance to comprehend the idea of a united Europe, before moving on an investigation 
whether religion is an obstacle in Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
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Although Europe did not have a sophisticated meaning back then, its historical roots 
lie in Antiquity. The idea of a Europe used to belong to myths and legends before 
becoming a geographical statement (Delanty, 1995, p. 27). The etymological root of 
the term Europe originates from the Greek mythology. Rather than its geographical 
meaning, Europa was the name of a mythological figure. In several myths, the figure 
of Europa was symbolized as princess or semi-goddess, Phoenician princess; a 
granddaughter of Poseidon, or a princess who was kidnapped by Zeus in the form of 
an after which and then she married to the King of Crete (Leontidou, 2004, p. 596). 
Not only Europe, but also Asia and Africa have a place in the mythology. They are 
all sisters in many myths (Delanty, 1995, p. 17). On the other hand, some scholars 
claim that Europe is not a Greek invention, but it is a Phonecian one and it may have 
Semitic roots. The notion of Europe based on Greek origin was an invention that 
occurred in the subsequent term, and according to Bernal’s famous thesis (1987) this 
notion arose from the struggles within the formation process of the European cultural 
tradition whose roots were based in Ancient Greece, not the East (Ibid., p.18) . 
Europe as a broader notion in Antiquity expresses at most a geographical idea with 
no definitive borders, and still less of a political identity. In the South, the 
Mediterranean separated Europe from Africa; in the east, the Sea of Azov and the 
River Don were often considered to mark the boundary between Asia and Europe, in 
the West, the Pillars of Hercules indicated the start of the ocean that was thought to 
surround the whole world (Ibid., pp. 7 – 11).  
The geographical expression of ‘Europe’ gets a special connotation as a consequence 
of the confrontation between the Persians and the Greeks. “Greek colonists settled in 
the West coast of Asia Minor, the Ionian coast. The Greek city-states were located 
around the Mediterranean and so, they had more contact with Asia rather than 
Europe as the continent that we refer to today. The Aegean Sea had for centuries 
been a connecting route which made possible intensive commercial contact. 
Colonization increased the awareness of the differences between Hellenes and non-
Hellenes” (Wilson and Dussen, 1995, p. 16). The Ionian city-states got help from the 
Greek homeland against the expansion of the Persian Empire. Therefore, wars began 
between the Greeks and Persians. 
The conflicts between Greece and Persia was viewed by the Greeks as representing 
the conflict between Asia and Europe, and stood for freedom as opposed to 
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despotism (Wilson and Dussen, 1995: 16).  In the 5
th
 century BC, Greek authors 
started to emphasize the differences between language, customs, and distinct systems 
of government between Europe and Asia. Herodotus indicated that wars between 
Greece and Persia were confrontation of Asian people who are despotic, ruthless, and 
unjust with the free Hellenic people (Fontana, 2005, p. 3). During this period, the 
word “barbarian” was used by the Hellenes to identify non-Hellenes firstly. After the 
death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC, there was increasing Hellenization in the 
East, as well as influences from Eastern cultures in the West (Wilson and Dussen, 
1995: 17). In this period, Europa is binding with Hellen (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 21).  
In various references, The Roman Empire was accepted as an inheritance in Europe. 
As Delanty quoted, T.S. Eliot said “we are all, so far as we inherit the civilization of 
Europe, still citizens of the Roman Empire” (p. 17). Christopher Dawson (2003) 
illustrates this idea, the expansion of the tradition of a higher civilization to the West 
was the work of Rome whose mission was to act as the intermediary between the 
civilized Hellenistic World of the Eastern Mediterranean and the barbaric people of 
Western Europe (16). However, it should be noted that neither Greeks nor the 
Romans had a strong sense of an understanding what called as European identity 
today. 
Following years, Christianity started to take a role in Europe history scene when the 
Roman Empire accepted it as an official religion.There were many gods and 
goddesses, fragmented rituals, taboos, and traditions before Christianity was founded 
as the official state religion in The Roman Empire. In fact, Christianity had been a 
missionary religion which relied on preaching and instance to persuade people to join 
the Christian community. Christianity was  considered to be a factor which could 
have unified the Empire.   
However, the Roman Empire was separated into two parts, Eastern and Western, in 
286 BC and new concepts evolved: the Occident and the Orient. The notion of the 
Occident refers to the Hellenistic Occident and it used increasingly to refer to the 
Western region of the former Roman Empire and came into the picture with Latin 
Christianity and Europe and Occident becoming synonymous with Christendom. The 
conflict between Europe and the Orient was slowly becoming apparent in these far-
reaching developments. The Orient was no longer merely Persia, but was gradually 
coming to designate Asia Minor. However, the concept Occident was not significant 
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like today, it did not have more than geographical meaning Thereafter, the idea of 
Europe began to take shape as a cultural idea (Delanty 1995: 22-23). Thus, the gap 
between Asia and Europe, East and West and especially Occident and Orient with 
their changing and expanding meanings have played a great role in the formation of 
Europe throughout the centuries.  
Political existence of Europe dates back into the Roman Empire as its spiritual unity 
originates from the Catholic Church (Dawson, 2003, p. 52). In other words, two 
concepts, namely Western civilization and the Western Christendom, have a major 
impact on the notion of Europe (Davies, 1996, p. 9). Following years, Europe was 
under the influence of feudalism. Feudalism was the dominant government system of 
the Middle Ages, in which people were faithful to their lords, their seniors and also 
to universal authority, namely the emperor or the Pope (Yurdusev, 1997, p. 38). The 
feudal system, as a social and economical foundation, is peculiar to Europe and it 
distinguishes Europe from the rest of the world.  Davies (1996) states that 
“feudalism, remained essentially a western phenomenon. Feudalism deeply affected 
the life of the church. It greatly weakened central ecclesiastical authority. It gave 
great power to local potentates and put the clergy at their mercy” (p. 315). The 
Middle Ages was an extended span of time in which colonials had become vassals, 
landlords had become feudal lords and theology had governed the politics in a 
multipartite international system (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 23). It can be argued that  
“early feudalism can relieve the strain only by simplifying institutions and 
personalizing loyalties. It must start by working against state-building, even if in the 
end it can become the basis for state-building” (Tilly and Jordan, 2005, p. 15). 
As a dividing line between the Ancient and Medieval periods, the foundation of the 
Germanic kingdoms in the West has always been accepted as one of the important 
milestones in the history of the World, as well as the barbarian invasions (Dawson, 
2003, p. 78). The barbarian tribes of the North, for example Anglo Saxon Kingdom 
in Britain, Persians, Vikings and Hungarians were no longer a threat because many 
of them had been converted to Christianity (Delanty, 1995: 24). It was difficult to 
find anything like a state anywhere on the continent of Europe until the year 1000; 
fragmentation proceeded at various rates (Tilly and Jordan, 2005, p. 15). 
The barbarian attacks, as the biggest threat to Greek and Roman civilizations, left its 
place in the Muslim colony which was a building threat at the time and this led to a 
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conflict of Islam and Christianity was considerable on the formation of the 
Eurocentric Worldview (Delanty, 1995, p. 23). The age of the Crusades had a great 
role in the clash between Islam and Christianity. From the tenth to thirteenth 
centuries, Western European aristocrats known as crusaders and their forces charged 
from their homeland to the East (Bartlett, 1993, p. 24). A total number of the 150 
crusades held until the 12
th
 century had an important role in bringing Europe together 
in a common concept of threat and joint action and created a unifying effect. 
Christianity and the Latin language had been the braces of this process while the 
concept of expansive religion, suggested by St. Augustine, had become the 
manifestation of the dominant perception until the 11
th
 century (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 
23). The significance of this event is that the notion of Christianity was seen as a 
unifying tool for nations that are divided by language and ethnicity. Furthermore, an 
ethno-cultural homogenizing identity was created which also became a core feature 
of European identity.  
In the 15
th
 century, the seeds of the industrial revolution, political reforms and new 
regimes were shown via the developing manufacturing technologies, the collapse of 
feudality, discoveries and exploration of new trade routes and new lands (Dedeoğlu:, 
2003: 25). The relations with the other continents and cultures as a result of the 
geographical explorations played an important role in forming European identity. 
During the fifteenth century the Portuguese were the first to sail to the coast of West 
Africa, America (1492) and to India (1498), not to mention Magellan, the first to 
circumnavigate the world (1519-21). Geographical knowledge has ever advanced. 
For instance, Atlas Minor was published by Hondius in Amsterdam, in 1607. It 
regards Europe as the first of the continents in terms of its population, fertility and 
illustrious deeds of its habitants. It contains an intriguing map of the world on which 
the spread of Christendom was indicated by symbols. The French edition is more 
interesting, since it includes also Islam and Judaism indicated by symbols. And this 
is important since it is the first map which attempts to indicate the distribution of the 
world’s religions by symbols (Wilson and Dussen, 1995: 45). According to Edward 
Said (2004), the fundamental relation in the political, cultural and even in the sacred 
context was a form of enforcement: to educate the East by modern western methods 
and to give an identity and a definition of the East, saving it from its barbarism. All 
these ideas are proposals which have become reality with the orientalism that was 
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launched with the geographical explorations (p. 96).  
It can be argued that the term ‘Europe’ had begun to be used as more than a 
geographical cultural term, with the underlying meaning of Christians living on the 
European continent between the 8th and 10th centuries. Yet it was not until the 
fifteenth century that the word Europe took its place in the literature with the above-
mentioned meaning. During the following period, in spite of the predominant 
depression, vast mortality, social unrest, political and religious crisis, which Europe 
endured from the mid-fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century, the 
identification of Europe with Christianity also became widespread (Wilson & 
Dussen, 1995, p. 34). At this time, the polarization between Christianity and Islam 
that was not related to the notion of Europe, although it will shape this nation in the 
future to a great extent. By the 10
th
 century, the notion of Europe had evolved into a 
cultural notion with political attributes rather than a geographical term, yet was not 
the basis of the European identity.   
The fall of Constantinople also had major importance in the conflict between Islam 
and Christianity. Since Constantinople was conquered by the Ottomans in 1453  
then, it is the capital of the greatest Islamic civilization in the world, and it also 
brought along the argument of what is known as ‘Turkey in Europe’ (Delanty, 1995, 
p. 36). During their hegemony, the Ottomans were Europe’s other.10 The border 
between the West and the East Europe, once was determined with Byzantium, was 
replaced with the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman surges into the west was 
considered as a threat for the 15
th
 century Europe. In response, George Podebrad, the 
king of Bohemia and Pope Pius II, called for a European alliance against the 
Ottoman threat in 1459 (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 25). Pope Pius II (1458-1464) tried to 
organize a joint defense for the “Respublica Christina” against the Ottoman threat, 
but without effect. Conquering Jerusalem was out of the question for the Crusaders, 
rather defending Europe. Republican Christina and Europe were used as 
interchangeable synonyms. Pope Pius II was the one who was the first to use the 
adjective ‘Europeus’, derived from the Latin noun ‘Europa’ (Wilson and Dussen, 
1995, p. 35). All, these of facts show that Christianity had an important place in the 
                                                 
 
10
 In fact, one may think that the Turkish Republic is different from the Ottoman Empire is the only fact. But the assumption 
asserting that they are completely different is not true. The history of the Turkish Republic cannot be thought without the 
Ottoman Empire. 
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notion of Europe in the Medieval period. The notion of Europe was basically a 
geographical term and was at the service of the dominant Christian identity until the 
end of the 15
th
 century. The Western notion of Europe was reinforced with the 
triumphs of the Age of Discovery. Later on, Europe began to grow away from its 
alliance with Christendom and created an independent discourse.  
In fact, the idea of a Europe “ is a creation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for 
it was during these centuries that it entered into its own as a secularized version of 
Christendom which began to decline as a unifying narrative” (Delanty, 1995, p. 64). 
On the one hand, Renaissance represented “a tremendous affirmation of the limitless 
possibilities of human existence” and this Renaissance point on “ realizing hitherto 
latent intellectual and creative possibilities no doubt underlies the extraordinary 
achievements of European culture first in art and then in science in the early modern 
period” (Pubul, 2012, p. 22). On the other hand, the division of Christendom the 
Protestant North and the Catholic South was one of the most important issues of the 
16
th
 century. The Reformation and the seventeenth century wars which related to 
religion divided Christianity: Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Lutheranism, and 
Calvinism and its Puritan sects (Ibid., p. 67). Moreover, following Thirty Years War, 
The Treaty of Westphalia was signed, which was “a structure of political authority 
that was forged centuries ago by a sharply secularizing set of events and that has 
endured in its secular guise ever since” (Philpott, 2002, p. 79). This means that the 
salience of religion in politics declined, that is to say “two related developments – 
secular modernization and the rise of science and rationality- would combine to put 
relentless pressure on religious faith, resulting in its steady decay and the emergence 
around the world of decidedly secular polities and societies” (Haynes, 2007, p. 32). 
The Enlightenment Age provided a basis for a new secular identity of Europe (Ibid., 
p. 65). With the Enlightenment, reasoning, knowledge and science had become 
distinctive powers. An individualism and liberal thought influenced the history of 
Europe.  One of the fundamental elements which is effective in the sui-generis 
character of Europe after the 18
th
 century is that religion gave up its claims to be a 
distinctive central power during the period in which the nation-states emerged. The 
rationalism and the inquisitive spirit of the era realized itself within a differentiated 
society in which the state and religion assumed different roles (Ibid., p. 101). 
Therefore, it is a fact that “the Enlightenment’s progressivism was premised on an 
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optimistic account of human nature and a high confidence in the beneficience of 
science” (Pubul, 2012, p. 18). 
Within this period, the other important element which is capitalism
11
. The role of 
capitalism in the building of states and the historical changes cannot be ignored. 
Charles Tilly (1990) mentions that a long-lasting process of negotiation took place 
between the state-makers and the emerging capitalist bourgeoisie in which “the 
pursuit of war and military capacity, after having created nation states as a sort of by-
product, led to a civilization of government and domestic politics” (p. 206). In other 
words, the primary events affecting the notion of unity in 18
th
 century Europe 
involved the growth of the capitalist bourgeois economy and the predominant liberal 
political disposition. As a result of growing trade as the keystone of the economy, the 
bourgeoisie gained political power and the idea was promoted that the system would 
work ‘efficiently’ in a peaceful environment. Therefore, the Enlightenment Age of 
Europe had flourished around peace and trade. However, European history cannot be 
read without one of the most significant ideas, maybe the most one, “property 
theory” which can be regarded as a basis of today’s European mindset. John Locke 
sees the body as everyone’s original property, and people increase their property by 
mixing their labor with the earth. This theory justifies interest and accumulation of  
“wealth” and it is central to a western and European mindset12. 
Following these events mentioned above, The French Revolution does have capital 
importance for European society. It was not a movement only about France but about 
Europe in general. National movements started out with the mottos of equality, 
freedom and fraternity. For this reason, the French Revolution was thought to be an 
adjustment of the idea of a united Europe (Delanty, 1995, p. 65).  The French 
Revolution is based on anti-Christian humanism (Pubul, 2012, p. 23), and the process 
ended up with state and nation building processes within secular understanding. The 
idea of a United Europe was taking the shape of a cultural model in the 18
th
 century. 
The words of Jean Jacques Rousseau perfectly explain the notion of a united Europe; 
“There is no longer a France, a Germany, a Spain, not even England, there are only 
Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same way of life” (cited 
                                                 
 
11
 For a detailed analysis on capitalism see, Giddens, a. 1987. The nation state and violence. United States: University of 
California Press (122-172).Wallerstein, I. 1979. The Capitalist World-economy, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
Braudel, F. 1984. Tehe Perspective of the World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
12
 You can see “Second Treaties on Civil Government”  chapter 5 for more detail. 
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in Delanty, 1995, p. 71).  
The friction between the East and the West was increasing due to the West 
describing the East in a “self and other” contradiction. It was a time when new terms 
were added to the literature. And with the linguistic evolution of the term 
civilization, which stands for ‘enlightenment’, was complete in the middle of the 18th 
century with its first appearance in the printed media (Braudel, 1980, p. 180). 
Furthermore, the 19
th
 century was not only the age of nationalism but also was the 
age of romanticism. Although nationalism and romanticism are closely linked, they 
are conceptually very different. While nationalism was a prospective political ideal, 
romanticism was based on the revival of the old revolutionary pattern (116). Unlike 
is ancient Greece, Europe gained importance as a concept beyond mythology. The 
concept of Europe was invented in the first half of the 19
th
 century. The classics were 
forged as a conventional discipline to generate a European cultural tradition 
stemming from a purified ancient Greece with no reference to its roots in the Orient 
(Delanty, 1995: 18).  
Wilson and Dussen’s analysis on Europe in the 19th century is noteworthy:  
The concept of European culture has arisen in the eighteenth century, but the 
history of European culture as an idea in itself originated only in the nineteenth. 
The concept of Europe became a dynamic one. This historical vision of Europe 
was closely connected with contemporary political, social, and religious ideals and 
ideas of what the future should bring. The concept of Europe was therefore not 
only historicized, but also politicized; in other words, it was seen more and more 
historical terms, with contemporary political debate forming the frame of 
reference. Roughly speaking, the division was one between the supporters and the 
opponents of the ideals of the Revolution, but within both parties there were 
considerable differences of emphasis with regard to the vision of Europe (1995, p. 
70). 
In sum, proceeding to the EU, it is important to note that Europe does not have a 
common history that embraces every region in Europe. For starters, Ancient Greece 
was a local civilization. The Roman Empire was unable to conquer Europe totally; 
Scandinavia, half of Germany and England, Eastern Europe were not included in the 
Roman Empire. Christianity had influenced almost all of Europe in the 16th century. 
The Renaissance did not reach Northern and Eastern Europe. The Reformation was 
only influential in Latin Christianity. When the above-mentioned events are taken 
into account, it would be fair to say that all of the social movements are dynamic in 
their nature and these phases do not necessarily stage an ultimate result. Each phase 
works up the next one and the resulting structures and foundations manifest changes 
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due to the time and conditions (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 38). Consequently, 
“’Europe’presupposes neither a prior identity to be overcome, nor a new one to be 
achieved” (Gasché, 2007, p. 17). 
3.2.2 Europe in the Twentieth Century: A Unification Process 
The 20
th
 was one of the most significant ages in the history of Europe humanity with 
the World Wars and devastating catastrophes, following technological improvements 
and the velocity gained in the destruction of the planet, that can be called as “age of 
extremes” by Eric Hobsbawm. Each period of economic or political crisis brings 
about a need to re-evaluate the historical background in accordance with the 
international conjuncture. Therefore, the World Wars of the 20
th
 century have 
unprecedentedly accelerated the integration process (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p 41). Indeed, 
the two World Wars devastated the European and the bipolar world system, brought 
by the World War II and increased the debates on integration. In the aftermath of 
World War II, all Europeans had difficulty of reconstructing their economies, and 
Europe needed peace and stability, above all (Staab, 2008, p. 6).  
One can argue that the idea of Europe is a product of conflicts rather than concord 
(Delanty, 1995, p.3). Indeed, there had been numerous wars throughout European 
history. For example, a war broke out in the last quarter of the 15
th
 century and went 
on through the first quarter of the 16
th
 century between France and the Hapsburg 
Empire for the domination of Italy. Another significant war was the Thirty Years’ 
War 17
th
 century. The War of the Spanish Succession in the 18
th
 century is another 
instance. In the last quarter of the 18
th
 century, expeditions of Napoleon Bonaparte 
resulted in other wars. Italy and Germany had established a political unity as a result 
of the hard times of the first half of the 20
th
 century. With the changing balance of 
power, the First World War, one of the most important wars in the human history, 
broke out. The war cost 8 million lives, led empires to fall apart and alliances to 
break up (Ibid., p. 150).  
The post-World War organization process in Europe was limited to the victorious 
nations’ efforts to support the status quo within the League of Nations (founded in 
1920) rather than promoting a regional revival. This notion of revival, which was 
invented by the French President Aristide Briand, is also supported by Richard 
Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi. Kalergi’s (1894-1972) book entitled “Pan-
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Europa” was published in 1923. Kalergi takes a political alliance established in 
Europe as a security of the peace. The first federalist movement of Europe, the 
Paneuropean Union, was founded in 1924 and carried on until it was prohibited by 
Nazi Germany in 1933. Several other initiatives were introduced in the years in 
question.  
The ‘Organization for European Economic Co-operation’ which brought banking and 
industry communities together; and the project of Anatole de Monzie which was 
involving the cooperation of France and Germany in the coal and steel plants in Ruhr 
and Lorraine –which also brought about the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC)- are just a few of the significant initiatives. By the way, the Europe concept 
cannot be set apart from the European fascism and its heritage, the EU; just as it 
cannot be set apart from the catastrophic Nazi attack in the guise of homogenizing 
the European culture. The German point of view and claims of European leadership 
and their conception of ‘Sonderwag’ have played an important role in the making of 
the political map of Europe after 1945 which made Germany closer to find a united 
Europe (Delanty, 1995, p. 114).  
Since the process of the EU has much more detail, it will be reviewed shortly. 
Basically, today’s European Union consists of three communities established in the 
20
th
 century: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). 
However, there were different viewpoints that influenced the notion of integration 
before the 20
th
 century. We will mention these viewpoints before analyzing the 
integration of Europe.   
3.2.3 Different viewpoints on the idea of a united Europe 
In fact, many ideas were brought up on the unification of Europe throughout history 
before the establishment of the European Union. For instance, St. Thomas Aquinas, a 
philosopher who lived between the years 1225 and 1274, law is a hierarchy of rules 
and the social movements can only be successful if they are for the ‘common good’ –
or common interest-, moreover it is possible to find common interests between 
different fractions. Nevertheless, the insight of John of Paris, who lived in the 14
th
 
century, suggesting a separation of the powers of the Church and the King.  
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The suggestions in the book De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae dated 1306, written by 
Pierre Dubois, a Normand lawyer and the consultant of the King of France, happens 
to be one of the milestones in the evolution of the idea of European unification. 
Although, Dubois advocates the reoccupation of Jerusalem, the procedures he 
proposed to reach this goal involve the unification of Europe. He also mentioned that 
the ongoing conflicts within Europe weaken the states and make them susceptible to 
attacks; what was necessary in order to avoid this situation and to provide peace is 
organization. And this organization in question is not based on a global monarchy 
but an international arbitration.  
One of the contemporaries of Pierre Dubois, The Florentine writer Alighieri Dante 
almost refers to the freedom of movement and residence when he wrote “one’s 
country is the whole world” in his masterpiece, Divina Comedia. Dante also carries 
out a similar course in his book De Monarchia dated 1308. Dante suggests that the 
reasons behind the chaotic order of his era and the obstacles behind why a person 
cannot be regarded as a world citizen are caused by state sovereignty. Dante 
proposes to maintain the structural differences between the Papacy and the Monarchs 
and while doing this makes sure it is rooted in the cultural unity in Europe. Being the 
first to pronounce a cultural unity, Dante underlines that monarchy plays an 
important role in sustaining this legacy in contrast with Dubois. According to Dante, 
many states should be united under one monarchy and there must be only one set of 
rules applied to all the participants. This layout, which is almost the same as the first 
step of today’s European Union, aims to revive the ‘Pax Romana’ (Dedeoğlu, 2003, 
pp. 24-25). 
The King of Bohemia, George Podebrad, mentioned the necessity to unite in order to 
take Istanbul back from the Ottomans in his book dated 1463. The prevailing theme 
of this book was that in order to take Istanbul back, first they needed to tend the 
intrinsic issues in a peaceful platform and combine their forces. In other words, they 
needed to establish a new ‘Pax Europa’. A European confederacy was designed in 
line with the definition above, yet the union could not be actualized (Ibid., p. 26). 
The concept of Europe while on one hand, was aiming to defend against the ‘other’, 
on the other hand became an ethos opposite to the ‘other’. Jean Bodin mentioned 
laicism in his book ‘Les Six Livres de la République’ dated 1576 and Hobbes’ (1588-
1679) social contract theory along with a baseline for the principles regarding the 
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European unification (Ibid., 26). 
The first half of the 17
th
 century had been a time for taking on tangible initiatives and 
applicable projects in line with European integration. Almost all of the proposed 
designs involved a peaceful atmosphere provided by the organization. Today’s 
European Union was also formed around the idea of peace. As we may see here, a 
sense of peace feeding on wars has been surfacing at intervals. Emeric Lacroix 
(Emeric Crucé) has suggested ways to provide political unity in Western Europe in 
his book Nouveau Cynée dated 1623. The most striking part of his suggestion 
involves the establishment of the worldwide trade liberalization. This suggestion 
resembles the European Council in terms of politics and the World Trade 
Organization in terms of trade liberalization. Associating peace and trade 
liberalization directly corresponds to the integration of Europe ((Ibid, p. 28). Duc de 
Sully (1560-1641) argues that the importance of a council which includes countries 
that could be identified as ‘Christian’. The article titled “de jure belli et pacis” dated 
1625 and written by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist and the person who 
laid the foundations of the international law, also involves similar suggestions. 
Grotius suggests the establishment of a ‘general assembly of nations’ consisting of 
princes or kings at the service of the international peace (Ibid., 29). Nevertheless, in 
the last quarter of the 17
th
 century, Quaker William Penn argued that a united Europe 
was necessary in order to protect the integrity of the Christianity and to join forces 
against Turks (Delanty, 1995,  p. 84). 
John Locke (1632-1704), one of the significant promoters of the Enlightenment Age 
of the 17
th
 century Europe, has set the scene for his successors by building his ideas 
around social contract, separation of powers, liberty and property which led to a new 
phase of the European mindset. William Penn (1644-1718), inspired by notably Duc 
de Sully and his contemporaries, in his book dated 1693, suggests the organization of 
Europe in order to prevent another war between France and England. Similarly, St. 
Pierre (1658-1743) also supports the organization of Europe in his book dated 1713, 
yet underlines that this organization should only include Christian nations. Aside 
from Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers, Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 
studies have also had a significant impact on the development of the European 
Integration model. Rousseau (1712-1778) not only paved the way for modern 
constitutions but his ideas also appealed to the people who were instrumental in the 
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events leading to the French Revolution (Ibid, p. 31). Rousseau presented the 
essentials of political engineering in his social contract. The idea of Europe is made 
up of the evident social contract which is also conceived as an alliance of nations 
(Delanty, 1995, p. 102). Jeremy Bentham’s (1748-1832) discourse in ‘A Plan for a 
Universal and Perpetual Peace’ (1789) is also abounding with innovations on the 
integration of Europe. Bentham suggested a European union with two branches; first 
is the European Council and the second is a collective army. Another significant 
name for his contribution to the integration of Europe after the French Revolution is 
Kant (1724-1804). Kant refers to a universal peace in his essay “on perpetual peace” 
dated 1795. He also supports the idea that peace should have been built among 
European countries in order to build the World peace and it should be interconnected 
with the orders of the law (Dedeoğlu, 2003, pp. 31-32). Edmund Burke stated in 
1796 that “no European can feel completely like an exile anywhere in Europe” (cited 
in Delanty: 103). Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) also noted, in the 
periodical (1814) which Augustin Thierry was also collaborating, that Europeans 
should be united by means of common institutions and establish a confederation 
(Dedeoğlu, 2003, pp. 31-32). Nevertheless, the divisive and warlike attributions of 
the Europe notion are prevalent in most of the preliminary ideas on the integration of 
Europe. Leibniz and Hume were the well-known advocates of the Enlightenment 
ideals, championing a European alliance (Delanty, 1995, p.  104). In addition, 
Kalergi’s statements after the World War I, as mentioned above, were highly 
influential on the integration of Europe. 
Finally, Jean Monnet suggested that France and England to unite in a confederacy 
and Tonybee suggested these two countries to enter into an alliance in issues such as 
defense, economy and European citizenry in 1940. Similarly, Paul-Henri Spaak 
called for an economical, political and military alliance between France, Belgium 
and Holland in 1944. In the same year, Luxemburg, Holland and Belgium signed a 
customs union agreement in order to take effect following the end of the war 
(Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 45). 
3.2.4 Towards the European Union: communities and treaties 
The notion of Europe was overshadowed by the notion of the West for most of the 
20
th
 century. Yet, the West was not only about Europe anymore. The West, globally 
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speaking, found a new meaning during the Cold War when the West faced off 
against the East. Europe had lost its significance due to the East and West opposition 
in the setting of the Cold War. It is clear that the Cold War had an impact on the 
development of the idea of Europe in the period starting from the end of the World 
War II.  
It can be claimed that the Cold War has its roots in the October Revolution, yet it 
takes a while until there is an evident polarization between the East and the West. In 
the period following 1945, Russia had a border with the West for the first time and 
the Slavic nations, primarily Poland and the Balkans, have found themselves 
symbolically separated from the West with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 
The Berlin Wall was the prominent example of the internal split of Europe.  The war 
while bringing guilt to the German national identity, also made the notion of Europe 
a prospective program, cleared from the past mistakes. Europe, as the Eastern border 
of the United States, had become a re-patterned power against communism.  
Therefore, it can be said that the United States supported the idea of Europe. Besides, 
the United States was re-exploring Europe by this time, just as once Europe was 
inventing myths about the East. Americans were considering themselves a part of an 
old civilization through romanticizing Europe and the notion of Europe increased its 
importance by being the Eastern border of the West. Poland, while losing one fifth of 
its population in the war, had physically expanded a couple of hundred meters 
towards the West. Besides, the Soviet Union had advanced towards the West by 
capturing Eastern Poland and the Baltic countries. This historical turn of events 
resulted in a new West which had lasted until 1989 (Delanty, 1995, pp. 157-163). 
In the period after the Second World War, the new polarization was between the 
North Atlantic and the Soviet Union. Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech (1946) and the 
Truman Doctrine made this new polarization clear (Ibid., p. 115). And the Marshall 
Plan was launched to help European countries, with a goal to reconstruct Europe. 
Following that, many organizations were established with the motto of “Never, 
again” (Ülger, 2008, p. 27). Two important institutions which include many 
European countries were established in 1949: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the European Council .  
France and Germany, enemies in the Second World War, had joined in cooperation 
for bringing a solution to the problems going on even if the war ended. One of the 
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most important problems was the control of Ruhr area. For this reason, in 1949, 
French politicians Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet prepared a draft for an 
international institution which would be effective in the control of steel and coal 
production which also can be used for military purposes. The “Schuman 
Declaration” was published with the consent of Charles de Gaulle and Konrad 
Adenauer. Following, the European Coal and Steel Community began uniting 
European countries in economic and political terms in order to secure the peace. 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were the 
founding countries.   
In 1955, Foreign Ministers of the founding countries debated and decided to extend 
the integration and to cooperate on economic relations and nuclear energy. A 
committee was then established to analyze the conditions of cooperation and the 
Belgium Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak appointed as secretary-general. In 1957, 
the Spaak Report was published and the Treaty of Rome was signed. In accordance 
with this agreement, European Atomic Energy Community and European Economic 
Community were established. Today’s European Union consists of these three 
communities, namely the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC). When the socioeconomic imbalance and the due conflicts are 
taken into consideration, it is concluded that economic interdependence and 
adaptation will promote peace. And this was what the EEC was trying to realize with 
the Treaty of Rome. It can be argued that with the establishment of the EEC, the 
notion of Europe had gained a new dimension. The EEC was not only a political 
community but also an economic community. Europe was no longer only about the 
politics and was gaining an economic aspect owing to the common market of post-
war reconstruction. The new notion of Europe as an economic community was 
crucial for the social democratic parties to disengage with the old and unreliable 
notion of Europe. Besides, the European Union project was the solution for the 
problems caused by the fallen nation-states (Delanty, 1995, p. 127).                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
In 1973 the Communities were expanded to include Denmark (which one included 
Greenland, which later left the Community in 1985), Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom. In 1981, Greece became the 10th member of the EU and Spain and 
Portugal followed five years later. In 1986, the Single European Act was signed and 
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took effect in 1987. Several new policies, such as economics and social integration, 
technological research and development, environmental policy and cooperation in 
foreign relations, were defined later on.  
The year 1989, while marking the end of the communist revolution, is also a 
milestone in the history of Europe. Some new definitions of Europe have cropped up 
starting in 1989. While the former polarization between Eastern and the Western 
Europe was set aside, Mitteleuropa
13
 reemerged as a political program and as an 
ideal. The polarization between the East and the West was superseded by the 
polarization between the North and the South. Due to the concerns about entirely 
losing Europe, the Eastern border issue of Europe was suspended until the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in 1990 (Ibid., pp.130-155). 
The third expanding process occurred with the participation of Sweden, Finland and 
Austria in 1995. Meanwhile, Norway had been applying for the accession and was 
rejected for the third time. Besides, the borders of Europe were redefined and 
expansion towards the East was on the agenda with the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1989. By the mid 90’s, twelve more countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta) 
applied for the accession. In 2004 Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia became members of the 
EU. The number of member states of the EU has increased to 27 with the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. It is a process of the former Eastern Bloc countries 
returning to Europe as members of the EU (Karlsson, 2007: 33). As we may observe 
in the usage of the word “return” here, the ever-changing borders of Europe signify 
an unsettled geographic structure. 
The Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 changed the official denomination of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Henceforth, it would be known as the EU. This treaty 
defined a new structure in terms of economic and monetary unity, mutual security, 
                                                 
 
13
 Mitteleuropa is the title of the polemical book of German evangelistic theologist and social politician Friedrich Naumann, 
written in 1915, and aimed to contribute to the arguements on the war held by Germany. Naumann refers to Mitteleuropa as a 
German sphere of influence in the Middle Europe. According to this,  Germans was going to group German-Austrians, 
Hungrians and Slavic People in a political unity and this union was going to claim to be both Eastern and Western. However, 
this part of Europe has also been altering throughout the history. The concept of Mitteleuropa was referring to an economical 
union between Prussia and Austria (the lands between Copenhagen and Trieste) by the mid 19th century. With the influence of 
Bismarc’s reign, Mitteleuropa was defined as the region between Germany and Russia, Vienna being in the centre. After the 
World War I, the concept was requestioned. The concept, which was suspended during the Cold War, has come to the fore after 
1989 (Karlsson, 2007, pp.  25-32). 
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internal and external affairs and law.  
The recent expansion of the EU puts stress on the organizational extent and 
bureaucracy and made it necessary to make organizational reforms. The phrase “any 
European country may apply to EU membership” was changed to “only European 
states which respect the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to EU membership” with 
the Amsterdam Treaty which took effect on 1 May 1999. 
As we may see here, the political map of Europe has been changing throughout 
history and may as well change in the future. The members of the EU are trying to 
provide peace within the union. However, the fall of the communist regime in 
Yugoslavia resulted in separations in the East. Apart from the countries removing the 
customs, Bosnia divided into three regions, Spain divides into federal states and 
Czechoslovakia’s dissolution show that unification and dissolution in Europe is 
simultaneous.  
In sum, history has witnessed several Europes and the European Union is sui generis. 
It is neither a federation nor a confederation of states. Nevertheless, it has a distinct 
supranational dimension in which the state governments play a more prominent role. 
However, one can mention that Europe is not an alternative to nationalism, on the 
contrary is an emphasis on the hegemony of the nation state. In fact, Europe is a 
function of the nation state which contributes to the rise of nationalism in the region. 
Even though it was born out of the discord between the nation states, Europe has 
reinforced nation states in the end (Ibid, p. 156)). On the other hand, Europe still 
exists by defining ‘others’. Particularly in the period after 2000 with the emphasis on 
Christianity and the accession process of Turkey -which revolves around Islam- 
taken into consideration we may see a Europe based on the enmity of ‘other’. In the 
next section the place of religion in the EU will be focused to make deep the main 
investigation.  
3.3 Religion in The European Union 
Discussing whether Turkey is feasible to integrate with the EU regarding religious 
factors  obliges to know the role of religion in the EU and state practices. For this 
reason, in this section, firstly religions’, particularly a Christianity’s current position 
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in legal documents of the EU, and state practices will be investigated. In order to 
demonstrate religious differences or similarities, state-church relationships and the 
role of religion in societies, how religion is represented in law and in each member 
state will be included. Although there is no homogeneous pattern among the member 
states, yet all of them is based on a secular principle. Following, the current position 
of Islam in Europe will be focused. 
3.3.1. Religion in the legal system of the european union 
What most significant is  to mention that there is no specific policy on religion or an 
explicit competence in relation to the religious matters in the EU (McCrea, 2010: 1). 
Nevertheless, as it stated above, the role of Christianity in European identity cannot 
be overlooked. Christianity and humanism form the capital part of the European 
identity (Ibid., p. 53). However, there are several significant treaties in effect which 
are legally binding and establish the basis to which EU members are bound within. 
These treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
14
, involve articles on religious freedom, that 
these conditions have direct or indirect binding affects upon their judges (Shadid and 
Koningsveld, 1995, p. 7). 
The international treaties which are referred to in this study are especially the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ECHR. The article 6.2 in the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), the rights which are recognized in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights can be applied as general principles in the EU legal 
system: 
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 
1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law. 
15
 
Even though the exact meaning and scope of this article is still debated, article 9 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may constitute a reference point in 
overcoming the problems related to the freedom of religion which cannot be tended 
by the EU law (Ferrari, 2006, p. 12). 
                                                 
 
14 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. ECHR, 
with the total participation of the members, was enacted in 1953. It sets forth a number of basic rights and freedoms. 
15 For a complete reading of the “Treaty of European Union” see the URL, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf 
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In article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance.” 
This article is significant in the way it stresses the importance of freedom of religion 
and consciousness in the EU context. As stated in this article, each citizen of the EU 
has the right to choose what to believe in. And there is no definition stating that the 
religion in question is only Christianity. One has the right to practice her or his 
religion whatever it is. This article is similar to article 9.1 in the ECHR which also 
asserts that each EU citizen has the right to freedom of religion. The article refers 
religion as an individual right and avoids its cultural or communal aspects which is in 
a way a prediction of the potential friction between public and individual elements of 
the freedom of religion (McCrea, 2010, p. 121). 
The second clause of the ECHR is also related to religion: 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
16
 
The second section deals with the limitations on religious freedom. The rights 
mentioned in the article 9 can be interfered with, yet with a weighty consideration 
within the scope of the principles namely ‘the protection of public order’, ‘health or 
morals’, and ‘the protection of the rights and freedom of others’ (Ibid.,). 
When collective religious freedom – and in particular relations between States and 
religious communities- is taken into account the things get complicated. According 
to Ferrari, the main cause of this unwillingness is due to the principles which 
organize the distribution of power between the EU and the Member states. The EU 
treaties do not mention religion, because religion is left to the responsibility of the 
member states just as culture and education, for those matters involve the identity 
individual of States (Ferrari, 2006, p.13) 
In declaration number 11 of the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam it was stated 
that: 
The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national 
law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member 
                                                 
 
16 European Convention on Human Rights. http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-
5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf 
 69 
States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and 
non –confessional organizations.17  
 
The EU is not supposed to manage the Church-State relations existing in the Member 
States such as the State Church of Denmark, Concordat in Italy and the separation in 
France which are framed by the national laws. The EU is bound to respect the 
Church-State relations as long as these legal systems do not violate fundamental 
rights. The frame of this declaration is not clear and therefore it has a limited legal 
value (Ferrari, 2006, p. 14). Consequently, the EU law does not directly shows 
different state practices in the member states. However, analyzing the various 
religious structures of the member states one by one would prove resourceful for a 
better understanding of religion as an “obstacle” and whether there is a common state 
practice on secularism. In the next section, state practices will be focused. 
3.3.2 Is there any common pattern for the member states?  
In this section, relations between state and religion and religious actors in the EU’s 
member states will be evaluated. Within this context, it is clear that finding common 
practices which are effective in all member states or common patterns is difficult. 
Each member state has various practices, but beyond this diversity is a common 
European pattern of church and state relations which can be observed under three 
features and a general principle which are asserted in different forms in the juridical 
systems of each EU member (Ferrari, 2006, p. 15). 
The first feature is protection of individual rights of religious freedom. Both the 
constitutions of the EU States and the international conventions were built around the 
principles which guarantee the right of every citizen to practice his or her own 
religion in equal conditions with citizens of other religions (or of no religion) as long 
as it is in the limits of civil and political rights; and permits any religious gathering 
with the intention to practice their faith and to form religious communities and 
associations which can obtain juridical status under the law of the State (Ibid., p. 15).   
The second common feature of the relationship between state and religion among the 
EU members is the mutual autonomy of not only the States, but also the religious 
communities. To be specific, there is an organizational and doctrinal autonomy 
                                                 
 
17
Treaty of Amsterdam http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf 
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provided for religious communities. The independence and autonomy of religious 
communities are granted in the constitutions of many EU countries. One of the 
important examples of this grant is art. 25 of the Polish Constitution which states that 
“the relationship between the State, the churches and other religious organizations 
shall be based on the principle of respect for their autonomy and the mutual 
independence of each in its own sphere”. As Ferrari underlines, there are different 
examples in other countries. On the other hand, similar arrangements can be found in 
the treaties and agreements stipulated by many States with several religious 
communities and in the decrees of the national Constitutional Courts and of the 
European Court of Human Rights other than the constitutions of the EU countries 
(Ferrari, p. 16/)
18
. The general principle suffers certain exceptions even in this case. 
For example, in some Northern European countries such as Norway, Denmark and 
England the bishops of the Church are appointed by political authorities and the 
ministers of the Church are considered as public servants. Even though the State-
Church system is in declination all over Europe, the autonomy of the religious 
communities is more and more considered as a consequence of the principle of 
collective religious liberty (Ibid., p. 17).  
It should be noted that these features by no means represent an organized system 
which is applied perfectly to all EU countries; it is only a paradigm or an “ideal-
type” which is helpful in providing a context to the constitutional traditions of the 
member states (Ibid.., p. 19). These features provide a conceptual framework to 
comprehend the common mechanism in the EU states. Nonetheless, in the light of 
this general information, different and/or common practices will be investigated for 
broader comprehension. 
3.3.3 State practices  
It should be kept in mind that all current member states share a largely Christian past 
but the influence of religion over law and politics have been reduced by humanist 
and secular ideas coming into the force (McCrea, 2010, p. 16). There have been 
various practices of religion-state relations since the establishment of nation-states. 
The issue of relations between state and religion cannot be fully understood without 
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 For more detail, see art. 137 (Weimar Constitution) of the Basic Law of Germany, art. 8 of the Italian Constitution, art. 44 of 
the Irish Constitution, art. 41 of the Portuguese Constitution 
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analyzing how the state-founding process shapes its pattern, and examining the 
policies concerning religious issues that the citizens of the state are subjected to. The 
West had the tendency to control religion on a state level until the 19
th
 century, either 
by suppressing religious authorities or driving them into being fighting factions 
(Madeley, 2003, p. 47). Indeed, the state’s dealings with religious institutions began 
to undermine the nation-states, starting approximately with the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648. Although this paved the way for the emergence of the secularization 
(Haynes, 1998, p. 63) and the attempts to suppress an impact of religion, it is 
becoming more and more visible in the public sphere in today’s multicultural 
societies, and religious toleration for all groups has come to the agenda (Madeley, 
2003, p. 47). 
In accordance with the purposes of this thesis, religion will be analyzed separately 
for each member state in the context of state and church relations. The standpoint 
here is that both church and state are equally matched in terms of power in line with 
the traditional European-centered perspective (Haynes, 1998, p. 8). On the other 
hand, it is the fact that the separation of state and church shows diversity among the 
member states. Each member state has its own practices and laws in its domain. In 
this part, this differentiation among states will be mentioned focusing on the state 
and church relations and also secularism and attitudes towards the other religions, 
particularly Islam.  
There is a presence of a Turkish diaspora in Europe since the labor migration in the 
late 1950’s and early 1960’s (Gözaydın, 2010, p. 2). Including this minority in the 
equation will provide a better understanding of the structures of the EU countries and 
also of the place of Islam in Europe in terms of the attitude towards the existing 
minority.  
It can be stated Austria is one of the best instances which shows rather “passive 
secularism” characteristic. In Austria, the state and churches/religious communities 
are institutionally separated and there is no established state church. Freedom of 
religion is provided by the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not provide 
a definition of secularism, Article 15 of the Fundamental Citizenship Law guarantees 
religious equality and freedom. Furthermore, the constitution does not refer to any 
specific church. It includes extensive indemnities with regard to freedom of religion 
and belief.  
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However, Roman Catholicism is predominant and many Roman Catholic holidays 
are also government holidays.
19
 Nevertheless, it is significant for the state to preserve 
its objectivity, although the state supports religious groups as a social element in 
society. The door is left open to recognition for different religious groups. Despite 
the fact that religious services in Austria are provided by a state-run institution and 
the state provides tax reliefs for all religious institutions, those individuals providing 
these services are not employed by the state; rather their salary is paid by individual 
religious communities. Finally, concerning religious education, students are allowed 
to take ‘ethics’ courses instead of ‘religion’ courses. With Bosnia and Herzegovina 
being occupied by the Habsburg Empire in 1908, Islam gained the status of a legally 
recognized religious society in Austria and Hungary. Covering only Hanafiyyah 
Islam until 1987, the law was revised to involve the entire Muslim population 
regardless of sect. While the Muslim population is facing problems similar to their 
counterparts living in other European countries, the recognition of the state provides 
rapid resolutions for these problems. Discussions on the headscarf are mostly 
attended by the European Court of Justice. For instance, a teacher is allowed to wear 
a headscarf as long as it is not considered as a threat, and students are allowed to 
wear a headscarf in any case. Liberal solutions are delivered to the problems of the 
Muslim population. Nevertheless, there are several mosques, and the biggest one of 
these mosques which was built in 1980, is allowed to make the call for prayer out 
loud in specific holidays and on Fridays. Even if Islam has been officially recognized 
by the state, negative attitudes towards the Muslim population have been increasing, 
especially after September 11 (Potz, 2006, pp.  35-56).  
The religious and ideological communities of Belgium have a tendency to form 
socio-religious or socio-ideological sides’; yet in the last 150 years it has evolved 
from the war of independence into a secular nation. Belgium’s stance towards 
religions is neutral. The civil government won’t give in to any kind of Church 
hegemony, on the contrary, it forbids religion to interfere with its internal affairs. 
Article 15 of the Constitution protects freedom of conscience (Martin, 2003, pp. 59-
63). Belgium does not have a state religion in the Constitution. The impartiality of 
the state in religious matters is explicit, and financial relations between state and 
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 For more detail, see the website. URL, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71367.htm 
 73 
religious institutions are regulated in the Constitution.
20
 Article 24 of the 
Constitution guarantees freedom and neutrality in education. Belgium seems to have 
found a balance between religion and a secular state; although there is a superiority 
of Catholicism in country, religious groups are recognized by the state as long as 
they are not against the law. Besides a neutrality of state towards various religions, 
religious communities have right to self determination (Shadid and Koningsveld, 
1995, p. 12). Furthermore, it is also possible for the people working for religious 
institutions to participate actively in politics. The state also provides financial 
support for the religious groups and their activities. And religious education remains 
available, although there are alternative courses provided for student who refuse to 
attend religion courses (Torfs, 2006, pp. 57-77). 
In Belgium, that is one of the founding members of the EU, Islam is one of the six de 
facto religions. However, the former prime minister of Belgium and the current and 
the first full time President of the European Council, Herman A. Van Rompuy is one 
of the key names stressing religious differences. In 2010, he stated that the EU 
should pursue close relations with Turkey
21
. In April 2012, the Foreign Minister of 
Belgium, Didier Reynders paid an official visit to Turkey, and he stated that 
“Belgium fully supports Turkey’s EU membership22. 
Luxembourg is a conservative country where the Catholic church extensive 
influence. (Messner, 2003, p. 137). Freedom of religion was manifested in the 
Constitution long before  other European countries
23
. Subsidies to private religious 
schools are provided as well as the opportunity for religious education in public 
schools.  
In the Netherlands, the relations between state and religion are specified with three 
principles which are religious freedom, non-discrimination based on religion and 
freedom of education (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995, pp. 18-19). The state does not 
promote one faith, but neither does it deny support of religious institutions. Although 
there is not a public department concerned with religious services, every ministry 
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 For the English version of the Constitution of Belgium see the website, URL: http://www.fedparl.be/constitution_uk.html 
21
 http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=230424 
22
 For more detail, you can see the website. URL, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/belgium-foreign-minister-
reynders-belgium-fully-supports-turkeys-eu-membership.en.mfa 
23
 For the English version of the Luxemburg Constitution: 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/lu00000_.html 
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takes the demands of religious institutions into considerations and establishes a 
separate department under its jurisdiction if needed. The confessional schools receive 
financial aid from the state if they fulfill legal requirements, in a manner similar to 
Belgium. From the very beginning, Muslims have religious freedom just like any 
other minority. However, it is obvious that Christianity has an impact on church and 
state relations and on religious freedom. An instance of this is the existence of the 
church as a legal entity (Bijjsterveld, 2006, pp. 193-209). 
State and church in Protestant societies are shaped by “de-facto co-option” of state 
by religion, and one of the examples of societies with this kind of a structure is 
Denmark (Haynes, 1998, p.64). The Evangelical Lutheran church is the national 
church; thus, the state is not neutral in religious affairs. Freedom of religion is 
guaranteed in the Constitution. Denmark provides a model pole apart from the Latin 
countries (particularly France) in terms of relations between religion, state and 
society. Denmark has a three faceted structure: Lutheran Church and national 
Church, other religious communities with a recognized status; and freedom of 
individual and collective conscience.  
It can be stated that Denmark is a supporter of the membership of Turkey to the 
EU
24
. In fact, relations between Denmark include some troubled events. For 
example, when the twelve cartoons of Muslim Prophet Mohammed were published 
in Danish newspaper, Jylland-Posten in 2005, it was shocking for many people not 
only at national level, but also international level. Many Muslims from different 
states held protests against the newspaper. On the other hand, the case of Roj TV 
broadcasting from Denmark is another example of the recent friction between Turkey 
and Denmark. Yet again, the Danish deputy prime minister and president of the 
Radical Party, Margrethe Westager stressed the necessity of Turkey’s accession to 
the EU in her annual party speech in September 2012. While this does not provide 
insight to the general attitude of the country, Westager has been criticized for her 
stance on the subject
25
. 
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There is no doubt, with its peculiar laicité, France has a total different structure from 
the other member states which can be described within Christian secularism. 
However, there are only a few constitutional texts related to religion in France, in 
contrast to the other member states in the EU. The French Republic is a “laicist” 
state, which maintains a neutral stance in religious affairs. Freedom of conscience 
and religion are guaranteed by the constitutional tradition, like in many other 
countries. Indeed, contrary to the popular assumption, religion and state in France are 
not particularly hostile to each other. Religious communities are recognized by the 
state in France, and their members are allowed to participate in active politics. 
However, there is no public institution which looks after religious matters. The 
French government can also provide financial support to some of the activities of 
religious communities, as long as the neutrality of the state towards the other 
religious communities is maintained. Although Islam is granted the same rights as 
other religions under the Law of 1905, there is no Islamic community recognized 
under the law of Alsace-Lorraine.  However, in France, Muslims are assembled in 
many different organizations, of which the most important ones are; The Muslim 
Institute of the Paris Mosque (1926), The Union of Islamic Organizations of France, 
The National Federation of Muslims of France, The Islamic Community of Milli 
Görüş in France and The Turkish-Islamic Union of Theological Affairs of France 
which was established by Diyanet (Messner, 2006, pp. 81-106). 
The Stasi Commission Report
26
 makes laicism more visible in the French Republic. 
This report displays the laic feature of the Republic by referring the separation of 
church and state with a law dating back to 1905. Indeed, this principle is a historical 
tradition which also found its place in the Constitution. As a result, France explicitly 
declares laicité as a constitutional tradition of the French Republic. 
The objections to Turkey’s accession to the EU are particularly voiced in France, in 
where “assertive secularists” are dominant (Kuru, 2007). The friction between 
Turkey and France was particularly prominent during the government of Nicolas 
Sarkozy. France is “exclusionist laicist” attitudes to Muslim population. Nicolas 
                                                 
 
26
 Commission de Réflection is installed by President Jacques Chirac in 3 July 2003 in order to 
make reflection about the application of laicité in France. Since the Commission is headed by 
Bernard Stasi, the Commission is also called as Stasi Commission. The Commission has prepared 
aReport on this specific issue. 
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Sarkozy’s objections to Turkey’s accession to the EU set the direction of the French 
discourse. The law draft on the so-called Armenian genocide has also played an 
important role in the dispute. Nevertheless, there is an affair of the headscarves 
which is the issue of national crisis and debates between Turkey and France. As 
Benhabib (2008) discussed many of the dilemmas experienced by the French 
national identity in the age of globalization and multiculturalism and she asks: 
How is it possible to retain French traditions of laicité, republican equality, and  democratic 
citizenship in view of France’s integration into [the] European Union, on the one hand, and 
the pressures of multiculturalism generated through the presence of second-and-third 
generation immigrants from Muslim countries on French soil, on the other hand? Would the 
practices and institutions of French citizenship be flexible and generous enough to encompass 
multicultural differences within an ideal of republican equality?. (p. 105). 
Besides France, Germany also has a distinctive objection to Turkey’s membership to 
the EU. Germany’s Constitution guarantees the liberty of religion and the relation 
between the state and religion is underlined in many articles for instance, article 4. 
Yet, the judicial system of Germany bestows a privileged status to the Church. The 
economical and social importance of the Church is a sign of this. This peculiar 
construct is a result of the modernization period and the Church gained ground in the 
period following the World War II. Christianity is the major religion in Germany 
with both Protestantism (the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany which 
was founded in 1948) and Catholicism (Ouédraogo, 2003, p. 43).  
There is no reference to secularism in German Law. Instead, neutralism plays an 
important role in the German perception. According to this neutrality, there is no 
established state church; the state should be neutral towards any religion. This is a 
positive type of neutrality, in which the state is obliged to support religion and to 
provide space for religion to flourish. The education system in Germany is based on 
religious education. In other words, there is a Catholic religious education for 
Catholics, Protestant religious education for Protestants, etc. The state also funds the 
schools of minority religious groups, such as Muslim, Hindu and Jewish schools. 
There is no specific status of ‘minority’ in Germany. The state should respect all 
religions. It means that no religion is officially recognized. In the case of Islam, there 
must not be any legal discrimination against Islam given the above-mentioned 
structure. Germany hosts probably the largest Turkish expatriate population, 
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however, there are doubts about Turkey’s accession to the EU (Robbers, 2006, pp. 
107-151). 
Great Britain consists of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The 
differences of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland put any kind of 
generalization away (D’Hellencourt, 2003, p. 167). King Henry VIII established the 
Church of England, the Anglican Church, as independent from the Vatican in 1534 
which once was subject to the Roman Catholic Church. The Queen of England, the 
constitutional head of State, is also the formal head of the Anglican Church (Catto 
and Davie, 2006, p. 153). A Presbyterian (Protestant) Church was found in Scotland 
in 1690 similar to the one in England. However, there is no Anglican Church for the 
Welsh or Irish connected with the UK (D’Hellencourt, 2003, p. 167). There are close 
historical ties between State and Church in Ireland, thus the Catholic Church is still 
very influential in many aspects of the social life. In this case, whether it is not the 
official religion of the state, Catholicism utilizes a whole different organization in 
Ireland (Champion, 2003, p. 125).  
There is no written Constitution in England. For this reason, the principle of religious 
freedom is guaranteed by special laws and international treaties. Neither the State 
Church nor the other churches or religious communities can get any financial aid 
from the State in England, (Shadid and Koningveld, 1995: 11-17).  
Indeed, there is a large Muslim community in Britain. However, there has been an 
increasing fear of Islamic extremism in Britain particularly after September 11, 2001, 
and also the London bombings. The Rushdie Affair had also triggered a huge debate 
on the place of Muslims in Britain. While Muslims in England keep being 
contentious, having a state Church and this Church playing an active role in many 
fields including politics can be given as an example of secularism’s place in England.  
Greece is an Orthodox Christian Eastern European country which is far from the 
state-religion relations conducted in Western Europe. Although the Greek Orthodox 
Church has its important place in Greece, freedom of religion is granted to the 
minorities. The Church, with the help of the state, takes measures against the ideas 
which are considered as a threat (Makrides, 2003, pp. 113-120). There is an Eastern 
Orthodox Church which is officially recognized in Greece. Not to mention, Laicité 
does not exist in the constitution or any other source of jurisdiction. And the 
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Orthodox Church is at the center of the debates on religion and state relations. 
According to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) a population exchange was held 
involving the Muslim residents of Greece and Greek-Orthodox residents of Turkey. 
Some Muslims became Greece citizens with the Treaty of Paris in 1947 (Papastathis, 
2006, p. 171).  
Greece’s religious character has been an issue of debates in the EU. Nevertheless, its 
relations with the EU are in a critical situation today due to the ongoing economic 
crisis in Greece. The long-continued issues between Turkey and Greece like the 
Aegean Sea and Cyprus have had an international impact and also have influenced 
the process of the EU accession of Turkey.  
Italy is one of the countries governed by the Catholic tradition. It has been through a 
long and complex road to the establishment of the state and church relations. As a 
result, with the conclusion of a new concordat with the Roman Catholic Church in 
1984, a new era of this relationship has been approved (Shadid and Koningsveld, 
1995, p. 16). The Concordat states that Catholic religion is no longer the official 
religion of the state. Article 19 states that the fundamental of religious freedom is a 
‘personal’ right. The Italian system of religious freedom reflects the European 
pattern of this right for some reasons: everyone is free to choose whatever religion to 
believe in without his/her choice entailing any negative consequences on juridical 
grounds. When there is conflict between the state’s policy and religion, state policies 
will be obtained, the European States sympathize with all religious communities, and 
this does not include any discrimination. If there is no harmony, there is also no 
collaboration. In a positive sense, Italian laicism stands for a ‘regime of confessional 
and cultural pluralism’. It can be also interpreted as a Habermasian laicité. It implies 
not a state indifferent towards religion, but a state guarantee to safeguard religious 
freedom. However, Islam is not officially recognized in Italy ( Ferrari, 2006, pp. 209-
240). 
One can argue that Poland is also one of the “passive secularist” examples, since 
there is no formal state church in the State. However, the Catholic Church is often 
regarded as a national church although it does not claim such a position nor it does 
not take place in any legal text. Religious education plays a significant role although 
it is optional. There is no formal definition of religious minorities in any law. 
However, regarding the majority of population as Catholic, other religions can be 
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identified as minorities. The Muslim Religious Association represents Muslims in the 
country with its separate status (Rynkowski, 2006, pp. 241-264). 
The State is defined as non-confessional and laic in the Spanish Constitution. The 
state should be at an equal distance to every religion and should treat believers and 
non-believers equally. The state can also cooperate with churches and religious 
denominations  for the purpose of guaranteeing the freedom of religion of the 
citizens. According to the agreement of 1978 and 1980, religious institutions and the 
state may come together in many arenas. Evidence of this collaboration can be seen 
in contracts between religious institutions and the state, signed by the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs under the Ministry of Justice. The state also provides tax reliefs to 
religious groups. Additionally, religious education is provided not only in Catholic 
domination, but also in other religions if demanded (Martinez-Toron, 2006, pp. 265-
299). 
In Sweden, the relationship between the state and church was changed at the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. The Lutheran Church of Sweden was the state church 
until the separation of church and state in 2000. The Constitution provides every 
citizen with the freedom of religion. Yet, it may not be possible to practice these 
constitutional provisions in every case. The freedom of religion can be limited 
according to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. There is no specific definition of laicism or secularism in the Constitution. 
There is no provision of religious education either. All schools and universities are 
supposed to be neutral in terms of religion. There are some Muslim communities in 
the country which are registered as religious communities (Friedner, 2006, pp. 299-
319). 
Within this context, there are two different approaches to the religious structure of 
the member states; one argues that there is a common pattern while other one argues 
that there is no common pattern but some similarities. It can be stated that the 
common heritage of Europe, Christianity and secular influences (McCrea, 2010, 
p.16). Namely, there is a common and a prioritized behavior among the European 
states which is a “spirit of cooperation”, despite the fact that states have different 
models of religion and state relations (Ferrari, 2006, p.3).  
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Despite its apparent secular nature, the EU is in fact based on Christian cultural 
assumptions to a great extent. (Weiler, 1999, p. 48). The Christian tradition has been 
a crucial element of European history and its evolution, yet it is not the only one. 
Grace Davie (2000) claims that there are three fundamental factors in the creation of 
the unity that we call Europe: “Judeo- Christian monotheism, Greek rationalism, and 
Roman organization” and whether these factors shift and change over time, 
combinations of these factors can be observed in the forming and reforming a 
lifestyle that we call Europe, the role of religion is explicit especially within such 
combinations (p. 23). Besides the fact that religion has a substantial part in the 
European fiber, there is an ongoing discussion about its place in the European 
integration which is also the issue in question here. In light of the role of religion in 
Europe, in the next chapter Turkey’s position will try to be captured. 
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4.   TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This chapter aims to investigate whether religion is an obstacle more deeply focusing 
Turkey and its relations with the EU. For the purposes of the chapter, there are some 
questions will be tried to respond: How is the process of relations between Turkey 
and the EU? How does religion take place in Turkey’s politics? It can be possible to 
establish a dialogue between different religions, particularly Islam and Christianity?  
4.1 A Brief History of Relations Between Turkey and the EU 
Relations between Turkey and the EU have been going on for over a half century.  
The historical process of this relation will be looked into with regard to 2002 year in 
this chapter. There are two main reasons for this selection. Firstly, the Copenhagen 
Criteria which play an important part in the accession process, will take effect after 
this year, since Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 concluded with “if the 
European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation 
from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, 
the EU will open negotiations without delay” (Düzgit and Keyman, 2008, p. 249). 
Secondly, Turkey’s current government JDP, with its founders who known with their 
Islamist backgroun, was elected for the first time in 2002. This party owed its 
electoral victory in large part to Turkey’s accession to the EU. The JDP leadership 
committed itself to a democratic reform process which guided by the Copenhagen 
Criteria for membership that include democratic institutions, commitment to human 
rights, a running market economy, and an ability to meet EU membership obligations 
(Gordon and Taşpınar, 2008, p. 43). Despite the fact that relations between Turkey 
and the EU  have come to a standstill particularly after 2005, many steps were taken 
on the way to Turkey’s EU membership, the official candidate status was obtained 
and the overall relations were developed during the term of this government.  
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4.1.1 The term before 2002 
Westernization and relations with the West have been an important factor in foreign 
politics in Turkey which has adopted the Western type of state organization and legal 
system. “Modernization, being one of the main goals described in the declaration of 
the Republic, can be defined as fully and effectively participating in the European 
organizations” (Akyıldız and Palabıyık, 2006, p. 73). In line with this, Turkey has 
become a member in several organizations. For example, Turkey became a founding 
member of the United Nations, and has been a member of the Council of Europe 
since 1949, NATO since 1952, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) since 1961.  
There was a bipolar world system between the United States of America (USA) and 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the period following the World 
War II. And, Europe was divided into two, the West guided by the USA and the East 
which was under the influence of the USSR. The USA decided to support Europe 
with the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine in order to prevent Europe from 
becoming socialist entirely. While Europe and the USA were interacting, Turkey 
remained neutral until 1945. Following Greece’s application to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, Turkey had also applied for membership for 
the first time in 31 July 1959. 
The response to this application was the suggestion to establish an association until 
Turkey’s circumstances permitted its accession. In 1960, a military coup d’état 
occurred and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and minister of foreign affairs and 
finance were all executed. The EEC criticized Turkey because of the poor 
functioning of democracy and the rule of law in both countries. Following that, the 
Ankara Agreement was signed between the Republic of Turkey and the EU in 1963 
(Brusse and Griffits, 2004, p. 18). The Ankara Agreement, as a basis for the legal 
grounds of Turkey - EU relations, was meant to arrange the process for the accession 
of Turkey. Therefore, a three-step integration model was adopted for the accession 
which involved a “preparatory phase”, “transition” and “completion”. According to 
this, the preparatory phase was started in 1964 when the agreement took effect. 
Turkey was not obliged to do anything in this phase yet the EU was obliged to 
support Turkey economically in order to prepare Turkey for the transition (Ülger, 
2008, p. 178). The EEC provided Turkey with 175 million ECU in the First Financial 
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Protocol term (1963-1970) and the trade concessions which were granted to Turkey 
in the form of tariff quotas were proved. Yet, the EEC’s share in Turkish imports was 
increased from %29 (in 1963) to %42 (in 1972) (Akyıldız & Palabıyık: 74). 
Although the issue of religion has come into prominence recently, it should be noted 
that the EEC first started as an economical project and the European identity was not 
an issue at that time –because it was not a cultural project. 
The preparatory stage was completed in 1970 and then the Additional Protocol was 
signed. Conditions of the transition were defined with the Additional Protocol. In this 
new stage, it was intended to enhance the trade of industrial and agricultural products 
between the parties, to provide freedom of movement and to complete the integration 
of the Customs Union. This obliged the EEC and Turkey to reciprocally void tariffs 
and quotas for imports and exports (with some exceptions including fabrics) within a 
period of 12 to 22 years. The harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the 
EU in economic matters was another issue. Furthermore, the Protocol proposed to 
provide the freedom of movement for both parties’ citizens within the next 12 to 22 
years. 
The 1970s witnessed constrained periods in Turkey. Oil crisis as a consequence of 
the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the 
following US embargo and its rough effects on Turkey’s economics were just a few 
of the difficulties of the decade. Turkey had not been able to fulfill its obligations to 
the EU due to internal and external events which destabilized the relations between 
Turkey and the EU. In fact, relations were suspended following the Turkey’s 1980 
coup. Although democratic elections were held in 1983 and the civil government 
replaced the coup d’état but the relations didn’t heal that quickly.  
In 1987, Turkey made an application for full membership to the EU on the basis of 
article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Turkey’s application was then forwarded to the 
European Commission. According to the Commission’s report endorsed by the 
European Council in 1990, Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership was debated and 
it was decided to be postponed until necessary conditions were fulfilled. At this time 
the European Community announced it was unsuitable for a new enlargement. 
Consequently, Turkey’s application for full membership was not approved. 
According to the EC there were some problems in the case of Turkey which included 
the state of the democracy in Turkey, the endless disputes with Greece, the lack of a 
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viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative economic backwardness, the Kurdish 
problem and human rights violations (Müftüler Baç, 2000, p. 22). 
In the meantime, Turkey’s foreign policy objective was shifting to find new 
strategies to guard against possible isolation from the emerging economic and 
political institutions of Europe and to reassert its significance as a regional power 
(Aybey, 2004, p. 27). The transition process, which was proposed in the Ankara 
Agreement, was completed with the Customs Union and took effect in 1995 and 
adopted its tariff policy according to the EU’s Common External Tariff which 
involved adapting itself to the EU’s commercial policy and preferential trade 
arrangements with specific countries.
27
 
However, Turkey happened to be the first country to conclude a Customs Union with 
the EEC before becoming a full member. It means that Turkey was not in the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, Turkey did not take necessary measures in 
line with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In addition, freedom of movement 
of workers was not part of is equation. It is obvious that economic relations are 
working well between Turkey and the EU even though Turkey is not a full member 
(Aybey, 2004: 27).  
The Luxembourg Summit was one of the landmarks in the relations between Turkey 
and the EU, since the expansion of the EU was reconsidered and finally in 1997 the 
EU made a call. The EU reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership and asked 
the Commission to prepare recommendations at the last Association Council, dated 
29 April, 1997. The Commission published the report under the title of ‘Agenda 
2000’. Turkey was excluded from the enlargement process of the EU according to 
this report. Political and economic discord was brought forward as one of the many 
reasons for this decision. On the other hand, The Commission suggested to improve 
relations between Turkey and EU within the current framework.   
The Cardiff Summit, held from 15-16 June 1998, has significant impact on EU-
Turkey relations. For example, EU leaders endorsed the Commission’s “European 
Strategy” for Turkey and it was requested to find solutions with a view to make the 
financial resources required for the implementation of the European Strategy 
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available. However, the strategy was not sufficient to improve relations to a desired 
level. Nevertheless, there have been many obstacles, such as the veto of Greece. 
The European Council was held in Helsinki in 1999 and it opened a new era in the 
relationship. Turkey was given candidate status during the Helsinki Summit. The EU 
evaluated Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 with respect to the Copenhagen criteria. 
According to these reports, “recent developments confirm that although the basic 
features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria. There are serious shortcomings in terms of human 
rights and protection of minorities” (Müftüler Baç, 2000, p. 24). Candidate countries 
have to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities. An accession partnership protocol for Turkey was defined 
by the European Union Commission and was declared on 8 March, 2001. 14-15 
December 2001 are another important date for EU-Turkey relations. The Laeken 
European Council mentioned the possibility of resuming the accession negotiations 
with Turkey, which were being discussed for the first time at the highest level. 
Obviously, in the 1990s there were many economic, political and as well as cultural 
crisis in Turkey. What a significant situation is that there appeared politicisation of 
identities first time. Political scene witnessed several movements organized around 
Kurdis, Sunni Muslim and Alevi identities. This was quickly followed by civic and 
political movements , that attempted to mobilise their followers by appeal to gender, 
religion, lifestyle, sexual choice, age and other subjective issues, feelings and 
attachments. The most important cause of the political crisis of the 1990s is the 
armed Kurdish secessionist movement led by PKK (Partiya Kerkeran Kurdistan - 
Kurdistan Workers Party) which reached its peak in the second half of the 1990s. 
Another source of the crisis in these years surely the rise of Political Islam in Turkey. 
This tendency was represented by many parties which pursued National Outlook 
(Milli Görüş) tradition all founded by Necmettin Erbakan. In parallel to inability of 
secular parties to represent pressing problems of Turkey, the country went to new 
elections in 2002 (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 57) 
4.1.2 The term after 2002 
In 2002, Turkey faced the significant consequences of the general elections in 
domestic politics. In the following period, a new government was formed by the JDP 
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led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This party was originating from a conservative 
background with a motivation of a hybrid form of ethical conservatism, nationalism, 
free-market thinking and technological modernization. Therefore, the foreign policy 
of Turkey has changed quite fundamentally (Zurcher and Linden, 2004, p. 160). The 
new government expressed its commitment to reformation very clearly and quickly, 
and stated its dedication to fulfill the EU’s Copenhagen criteria which paved the way 
for the reopening the accession negotiations with the EU (Aybey, 2004, p. 34). The 
JDP has pursued a policy of reforms purposed at bringing Turkish politics, 
institutions and society in line with current EU standards. One can argue that 
“Turkey have entered a historic path of democratic reform” in a broad range of fields 
from human rights to civilian-military relations; the reforms and legal changes 
including the abolition of the death penalty, the fights against torture, the 
enlargements of individual rights and freedoms, the fight against corruption, 
achieving transparency and accountability of public expenses, and institutional 
restructuring in the fields of government and relations between government and 
military relations”. Nonetheless, the future of these paths is not clear because of as 
destabilized depending on a variety of factors (Düzgit and Keyman, 2008, p. 250). 
Indeed, if Turkey continue accession to the EU, if democratic reforms will go on, it 
is not exactly clear. Besides many paths, the current government also has established 
its own hegemony and it seems that the first priority of JDP is not the EU 
membership anymore.  
As a matter of fact, the accession process has stalled and optimist ideas decreased 
due to several reasons. One of them is which can be called as “enlargement fatigue” 
in Europe. Following this, the unwillingness of member states to new members. In 
2005, after brutal internal discussion, the EU enters a term of political crisis in itself 
because of French and Dutch rejections of the proposed EU constitution, in large part 
public interests about immigration and unemployment. Furthermore, in 2005, there 
were many attacks from Islamists in Europe, such as Britain and Madrid and a 
murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist (Gordon and Taşpınar, 
2008, p. 45). 
The EU member states close the deal on starting negotiation talks on Turkey’s 
accession to the EU. The accession negotiations for full membership of Turkey were 
launched in 2005. This also came to mean that the transition stage was over and it 
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was time for the completion stage. Henceforth, Turkey must successfully complete 
the negotiations with the European Commission based on the adoption of 35 chapters 
of the European Union acquis which include taxation, financial services, energy, 
transport, and foreign, security, and defense policy. As of spring 2008, eight of the 
chapters that related to trade issues and foreign policy have remained frozen. This 
situation is like to remain blocked as long as no progress is made in the Cyprus 
discussion.  
However, besides many objections related to economical issues, democratic criteria, 
and following Cyprus issue and overcoming Austria’s determination that Turkey can 
be offered as a “privileged partnership” instead of full membership, the EU added 
some significant caveats to its decision to start talks. It noted that the talks could be 
“open-ended”. And there is an ongoing debate on the idea, which is particularly 
supported by Germany and France, that underlines a “privileged partnership” of 
Turkey. Moreover, in 2006 French National Assembly approved a bill which 
criminalizes the denial of genocide against the Armenians during the World War I 
and this has been one of the most significant debates of issues between Turkey and 
France. 
In parallel to the objections, a number of non-supporters both in Turkey and the EU 
has been increased and relations came to a standstill. The accession process, 
squeezed between Turkish Euroscepticism and European Turkoscepticism, may very 
well fail (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 63). It would be fair to say that the EU relations have 
turned into a complex process recently, considering the first stages of the relations. 
Once the ultimate goal of foreign affairs, the EU, is now drawing away from being in 
the center of the foreign affairs due to the ongoing crises between Turkey and the 
EU. For instance, Cyprus has been one of the most problematic issues between 
Turkey and the EU.  There are also other events have been causing friction between 
the EU and Turkey such as the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad 
in a Danish newspaper or the veil ban issue in France. Moreover,  cultural 
differences has been emphasized as an obstacle which is regarded as a significant 
barrier to Turkey’s membership.  
Furthermore, one of the most significant change which cannot be exactly envisaged 
is that how Turkey’s foreign policy will be shaped. It is argued that Turkey’s 
changing axis. By the winter of 2011,  JDP’s democratic reform process began to 
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slow down its domestic reform agenda and it is “simultaneously began to emerge as 
a ‘pivotal actor’ in regional politics, especially in the aftermath of the onset of the 
street uprisings and political revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen 
and Syria” (Kadıoğlu, 2012, p. 55). However, at the same time the accession process 
to the EU did not come to an end. For this reason, making an exact implication still 
seems difficult.In this thesis, it is assumed that the process will go on. As a result, 
religion as a matter between the EU and Turkey obliges to analyze the role of 
religion in Turkey to find out whether there is possibility for integration. Therefore, 
the position of religion in Turkey will be examined in the next part. 
  4.2 Religion in Turkey: Is it Compatible with The European Union? 
In this section religion and state relations in Turkey will be examined. Therefore, it 
will touch on the various issues such as historical regulations on laicism, Diyanet, 
democracy, the increasing influence of political Islam, the role of soft power in 
Turkish politics, the Gülen movement as a significant non-governmental actor and 
religious minorities will be discussed. 
One can argue that Turkey is historically considered as a bridge between West and 
East and it is unique and exceptional both culturally and geographically (Bogdani, 
2011, p. 19). Furthermore, there is a common saying that Turkey is a good model for 
many countries with its specific attributes. Although it is debatable, it can be claimed 
that Turkey while being a part of Europe is out of the club at the same time; on the 
other hand, Turkey is a part of the Muslim World yet does not resemble any other 
Muslim country (Zurcher, 2008, p. 477). However, discourse on the “Turkish model” 
includes a kind of supremacy claims and partial perspective and various conditions 
which are beyond the scope of this thesis. For this reason, aside from the troubled 
rhetoric of being a model, hallmarks of Turkey’s history will be examined below.  
Primarily, as as a general framework, to understand modern Turkey with its Ottoman 
past and the role of religion in Turkey, historical process of Turkish politics should 
be examined. I propose to read this history in recognition of religion and state 
relationship with Şerif Mardin’s center-periphery polarization (1973). In addition to 
this differentiation, different attitudes of both center and periphery to relations 
between religion and state can be more easily understood by concepts of “assertive” 
and “passive” secularisms which propounded by Ahmet T. Kuru. In this context, in 
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Turkey history Kemalist elites, who found Turkey as a modernization project with an 
assertive secularist approach, have been at the center for years and in this sense 
Islamists are regarded as a component of the periphery. However, this situation has 
started to change recently. Particularly after the hegemony of JDP in Turkish politics, 
which supports passive secularism compared to oppressive one, “Islamist movements 
express the aspirations of a new ‘counter-elite’ that attacks the vested interests of 
Turkey’s Westernized elit” (Jung, 2008, p. 117). In fact, a labelling which refers to 
Kemalists and Islamists can seem as a problem at first glance, however a discussion 
on religion and politics have been a problematic issue between founder elites and its 
other, Islamists who reject an oppression of religion. Therefore, this labelling is an 
ineluctable since it propound main conflict on religion from a foundation of Turkish 
Republic up to the present. 
Secondly, one should initially look the Ottoman Empire to comprehend a modern 
Turkey history. That’s why, even a modern Turkey was founded in 1923 as a nation 
state, its history cannot be regarded as independent from its past on the contrary of 
Kemalist foundation narrative. There have been not only cuts but also many ties to 
the Ottoman past. For this reason, it is impossible to cut out the history of the 
Ottoman Empire, once sovereign in this land. It is indeed necessary to analyze its 
historical process in order to comprehend Turkey’s inner dynamics and its regional 
relations. Just as the EU cannot be possible without the notion of Europe which has 
been evolving for centuries, Turkey also cannot be dissociated from its Ottoman 
legacy. 
The Ottoman era is also significant for providing a comprehension of the historical 
course of affairs between Turkey and the West. In the mid-19
th
 century, the adoption 
of a European political, economic and socio-cultural paradigm was tried attempted 
by the Ottomans. However, it can be said that this situation seems to be a pragmatic 
one, nonetheless “if Western institutions could rejuvenate the state, they would be 
adopted. It would be difficult otherwise to explain the ease with which Ottomans slid 
into westernizing reform” (Mardin, 1981, p. 197). 
When it comes to the relations between state and religion, it is also necessary to 
compare a modern Turkey and the Ottoman era in order to mark out the points of 
rupture and continuity between the two periods. There are three approaches to the 
Ottoman studies on the relationship between state and religion. The first approach 
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mentions a duality of legitimacy existing in the Ottoman World, which were 
depending on the Islamic canon law and the sultan’s acts separately. Although this 
was not a structure intended to be secular, the seeds of the secular system that was 
established in the Republican era may have been sown with this dual structure of the 
Ottomans starting from the 15
th
 century. The second opinion is that there was no 
duality in the Ottoman structure and the Caliph-sultan had both religious and 
political identities. According to this approach, the Ottoman state was theocratic and 
thus, the entire state structure was in accord with the Islamic canon law. The chief 
religious official, the sheikh UL-Islam, and the grand vizier was second to the sultan 
in political and religious matters in a way supporting the idea that there was no 
separation between religious and secular matters in the Ottoman Empire. The third 
one claims that in the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of 
Turkey, there was always state control over religion (Gözaydın, 2012, p. 4). And the 
current position of religion is tried to understood with based on this continuity 
approach. 
The After World War I, Kemalist elites, led by Kemal Atatürk, pushed through far 
more radical reforms with the purpose of building a modern state. According to the 
Kemalists, the reforms were not exactly succeed since the Tanzimat period because 
of the co-existence of the secular and Islamic institutions (Kuru, 2009, p. 217). 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s intention was to remove religion from the social realm and 
the state affairs and “to confine it to the conscience of people”. In this new 
republican era the primary goal was to secularize and modernize not only the state, 
but also the society. Actually, the radical program of reform and Westernization 
pursued in the 1920’s and 1930’s can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire in the 
mid-19
th
 century, the period starting from the reception of Western codes and 
political principles (Gözaydın, 2012, p. 6).  
Westernization and disengagement from the Ottoman Empire were the  primary 
purposes of the founding elites. According to Ataturk, Islam and civilization were 
two conflicting terms and the Caliphate represented Turkey’s attachment to the past 
and to Islam. Therefore the Caliphate was abolished (March 3, 1924) which soon was 
followed by the elimination of the Seyh-ul-Islam, the Ministry of Seriat (Sharia) and 
the Sharia courts, not to mention the religious schools. The Ministry of Seriat was 
then replaced by Diyanet, which will be analyzed in detail in the following pages. 
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The declaration of the Law for the Unification of Instruction (1924) was a 
fundamental step in the establishment of a unified, secular national educational 
system. The adoption of the new dress code (1925), which stated that religious outfits 
can only be worn by people holding an official title was a part of the Kemalist 
program of Westernization intended to eliminate visible symbols of the past and the 
Islamic tradition (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 47). Nevertheless, Islamic law was rejected 
and a modified version of the Swiss Civil Code was adopted in 1926. Adoption of 
the Gregorian calendar, the Italian Criminal Code and the Latin Alphabet were other 
reforms which soon followed. Apart from that, the day of rest changed to Sunday 
instead of Friday. The finalizing change was the abolition of the second article of the 
1924 constitution stating that “the religion of the Turkish state is Islam” and laicism 
has become a constitutional principle in 1937 (Ibid., 49). It is clear that, these 
reforms are the extension of the political reforms made in the Ottoman state in 1839 
which had already secularized the law and education systems to a point (Zurcher, 
2008, p. 257). The comprehension of laicism in Kemalism does not aim to separate 
state and religion but aims to control religion and even to reform it (Kuru, 2009). 
Thereafter, it was the growing gap between the radically differentiated modernizing 
elites and the muted masses. And there was no common ground among the 
modernizing discourse of the elites and the lifestyle of the masses (Keyder, 2005, p. 
38). The significant point is that were remained a conflict-prone relationship between 
politics and religion. On the contrary a hope of founding elites, Islam hold its own 
effective power. Moreover, one can argue that the Islamism was born an ideological 
form to challenge modern world simultaneously with western adaptations (Türköne, 
2011, p. 17).  
It is obvious that the Turkish state’s policies toward religion are incoherent. The 
state, on the one hand, pursues limiting policies toward Islam. On the other hand, it 
provides Islamic instructions in public schools and conducts public Islamic schools 
(Kuru, 2009, p.166). This kind of secularism, Kemalist laicism established control 
mechanism on religion unlike western type of secularism. As an other instance of 
state control on religion which can be given is that state pays the salaries of the 
imams in mosques who are servants of Diyanet (Ibid., p.166). It is certain that the 
existence of an institution like Diyanet is one of the basic “matter” of religion and 
politics in Turkey. It can be argued that this institution was established as a reflection 
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of Kemalist laicité (Gözaydın, 2008, p. 218). In fact, religion was not free from the 
Ottoman Empire. It was under the control of political power and the status of Diyanet 
in Turkey is similar with the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, religion is not free, it is 
still under the effect of political authority (Kara, 2008, p. 64). The state utilizes the 
Diyanet institution in reply to the religion and its potential socio-politic influence. As 
it can be seen in the Kemalist discourse, the comprehension of laicité in Turkey does 
not cover only the separation of state and religion. On the contrary, Diyanet was 
founded in 1924 in order to control the phenomenon of religion which was 
considered as a threat (Gözaydın, 2009, p. 246). In order to make sure about the 
place of Diyanet in laic Turkey, we should also mention its role and responsibilities 
which involve services of worship, enlightening the people on religious matters, 
services of education of religion (Çakır and Bozan, 2005, p. 21). It would be fair to 
say that Diyanet had been utilized as an ideological and advantageous device for the 
good of the state at several points in time. Diyanet has played a role as a state based 
actor in Europe, when it opened a number of mosques to establish an ethno-religious 
comprehension of Islam among the Turkish workers in Europe, it was also 
transformed by the European realities (Yavuz, 2006, p. 240). Once founded as an 
institution to control the religion in the Kemalist context, Diyanet is also being 
supported by the recent government now. JDP government reinforces Diyanet in 
order to revitalize religion both in the national and international spheres (Gözaydın, 
2012, p 11). The budget of the Diyanet has been increasing and the minister of 
Diyanet has been backing up the opinions of the government, as we have seen in the 
specific discussions on abortion recently. In this context, Diyanet has an indisputable 
role as a religious actor and it seems like Diyanet is going to be an issue to be 
considered in Turkey’s accession process.  
It would be suitable to say that the early 1980s were a milestone in Turkish 
modernization. The Turkish experience seems to be bound up with economic 
backwardness and social unrest in the early 1980s; conflicts between laicist and 
Muslim, reason and belief, in other words, the new and the old have been coexisting 
in this sudden and rapid modernization project. It was being discussed and criticized 
for the first time in the 1980s. All the myths of the nationalistic history, particularly 
the laicism, have been put into question in the period followed (Kasaba, 2005, p. 13). 
It can be argued that Kemalism has been inefficient in covering the philosophy and 
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the ethical gap created with the ejection of the religion from the public sphere 
(Mardin, 1991, p. 127). 
The globalization phenomenon, technological advancements and the increasing 
debates on identity also have a part in the process of change, aside from the inner 
troubles and the interruptions of democracy that the country was experiencing. The 
decreasing trust in the nation states is yet another quality of the ever integrating 
world since the 1980s and the rise of global capitalism. Islamism in Turkey has taken 
hold in the new middle class of the rapidly growing metropolitans. It would be fair to 
say that political Islam has assumed an increasingly important role in the following 
years. In fact, the state tried to control religion. Turkey has been governed by a 
political party distinguished by its conservative and Islamist identity, and it is clear 
that political Islam plays an important role in this country. The resurgence of Islam in 
Turkey arouses following a period of laicist nationalism and as a response to the 
depression caused by this period, just like other countries in the region (Gülalp, 
2005, p. 44).  
Another important point to delve into, before going on to discuss recent events, is the 
interrupted democratic process of Turkey which is one of the leading reasons for the 
objections of Turkey’s accession to the EU is the issue of democracy (Müftüler Baç, 
1998, p. 240). It is obvious that the Turkish military had played an active part in 
securing the Kemalist and laic texture of the state. It would be necessary to take a 
short look into history for a better understanding of the course of Islamism and where 
the military stands in this process. The Turkish military was referred as the 
“guardians of Kemalism” by Bozdağlıoğlu (2003) for its disposition against the 
Islamist parties all along the Republican history (p. 135). As it is seen in the brief 
history, the working on the things was like the military would allow democratic 
elections yet when a party lacking the Kemalist ideals is elected then a coup was 
staged and this was conducted until the JDP government (Gellner, 1997, p. 243). 
The transition to a multi-party political system in 1946 is a milestone for the revival 
of the Islamic values and reached its peak during the term of the Democrat Party 
between 1950 and 1960 (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 130). The democratization process 
starting with the end of the World War II was identified as a “restless democracy” by 
Zurcher (2008, p. 321). Thus, the 1960 coup d’état was announced to be staged to 
“save the democracy from the depression it had” (Ibid., p. 351). The politicization of 
 94 
Islam was polished with the formation of the Islamic National Order Party (NOP) in 
1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Following the military coup in 
1971, the Constitutional Court banned the NOP and its leader, Erbakan. The 
increasing public disorder, prominent Kurdish separatism, tangled political system 
and the disastrous economy, all led to the 1980 coup d’état. Nevertheless, Islamic 
radicalism also accompanied these events (Zurcher, 2008, p. 387). Hence, the 
National Salvation Party (NSP), which was founded by the supporters of Erbakan, 
was banned again after the September 1980 coup d’état.  
The party reemerged under the name Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan in 
1983. The re-Islamization of Turkish politics was increasing dramatically in the 
1980s. In 1996, Turkey witnessed an unexpected event: Necmettin Erbakan, who is 
inspired by Islamic standards and values both politically and personally, became a 
prime minister (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 130), which led to the 28 February process. 
The military presented a list of eighteen conditions which are to be put into effect by 
Erbakan’s government in 1997. Briefly, the military organized a campaign against 
the government with the help of media, law and bureaucracy. Finally, the 
government fell in 1997. This 28 February Process is denoted as a ‘soft’ or 
‘postmodern’ coup d’état’ in Turkey (Zurcher and Linden, 2004, p. 93). Erbakan was 
forced to retire from active politics in this process. Then, the Virtue and Felicity 
Party picked up where the Welfare Party left off.  
The most important of all these parties from the same school is certainly the Justice 
and Development Party (JDP) which is led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan an apprentice 
of Erbakan. In the elections held in 2002, JDP formed the government and it has 
been the government since then, with an increased poll in 2007 and 2011. This 
government, identified with political Islam, is given as a reason for the controversial 
state of religion in the EU accession process. JDP is not identified as an Islamist 
party, although it has roots in the Islamist tradition. JDP has a different agenda than 
the national vision movement, the “Muslim” identity being the only common ground 
and yet again JDP won the elections introducing itself as a party that abides by the 
rules of liberal democracy. JDP, in contrast with the national vision movement, has 
different opinions on the subjects of globalization, modernization and European 
integration (Gülalp, 2003, p. 181).  Some argue that it is post-Islamist party. 
Although it is hard to estimate how this process will go on or how it will end; but it 
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can at least said that JDP formed a government through democratic elections and it is 
also evidence of that liberal democracy can be worked in a country with a Muslim 
majority (Ibid., p. 184).  
It is clear that there is a friction between Kemalists and Islamists in the country; the 
reestablishment of the religious schools and freedom for wearing Islamic 
headscarves in the public sphere have led Kemalists to think laicism is under attack. 
On the other hand it may be regarded as a response to exclusionist laicism, or 
“Islamist challenge to assertive secularism” (Kuru, 2009, p. 161). Indeed, JDP 
assumes a kind of passive secularism with a Western touch rather than Kemalist 
laicism (assertive secularism). JDP was elected by promoting the minority rights, 
freedom of religion –not limited to Islam- and with its pro-EU membership tone, as 
distinct from its antecedents. On the other hand, the same party has bureaucrats 
making conservative provisions like dressing artworks since they are unacceptably 
nude. Namely, one can argue that conservative tendencies started to dominate in the 
public sphere.  
Not only the domestic affairs, but also the foreign policy of Turkey has changed with 
the JDP. In 2001, a book titled ‘Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu’ 
(Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position), was written by the current 
minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu. It can be argued that this book 
provides a basis for the JDP’s foreign policy. It refers to the Turkish soft power in a 
popular manner simultaneously with the JDP’s coming power. The actual question is 
that what kind of a foreign policy JDP pursues? Davutoğlu re-interpreted Turkey’s 
geopolitics. According to him, the geographic situation of a country is a constant 
factor; yet its geopolitical dimension is a dynamic variable connected with the 
international power balance and swings (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 116). The geopolitical 
situation should not be regarded as a means of maintaining the status quo, but should 
be regarded as a means of channeling the regional activity to a global level, in other 
words, gradually globalizing (Ibid., p. 117). There is no doubt, JDP inspired by 
Ottoman history. In Davutoğlu’s sentence JDP’s understanding on Turkey history is 
clear. He states that Turkey emerged from the Ottoman legacy with new definitions 
(Ibid., p. 23). 
It would certainly be an overstatement to take the Ottoman legacy as continuous with 
the Turkish Republic. Yet again, the founding elite of Turkey can be traced back to 
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the Ottoman period and also the Westernization movement dates back before the 
Turkish Republic was founded. However, these two forms of modernization are very 
different from each other. One was a way to bail out a falling empire and the other is 
an out of the blue Westernization in a pursuit to identify itself as European and 
modern. The third legacy of the Ottoman Empire inherited from Turkey is the 
skepticism towards the other states. 
First of all, one of the most decisive factors in the formulation of a country’s foreign 
policy is, of course, the geographical situation. Geographical situation, while 
providing with opportunities, is a double-edged sword with serious challenges. 
Turkey, located in middle of Europe, Asia and Africa, is considered a key country in 
international politics. Particularly with JDP’s “zero problem” strategy, Turkey has 
started to be a more active regional actor. JDP, from its beginning, wanted to keep 
good contact with Turkey’s neighbors, the USA and the EU. For instance, several 
multilateral dealings were handled in the term of JDP’s government. ‘Iraq’s 
Neighboring Countries Process’ was institutionalized in 2003 with the meeting of 
foreign ministers of countries, which are Iraq’s neighbors, in Istanbul for the first 
time. Sequential meetings took place in other countries with the participation of 
several countries. Nine official and three non-official summits of foreign ministers 
were held in this context until 2009. In 2007, these regional meetings were 
broadened to include representatives from the UN Security Council, the European 
Commission, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and G-8 
countries.  
With regard to religion and contemporary politics, it can be argued that soft power 
has been influential in the term of the JDP. In terms of its foreign policy vision and 
Strategic Depth, it stands on elements of soft power such as persuasive diplomacy, 
economic interdependency and dialogue. The efficiency of soft power is particularly 
prominent in the Middle East affairs. On the other hand, there is an ongoing issue of 
Cyprus which is overwhelming foreign affairs and also is a drawback in the relations 
with the EU. 
Turkey’s foreign policy, in other words being a state actor, is a good example of 
application of soft power, yet it cannot go without mentioning the Gülen movement, 
a non-state actor with its own TV channel, a daily newspaper and several educational 
institutions both in Turkey and the world. This movement developed its own identity 
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over the last decade although it originated from the Nurcu movement (Zurcher and 
Linden, 2004, p. 120). Whilst Nursi was focused on personal transformation, Gülen 
has focused on personal and social transformation by utilizing new liberal economic 
and political conditions (Yavuz, 2003, p. 19). Basically, Fethullah Gülen stresses the 
compatibility of Islamic ideas and practices with the market economy, and his 
followers control a complex web of businesses and a significant broadcast and print 
media in Turkey and Central Asia (Gözaydın, 2009, p. 1219). The Gülen movement 
mainly has two goals. One of them is  bringing up a new type of generation, called as 
“golden generation” consisting of modern Muslims who are able to reconstruct a new 
world, who are both closer to God and still active in a social environment. Gülen 
defends that this possibility of such a combination has been ignored by the 
westernization oriented Turkish founder elites. The second aim of the movement is 
based on education activities which is a global intention to introduce Turkish culture 
to the world (Lorasdağı, 2008, pp. 157). As it mentioned in the second chapter, 
Fethullah Gülen is also an effective defender of interfaith dialogue. In this sense, 
Gülen movement is influential non-state actor which play a significant role with 
regard religion and politics. And as it is known Gülen movement supported JDP. 
Between Gülen movement and JDP, there are two tacit significant points. One of 
them is pro-globalization, it means take an advantages of globalization’s 
opportunities, rather than pursuing an isolationist policy and an obvious indicator of 
this is to defend the membership to the EU. The second point that Gülen movement 
and the JDP have been agreement is interfaith dialogue. Gülen movement has been 
very active in interfaith dialogue in Turkey and abroad. The JDP also tried to pursue 
benevolent policies toward non-Muslim communities (Kuru, n.d, p. 147)
28
 
However, one of the most controversial issues of religion and state relations in 
Turkey is the case of religious minorities. Non-Muslim minorities living in Turkey 
are recognized by the articles of the founding Treaty of Lausanne. After this treaty, 
state practices and discourse have come to confine this reference to Lausanne to three 
specific non-Muslim communities: Jews, Armenians and Orthodox Greeks and it was 
the EU reform process that raised the issue of the rights of smaller groups, for 
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 It is a rather complicated issue which cannot be detailed in this study. For more detail about Gülen’s 
movement, see Yavuz and Esposito (2003), Yavuz(2003), Özdalga(2007), Kuru(2009), Gözaydın 
(2010). We will mention the movement’s active role in the World under the title of Inter-religious 
dialogue. 
 98 
instance Assyrians and Chaldeans (Oran, 2004, p. 36). However, non-Muslim 
minorities have faced with various difficulties since the founding of the republic. 
JDP initiated reforms to solve certain problems of Christian and Jews, for example 
property rights, however non-Muslim communities still face with various 
bureaucratic obstacles. And resolution of non-Muslim problems will show to what 
extent passive secularism accomplished by the JDP (Kuru, 2009, pp.179-181). 
One of the significant examples of the multilateral initiative is the ‘Alliance of 
Civilizations’29 which was brought forward by the Spanish government. The Spanish 
Prime Minister Zapatero proposed this initiative to the secretary general of the UN in 
his speech for the first time at the 59
th
 UN General Assembly in 2004. The UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan supported the idea forwarding the process to include a 
Muslim country as a co-sponsor, and consequently Turkey was offered to take on 
this position for its dual identity as an Islamic country culturally and a Western one 
politically, and for its stance towards global terrorism (Balcı and Miş, 2008, p. 392). 
Turkey has been increasing its influence in multilateral organizations and 
institutions. Assuming the non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2008 is 
a testament of this influence. Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
 30
 is 
another political entity in which Turkey plays an active role. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, 
a Turkish academic, is the first vote-elected Secretary General of the OIC and there 
are three reasons why his election is important: First of all, it was the first time to 
hold a democratic elections were held in adapt assign someone to the position. 
Second, it was also the first time that a Turkish candidate was assigned to the post. 
And third, it is the second biggest international organization after the UN and it is the 
world’s largest Muslim body. It is obvious that Turkey, not only a connected with the 
above-mentioned organizations but many others, and has been playing a much more 
active role in the regional context in comparison with the past.  
Therefore, Islam is not only about the Sunni sat but also involves the Alevi. The 
“Alevi question” has been on the agenda since the very first days of the Turkish 
Republic. Alevi lodges and its practices are banned if not governed by the Diyanet 
(Dressler, 2011, p.190). The Kemalist exclusionist laicism played its part in this case 
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too and the Alevi question has remained an unsolved issue. Besides Kemalist 
laicism, JDP’s passive secularism model also does not exactly response to “Alevi 
question”. In the public sphere, still many situations and/or regulations far from to 
prevent sovereignty of Sunni Islam on Alevism on the contrary of JDP’s secularism 
definition.  
In sum, Turkish politics is conducted by a post-Islamist party government. And it is a 
fact that Turkey as an influential political actor utilizing religion as soft power, is 
drifting away from Kemalist laicism. Ironically, EU relations have been at their peak 
during the government of this party known with its conservative identity. Although it 
has been stagnant recently, it would be impossible to overlook the efforts placed 
towards EU accession by the government. Nevertheless, in parallel to the slowdown 
of the accession process, distinctions for instance about democratic secularism is not 
so clear always in Turkish daily politics, because of intervention in private life with 
conservative justifications and religious minorities. However speculations on this 
process and where it is going would be just a bunch of conspiracy.  
From the point of the EU, it might maybe be possible to overlook the religious 
identity of Turkey with a government having a comprehension of liberal democracy 
approaching the one Europe has, and emphasizing democratic principles while 
embracing secularism. Surely, the role of JDP can play more influential role to 
Turkey’s long standing accession journey to the EU if it will want to continue this 
process effectively. Both JDP’s effects on accession process and the role JDP can 
play as a pivotal regional actor related to “its ability to continue with 
democratization” (Kadıoğlu, 2008, p. 55). In other words, how a democratic state 
with internalized secular and pluralistic comprehension and values can be a threat for 
Europe. Then only then, when Turkey could meet European specific values, such as 
democracy, secularism, human rights, a consequence of the accession process will be 
understood. However, while a process is going on, there are some efforts to make a 
deal between different religions. In the next section, specially interfaith dialogue as 
an alternative to create harmony will be focused on. 
4.3 Interfaith Dialogue: Is Compromise Possible Between Different Religions? 
On the contrary to the notion which labels religion as a source of conflicts, attention 
has drawn to the question of whether religion can be considered as a beneficial 
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element of conflict resolution and peace-building, particularly in the period after 
2001. Interfaith dialogue is regarded as a crucial step of the international peace-
building by many scholars. For example, Hans Kung asserted that: 
Our generation has arrived at the threshold of a new era in human history: the birth of a 
global community. Modern communications, trade, and international relations as well as the 
security and environmental dilemmas we all face make us increasingly interdependent. No 
one can live in isolation. Thus, whether we like it or not, our vast and diverse human family 
must finally learn to live together. Individually and collectively we must assume as greater 
sense of Universal Responsibility. No peace among the nations without peace among the 
religions. No peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions. (1991, p. 138). 
 
Interfaith dialogue is significant with regards to the mutual dealings between 
different religions. It can be differentiated from other types of dialogues with its 
specific point that spirituality being at the center of the dialogue. Interfaith dialogue 
uses or emphasizes symbols and rituals. And sacred scriptures and texts are 
significant features of the dialogue. Interfaith dialogue can be enriched by them 
(Abu-Nimer, 2002,  pp. 15-32). Interfaith dialogue can be distinguished from secular 
dialogue with these features. However, it is not necessarily the only way of peace-
building. Sometimes, both secular and faith-based dialogue act in a similar way just 
as they do for global issues like environmental concerns or fatal diseases.  
In fact, this is not a very new issue. The Council for a Parliament of the World’s 
Religions held in 1893 in Chicago can be accepted as a starting point of interfaith 
dialogue among faith-based actors. It is the first formal gathering of representatives 
from both Eastern and Western spiritual traditions.
31
  
There are some faith-based actors which are effective in interfaith dialogue. These 
are organizations, individuals and institutions which are motivated by their religious 
and spiritual traditions and values to provide peace as a faith-based organization. 
Among these kind of actors are; religious NGOs, religious militants, national and 
transnational religious hierarchies, ecumenical and interreligious bodies and local 
religious communities (Appleby, 199, p. 211). In the case of Turkey and Islam, 
Gülen’s movement can be given as an instance of an NGO. One of the activities of 
Gülen movement is to advance transnational interfaith dialogue. According to Gülen, 
the importance of interfaith dialogue originates from five main reasons; saving 
                                                 
 
31 For more information on the Parliament of the World’s Religions, see the official web site. URL: 
http://www.parliamentofreligions.org 
 
 101 
modern humans from materialism; all religions have the same sources and natures; 
the Koran’s call for interfaith dialogue; religious tolerance as a purpose of human 
life; and love as the essence of being tolerant. He refuses to acknowledge 
fundamentalist, violent, and exclusivist interpretations of religion (Gözaydın, 2010, 
pp. 3-4). Instead, Gülen emphasizes the importance to fight materialism and to revive 
faith in people’s lives as he considers it the common goal of all religions. In other 
words, he is concerned with bringing religion back to the lives of contemporary 
humans in order to increase both tolerance and interfaith dialogues (Gözaydın, 2009, 
p. 1225). Gülen, in his pursuit to increase interfaith dialogues, has held talks with 
many religious leaders and institutions, such as Greek Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomeos (1996), Pope John Paul II (1998), and Sepharadic Chief Rabbi of 
Israel Eliyahu Bakshi Doron (1999) via the Intercultural Dialogue Platform –a 
project of the movement (Gözaydın, 2010, p. 4) 
Diyanet, which is an institution peculiar to Turkey, has also made “dialogue” a part 
of its agenda since 1998. Popes Paul VI and John Paul II visited Turkey in 1967 and 
1979. Pope Benedict XVI also visited Turkey in 2006, on a tour of Muslim countries 
(Ibid., p.4). The following quote from the official website of Diyanet sums up its 
stance about interfaith dialogue: 
Our religion, Islam, attached great importance to the establishment of positive relations 
between individuals and religions, and has called for eliminating discrimination in the World 
and eradicating the moral degeneration and injustice that threaten humanity. Dialogue 
between the adherents of two different religions does not necessarily mean that they approve 
of other’s stance, but rather that they are trying to understand one another and to set up a 
healthy communication based on knowledge, emotion and action. In this context, as dialogue 
makes it possible for there to be an atmosphere of tolerance, enabling the recognition and 
understanding of one another, as well as providing sound and unprejudiced information about 
the other, this forms an important step in the general call for peace and permanent happiness 
in Islam
32
. 
Not only the religious actors use faith as a policy, but also secular organizations -such 
as the EU- do utilize faith in a way assuming the role of religion without emphasizing 
it (Appleby, 1999: 211). In compliance with the purposes of this study, analyzing the 
interfaith dialogue will be useful if only focused on Turkey, Islam and the EU. Several 
conferences have promoted to study the effects of religion in Europe and to develop an 
alternative approach to the Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” by the Forward 
Studies Unit of the European Commission in the mid 1990s. The Mediterranean 
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Society: A Challenge of Islam, Judaism and Christianity and the Carrefour Européen 
des sciences et de la culture (European meeting point of sciences and culture) took 
place in Spain in 1995 and consequently in Portugal in 1996. 
Interfaith dialogue was formalized with the Barcelona Process which is also called the 
Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) which is the first attempt in the history of the 
European Union to create strong bonds based on political and economic stability and 
peace between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Social and cultural dialogue came 
onto the agenda with the Barcelona Process (Schumacher, 2005, pp. 281-290). From 
the beginning, this process is about developing contacts between Europe and the 
Muslim World since Islam is a major part of the cultural expression of the North 
African and Middle Eastern countries. Dialogue is a key concept of the Barcelona 
Declaration. How intercultural and interfaith dialogue should be conducted was 
addressed in the third chapter of the declaration: 
Greater understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-Mediterranean region 
will facilitate great mutual tolerance and cooperation. Support will be given to periodic 
meetings of representatives of religions and religious institutions as well as theologians, 
academics and others concerned, with the aim of breaking down prejudice, ignorance and 
fanaticism and fostering cooperation at grass-roots level 
33
 
Another important fact is that the enlargement of the EU in 2004. This enlargement 
decision made an impact on the initiatives of Europe for furthering the dialogue. 
With this enlargement, the EU faced with a growing multiplicity of cultures, 
traditions and states. These differences needed not only being acknowledged but also 
to be in a harmonious relationship with each other (Silvestri, 2005: 393). European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was developed to avoid the emergence of new gaps 
between the enlarged EU and its new neighbors in the Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean. The ENP was first outlined in a Commission Communication on 
Wider Europe in 2003, and followed by an improved Strategy Paper on the ENP 
published in May 2004. This was an attempt to add new dynamics into the existing 
framework that was outlined in the Barcelona Process. It keeps the dialogue in the 
agenda as well as the Barcelona Process and it was made clear by stating that: “An 
effective means to achieve the ENP’s main objectives is to connect the people of the 
Union and its neighbors, to enhance mutual understanding of each others’ cultures, 
                                                 
 
33
 (Barcelona Declaration, available on-line. URL, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf 
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history, attitudes and values, and to eliminate distorted perceptions”34. Secularity 
stands out as a dimension of dialogue both in the EMP and the ENP. However, the 
ENP has a deeper focus on security due to the implications of September 11 and 
changing borders of the EU. The fight against common threats, such as organized 
crime, international terrorism and illegal immigration are at the top of the agenda 
(Lynch, 2005, pp. 33-43). 
In Europe, Islam is seen as a threat to universal values. The threat of Islam in Europe 
brings out the concerns about security particularly after September 11. Islam has 
become the core object of the dialogue initiatives, and the EU started to place a 
special attention to engage in dialogue especially with the Muslim tradition 
(Silvestri, 2005, pp. 385-405). Besides the security concern, one can argue that that 
negative associations with Islam play an important role in the establishment of 
West’s rationality, culture, identity and secular. That is the negative representations 
of Islam, which exist in dialogue projects, contribute to the revival of secularism. 
Even in the dialogue level, there is a huge influence of the secular modernist 
perspective, since religion is regarded as problematic. The resurgence of religion, 
particularly the one involving Islam, is identified as a consequence of incomplete 
modernization (Hurd, 2008, p. 52). 
In sum, a well-established interfaith dialogue can provide a steady basis for a mutual 
understanding of Christianity and Islam. Nevertheless, the real problem will arise 
between the religions looking down at each other, therefore it is necessary to 
question whether a proper dialogue is even possible. Even if it is rigorous and it is 
necessary to give time to knowing, trusting, and respecting each other, and even if 
we should take on the widest possible responsibility to report back, it is only one step 
or one aspect of the encounter between various religious traditions, “dialogue is not 
enough”  (Ramadan, 2005, p. 211). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
34 ” (European Neighborhood Policy, Strategy Paper. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/World/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have attempted to investigate the role of religion in Turkey’s long-
continued accession process to the EU. There has been an increasing opposition from 
the member states to Turkey’s membership to the EU, which implies cultural and 
religious differences, particularly intensified following the end of the 20
th
 century. 
The main objective pursued in this thesis is to find out if religion can be the main 
obstacle all by itself as it is proposed by the defenders of such an idea. It is clear that 
cultural difference is an obstacle which grounded history and memory. However, it 
should be argued whether the cultural difference is a definite border between two 
parties.  
This thesis has a positive perspective regarding the Turkey’s accession to the EU 
with its approach which underlines the possibility of integration due to the 
accomplishment of various “criteria” by Turkey, such as economic development, 
democracy, human rights, minority rights as well as providing a continuance of 
“secular” characteristic of the state with freedom of thought, belief and 
consciousness and ensuring the neutral status of the state to religion and religious 
denominations. (In addition to that, there are several politic matters, for example 
Kurdish question and Cyprus which needs solution). The main idea defended is that 
religion all by itself cannot be an obstacle in the way of full membership of Turkey 
to the EU and it should not be a definite borderline. 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter, introduction, aimed to 
provide information regarding the general framework and approach to the subject. It 
includes attempts to define significant concepts employed in the thesis and to search 
different ways of studying religion and politics referring to religion and secularism 
that is the core of western European mentality. The general approach to religion and 
the secular employed in the thesis follows Foucault’s genealogical analysis. The 
defended idea is that neither religion nor secular is a universal concept. 
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The second aims of the second chapter to explore discussions about the role of 
religion in contemporary politics. “Religious phenomena” have always been a 
component of politics for centuries. Perhaps even more than before, its political 
impact is felt to the contrary of western policy makers who claimed that it was 
marginalized to the private sphere. What is certain that, in parallel with the 
technological innovations and globalization, religion became more visible. On the 
one hand, there have been many conflicts correlated with religion. On the other hand, 
religion can be a tool for peace-building and a part of foreign policy as a “soft 
power”, especially in an age of multiple actors in politics.  
One can argue that secular modernism is an implicit feature of the western European 
mindset. In fact, it cannot be possible to clarify the role of religion in the European 
mindset with one viewpoint or theory. Despite the fact that the EU was established 
due to the economical reasons, it does not mean that religion does not have an 
influence on politics. If one analyzes politics in Europe, one also should think about 
the historical background of relations between economy and religion, which have 
effected one another mutually in European history and have a sui-generis 
characteristic regarded as peculiar to Europe. Therefore, one cannot argue that 
religion does not play a key role even in secular European politics. It has been 
already included in politics, but its limits have been demarcated by a secular 
understanding of European modernism. However, today’s world witnessed a 
changing perception, the reality shown that secular modernism is not a universal, 
immanent and a single one. 
The third chapter was based upon a special focus on Europe. It can easily be stated 
that today’s EU was established around economic and political goals. However, it is 
difficult to claim that there is a single reality. The historical process is much more 
complicated. Today, particularly with the enlargement process of the EU, the borders 
of Europe both as a continent and identity are being interrogated. This attempt has 
accelerated with an enlargement process and it has been discussed that the EU is also 
a cultural project.  
Europe itself, if it is a concept, is a contested one. Attempts to identify the European 
identity and its components led to discussions about different definitions of Europe 
throughout the centuries and even deconstruction of Europe concept. Today, there is 
a significant tendency to identify “European” with the EU. It is a discursive construct 
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which is appropriated by the EU. Indeed, the geographical borders of Europe was re-
identified with the enlargement process. Nonetheless, the components and borders of 
European identity are being discussed and an attempt to define Europe as a cultural 
concept is underway. Namely, there are no fixed meanings of Europe. 
The meanings attributed to “Europe” become considerably important in terms of 
enlargement debates. Different approaches can enlighten the issue of integration, 
since it shows different attitudes to the membership of Turkey. In light of different 
arguments that the enlarged Europe is a “New Europe” or a “Cultural Europe”, 
different ideas, which clarify consents or rejections to Turkey’s accession, can be 
understood more clearly. On the one hand, some people defend that an enlarged 
Europe is a “New Europe” which has a political identity based on universal norms of 
democracy and modernity. According to this approach, “Copenhagen Criteria” is a 
sufficient condition when it is accomplished by a candidate state. On the other hand, 
some people argue that Europe is a “ Cultural Europe” which has an accurate line 
implies the basis of cultural and geographical understanding of European identity. 
Contrary to the idea of “New Europe”, “Copenhagen Criteria” could not be sufficient 
for full membership (Düzgit and Keyman, 2007, p. 252). In fact, the consequence of 
the accession process has long been unclear. A final decision will show which 
approach has more influence on the accession process. A stance of this thesis is 
closer to the idea of “New Europe”. 
However, how the EU will be shaped in the future is an uncertain “matter”. The 
European Union is being continually redefined in parallel with the changing world 
politics. The EU is experiencing internal economic problems, particularly the 
economic crisis in Greece, which consequently affect its internal dynamics. Debates 
claiming that the end of the EU has come or is coming are being held in the academic 
spheres. Regarding all the statements above, it is quite difficult to suggest or predict 
the future of the EU and its relations to Turkey in this ever-changing world. 
There have also been debates about “European-ness” of Turkey. This concept based 
on cultural and religious identification rather than of political and economic 
references. That is to say, it's defined in terms of Islam versus the West (Arısan Eralp 
and Eralp, 2012, p. 167). Throughout centuries, Islam has been the “other” of 
Europe. Turkish accession has shown symbolic situation of European apprehension 
about religion and especially Islam and politics (Hurd, 2006, p. 405). To comprehend 
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this matter clearly, firstly the historical background of the idea of a united Europe 
was investigated in the third chapter. Following the deep annals of “Europe”, the 
secular character of the EU was analyzed. Both the formal documents of the EU and 
state practices were examined to find out a common basis of European 
understanding. Secularism is a necessary condition to become a member of the EU. 
Nevertheless, member states do not have the same practices about religion. In spite 
of various state practices, they are all secular which implies a neutral status of a state 
to different religions and religious denominations (although some countries have a 
state church, they are secular) and they all guarantee individual rights such as 
freedom of thought, belief and consciousness. According to the Article 6 (1) of the 
Maastricht Treaty, “principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and rule of the law” are common to the member states. 
One of the significant questions is: Can Turkey maintain all the responsibilities and 
balance its stance on the subject of religion and politics. In line with this main 
question, Turkey’s accession to the EU is investigated in depth in the fourth chapter. 
This thesis focuses on the relations regarding JDP government, since relations have 
reached the highest phase than ever before with this party, even it seems outstanding 
for a few years. As distinct from many other political parties that formed 
governments before, JDP’s foreign policy, which was affected by a “Strategic Depth 
doctrine” developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, has been apt to promote relations with the 
EU.  
Yet, the current government JDP is a subject of discussions since it won election 
firstly in 2002.  This is an ironic situation, as JDP with its Islamist base or in spite of 
its Islamist base has seemed closer to the EU, as opposed to the Kemalist tendency 
with its laic base. It can be identified as a “conservative democracy” maybe, but its 
stance seems closer to European understanding of democracy. Despite the existence 
of Islamist base, the JDP government has made the highest progress of accession 
history. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the full membership process has been 
interrupted since 2005. Ayrıca, bir westernization project olarak kuluran modern 
turkey avrupalı devlet modelinden ziyade gittikçe amerikan modeliyle benzerlikler 
göstermektedir. Bu da incelenmesi gereken ayrı bir durumdur. Now, Turkey has 
become a more significant actor in the Middle East and JDP and its usage of “soft 
power” is being under discussion.  
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The main basis of the objections, as assumed by many scholars, is that Muslims are 
attached to the values based on Islamic belief, which are opposite to the ones that a 
modern secular state have (Asad, 2003: 159). Besides ongoing debates on new 
constitution during the period of debatable current government, Turkey has 
constitutionally been a laic state. Therefore that it cannot be evaluated as an Islamist 
state. Similar to Europe which has suigeneris characteristics with regards to relations 
between religion and politics, Turkey also has suigeneris characteristics since it is a 
laic state with its Muslim majority of populations as well. 
It is obvious that not only the future of the relations between Turkey and the EU, but 
also the future of Turkey and the future of Europe, are blurry. It cannot be predicted 
whether Turkey would be a member of the EU. And the course of Islamism in 
Turkey is also ambiguous. Commenting on this does not go beyond conspiracy 
theories.  
One can argue that JDP has received rather widespread support from various actors 
thanks to its pro-democracy tendencies and inclination towards laissez faire 
economy. It is also significant to note here that the government has taken concrete 
steps towards democratization. However, the government is building its own 
hegemonic system internally with its conservative discourse. Interfering with art 
works and TV broadcasts is an extreme example of this. It can be stated that the very 
subject of democracy -and integral to that, secularism- has long been a double-edged 
sword in Turkey. One can argue that the country has rather diminished the repressive 
laicism (or assertive secularism) policies in favor of a “more democratic” laicism 
(passive secularism). It can, however, be an exaggeration to claim that the laicism, 
which has been considered as a pervasive characteristic of the country ever since the 
foundation of the Republic, has come to an end. Yet the conservative arrangements 
to the public sphere (such as the regulations on abortion and alcohol) can be 
considered as a warning since they are against laicism and fail to guarantee 
individual freedom. It is safe to state here that there is a lack of tangible data that can 
ensure concrete comments regarding the future. Time will tell the future of JDP and 
thus Turkey, as in the case with the European Union and the relations between the 
EU and Turkey.  
Particularly September 11, 2001 and other Islamist attacks led to more interrogation 
of the existence of Islam in world politics. Since objections show European angst 
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about Islam, in the second section of the third chapter, firstly the place of Islam in 
Europe was emphasized.  Following this section, the place of religion in Turkey 
since the foundation of modern Turkey until now is investigated. This is important, 
because of the existence of religious and secular dichotomy is not occurring only in 
Europe but also in Turkey itself. In the last section the fourth chapter, it is 
investigated whether interfaith dialogue can be a way of integration between several 
religions. Actually, an interfaith dialogue is not sufficient in itself but can prove a 
great contribution to the Turkey’s accession. 
However, even after many examinations, the main question remains without a certain 
response: Can Turkey be a part of the EU with its different cultural heritage? This 
question may be interpreted as: Is the EU, which was founded for economic and 
political purposes -not cultural ones but also includes a tie with its cultural heritage 
de facto, going to grant full membership status to Turkey? In the essence of these 
questions is that: What is the role of religion in both Europe and Turkey with respect 
to the developments in the world? How does Christianity influence the European 
mindset against Turkey with its Muslim majority population? Does religion 
constitute an obstacle between Turkey and the EU? Although the question is being 
reproduced and remains unsettled, there have been many different responses to the 
question. 
Basically, one can argue that the collaboration between Turkey and the EU, in other 
words Islam and Christianity, seems impossible. If so, if the EU is a project of 
“Cultural Europe”, the discussion can be over. Nonetheless, it is also possible to see 
that there can be other responses suggesting a harmony is possible between Turkey 
and the EU. There are several approaches which see a possibility of full membership. 
For example, one can support Turkey’s full membership with utilitarianist view that 
underlines Turkey’s contribution to the EU with regards to economics, security, etc 
and vice versa. One can also emphasize the contribution of Turkey to the EU. 
Another approach is based on post-national hypothesis. This is like a “New Europe” 
hypothesis which underlines the significance of democracy, human rights, superiority 
of law rather than cultural differences. This idea is also  convenient to the idea of a 
united Europe whose motto is “united in diversity”.   
It is also noteworthy that Turkey’s accession to the EU should be taken into 
consideration not merely on the grounds of the EU’s consent (which ultimately 
 111 
highlights the superiority of the EU) but also on the grounds of the Muslim 
population in Turkey and Europe. Aside from the question of Europe’s admission of 
a Muslim country, it should be asked if it is possible for the Muslim minorities living 
in the secular European countries to be represented (Asad, 2003, pp. 192-216). If it is 
not possible, European pluralist mind should be reconsidered. As long as the notion 
of Europe is not correlated with multiculturalism and transnational citizenship, the 
European identity should be received with doubts (Delanty, 1995, p. 161). 
Nevertheless, if it is not providing the grounds for different cultures to flourish not 
only for multiple identities, it will never be able to go beyond being an economic 
community of an imperialist civilization (Asad, 2003, p. 180). 
However, it is clear that Europe and Turkey are different since they have different 
cultural values and historical progress of relations between religion and politics. 
Nevertheless, religion all by itself does not seem to be an obstacle for Turkey’s full 
membership to the EU. Moreover, different religions can exist together. It is just 
required to prove dialogue, interaction and particularly mutual wish of existing 
together provided by current political decision-makers. “In this way, Turkey’s EU 
accession call for a reframing of past history as well as the manner in which Turkey’s 
place in Europe is imagined” (Kirişçi, 2008, p. 37). 
Turkey, with its Muslim majority, does not seem to be afraid of Christianity. 
Naturally, monotheistic religions whether they promote inter-religious dialogue, may 
well conflict with each other given their claims of superiority; yet the idea that 
interiorized secular understanding getting harmed can only come up if an 
exclusionist identity is defined.  
People have the right to adhere to different religions and of course religiousities in a 
secular country. However a constant emphasis on secularism while at the same time 
ostracizing one religion per se leads to question marks regarding the nature of 
secularism. Secularism, on the contrary, can be universal as long as it can guarantee 
religious freedom and differences, which ensures that people- be they in Europe or in 
Turkey, whether they support Turkey’s accession to the EU or not- exercise their 
religiosity as they wish. In case religion is a private matter, it becomes rather 
problematic to justify the tendency to reject other religiosities, aside from the 
remnants of the accumulative collective memory. However it is required for the 
citizens of Turkey and the Muslim population to manage to live their religiosities 
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individually. Considering that the EU would prefer to base the integration process on 
secular principles, Turkey would be required to transform its laicism to be in line 
with the European secularism; otherwise the very process of integration is risked in a 
way that it can come to a deadlock.  
One can ask again and again: is religion an obstacle? The answer is both Yes and No.  
On the one hand, it has been introduced as an obstacle and on the other hand it does 
not constitute an obstacle by itself. In sum, we can say that it is not proper to claim 
that Turkey’s accession will be inappropriate only by looking at the religious facts. It 
is true that religion has been ‘presented’ as an obstacle, yet however much it was 
debated and remained on the agenda in the accession process, it is due to the lack of 
knowledge and a reference to prejudice to present it as an obstacle. For a better 
understanding of what is really going on, all the arguments about the welfare, 
migration and the potential of decision-making of the European organizations should 
be taken into account (Zurcher and Linden, 2004).  
However, in the midst of all this, other questions come to the focus; is it possible for 
the EU, with its valued pluralist approach which represents further values than 
Christianity and its inner processes, to embrace another religion? Or does it prefer to 
go for this option? And if not, would not that be contradictory by itself? On the other 
hand, can any actor be identified with only its political or cultural features under the 
influence of global capitalism? Can the role of the economy in this respect be 
overlooked? All the questions and their answers aside, it would contradict Europe’s 
long-established values if Turkey’s accession has failed based only on religion, in a 
time when the economy is ever important.  
However, the discussion on Islam in Europe is also related to the whole project; the 
idea of a united Europe. Does Europe, with its significant values and ‘peaceful’ 
purposes, unify different religions or not? Furthermore, arguments related to poverty, 
migration, human rights must be investigated seriously. It should be remembered that 
this thesis does not cover these aspects. In light of the all of these critical issues, this 
thesis concerned with the idea that Turkey could not, or should not, be excluded from 
an enlargement process, if it will occur, because of the fact that the majority of its 
population is Muslim. 
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It is rather implausible to speculate on the future of Turkey, the EU or the relations 
between two parties. However it is significant to note here that it would be  in line 
with the EU’s own values if the union render its decision according to “the principle 
of fairness.” Senem Aydın Düzgit and E. Fuat Keyman mention this  principle that 
“entails that the progress reports written on Turkey and decisions about Turkey’s 
success in full accession negotiations should be universal and impartial” (Aydın 
Düzgit and Keyman, 2007, p. 253). The principle of fairness entails also the 
Copenhagen Criteria. It means that “the level and the nature of democratization and 
modernization in Turkey, which constitutes fairness in Turkey-EU relations” (p. 
254). In this context, fairness and objectivity can provide “a reciprocal relationship 
between Turkey and the EU, in which both parties have mutual benefits”. It means 
that 
With its secular modernity and mostly Muslim identity, Turkey has the potential to reshape 
the political identity of Europe as a multi-cultural space governed by the universal norms of 
democracy and liberal economy. With such a political identity, Europe has the potential to 
reshape international relations as a democratic space of world governance which our 
extremely dangerous post-September 11 world needs today. (Ibid.,, p. 256). 
It can be stated that the determinative factor will be the “willingness” of both parties, 
along with the principles of fairness and objectivity. The establishment of fairness 
and objectivity and the idea of living together can solely be ensured by the 
willingness of both parties. If Turkey prefers to make the required constitutional 
amendments, that is if Turkey shows a willingness, then the determinative factor will 
be the willingness of the EU. Within this context, it is also enigmatic whether the EU 
will have a precise definition or not. One should also take cognizance of the current 
arguments claiming that the EU has lost its effect.  
Moreover, the “willingness” of Turkey is also consequential in that whether the 
European Union consents to or rejects the accession of Turkey based solely on 
“religious reasons” can be unveiled only if Turkey makes the required amendments 
regarding the Kurdish question, minority rights and economic progress. It can be said 
that Turkey shows a willingness to improve these issues, yet is far from an ultimate 
outcome. With regards to the issue of religion; it is necessary to diminish the 
opressive laicism at the heart of modern Turkey for a more democratic country, yet 
the current improvements regarding the issue are not sufficient. One can argue that 
JDP with its tendency to increase its influence in the Middle East and with its 
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“conservative” identity that can be described as a “soft power” bears a resemblance 
to the American model rather than the members of the European Union. One can also 
argue that JDP displays rather “conservative” inclinations. Whether JDP succeeds in 
ensuring “democracy” as required by the “conservative democracy”-in its own 
words- is a controversial subject, which demands a close monitoring.  
It is also required to provide solutions to various subjects based on mutual 
expectations, notably the Cyprus issue. The sum and the substance of it is that the 
solution to mutual expectations can be established with the willingness of both 
parties.  
In conclusion, it can be stated that the political interests of both parties will be 
decisive in the outcome of the process, whether it results in a willingness or 
unwillingness. It is extremely challenging to predict the ever-changing political 
interests of the parties; one can merely speculate on the subject, which is rather 
irrelevant for the purposes of this thesis. Within this context, the most sensible thing 
to do for now is to “wait and see” in lieu of speculating on Turkey’s accession to the 
EU.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A: Turkey Timeline – A Chronology of key events 35 
 
1923 - Assembly declares Turkey a republic and Kemal Ataturk as president. 
1928 - Turkey becomes secular: clause retaining Islam as state religion removed 
from constitution. 
1925 - Adoption of Gregorian calendar. Prohibition of the fez. 
1938 - President Ataturk dies, succeeded by Ismet Inonu. 
1945 - Neutral for most of World War II, Turkey declares war on Germany and 
Japan, but does not take part in combat. Joins United Nations. 
1950 - Republic's first open elections, won by opposition Democratic Party. 
Military coups 
1952 - Turkey abandons Ataturk's neutralist policy and joins Nato. 
1960 - Army coup against ruling Democratic Party. 
1961 - New constitution establishes two-chamber parliament. 
1963 - Association agreement signed with European Economic Community (EEC). 
1965 - Suleyman Demirel becomes prime minister - a position he is to hold seven 
times. 
1971 - Army forces Demirel's resignation after spiral of political violence. 
1974 - Turkish troops invade northern Cyprus. 
1976 - Earthquake kills more than 5,000 people in western Van province. 
1978 - US trade embargo resulting from invasion lifted. 
1980 - Military coup follows political deadlock and civil unrest. Imposition of 
martial law. 
1982 - New constitution creates seven-year presidency, and reduces parliament to 
single house. 
1983 - General election won by Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party (ANAP). 
PKK war 
1984 - Turkey recognises "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." 
Kurdistan Workers' Party launches separatist guerrilla war in southeast. 
1987 - Turkey applies for full EEC membership. 
1990 - Turkey allows US-led coalition against Iraq to launch air strikes from Turkish 
bases. 
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1992 - 20,000 Turkish troops enter Kurdish safe havens in Iraq in anti-PKK 
operation. 
Turkey joins Black Sea alliance. 
1993 - Tansu Ciller becomes Turkey's first woman prime minister, and Demirel 
elected president. 
Ceasefire with PKK breaks down. 
1995 - Major military offensive launched against the Kurds in northern Iraq, 
involving some 35,000 Turkish troops. 
Ciller coalition collapses. Pro-Islamist Welfare Party wins elections but lacks support 
to form government - two major centre-right parties form anti-Islamist coalition. 
Turkey enters EU customs union. 
1996 - Centre-right coalition falls. Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan heads 
first pro-Islamic government since 1923. 
1997 - Coalition resigns after campaign led by the military, replaced by a new 
coalition led by the centre-right Motherland Party of Prime  
Minister Mesut Yilmaz. 
1998 January - Welfare Party - the largest in parliament - banned. Yilmaz resigns 
amid corruption allegations, replaced by Bulent Ecevit. 
1999 February - PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan captured in Kenya. 
1999 July - Ocalan receives death sentence, later commuted to life imprisonment. 
1999 August - Devastating earthquake with epicentre at Izmit in Turkey's heavily 
populated northwest kills 17,000 people. 
1999 November - Second quake in same region kills hundreds more. 
Into the new millennium 
2000 - Ahmet Necdet Sezer takes over from Suleyman Demirel as president. 
2001 January - Diplomatic row with France after French National Assembly 
recognises the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide. 
2001 May - European Court of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty of violating the 
rights of Greek Cypriots during its occupation of northern Cyprus. 
2001 June - Constitutional Court bans opposition pro-Islamic Virtue Party, saying it 
had become focus of anti-secular activities. New pro-Islamist party Saadet is set up 
by former Virtue Party members in July. 
2001 November - British construction firm Balfour Beatty and Impregilo of Italy pull 
out of the controversial Ilisu dam project. Swiss bank UBS follows suit in February 
2002. 
2002 January - Turkish men are no longer regarded in law as head of the family. The 
move gives women full legal equality with men, 66 years after women's rights were 
put on the statute books. 
2002 March - Turkish and Greek governments agree to build a gas pipeline along 
which Turkey will supply Greece with gas. 
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2002 July - Pressure for early elections as eight ministers including Foreign Minister 
Cem resign over ailing PM Ecevit's refusal to step down amid growing economic, 
political turmoil. Cem launches new party committed to social democracy, EU 
membership. 
2002 August - Parliament approves reforms aimed at securing EU membership. 
Death sentence to be abolished except in times of war and bans on Kurdish 
education, broadcasting to be lifted. 
Islamist party victorious 
2002 November - Islamist-based Justice and Development Party (AK) wins landslide 
election victory. Party promises to stick to secular principles of constitution. Deputy 
leader Abdullah Gul appointed premier. 
2002 December - Constitutional changes allow head of ruling AK, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, to run for parliament, and so to become prime minister. He had been barred 
from public office because of previous criminal conviction. 
2003 March - AK leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan wins seat in parliament. Within days 
Abdullah Gul resigns as prime minister and Erdogan takes over. 
Parliament decides not to allow deployment of US forces ahead of war in Iraq but 
allows US use of Turkish air space. It authorises dispatch of Turkish forces into 
Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. 
2003 May - More than 160 people, many of them schoolchildren trapped in a 
dormitory, die in an earthquake in the Bingol area. 
2003 June-July - Eyeing future EU membership, parliament passes laws easing 
restrictions on freedom of speech, Kurdish language rights, and on reducing political 
role of military. 
Istanbul attacks 
2003 November - 25 people are killed and more than 200 injured when two car 
bombs explode near Istanbul's main synagogue. Days later two co-ordinated suicide 
bombings at the British consulate and a British bank in the city kill 28 people. 
2004 January - Turkey signs protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances, a 
move welcomed in EU circles. 
2004 February - More than 60 people killed when apartment block in city of Konya 
collapses. 
2004 March - At least two people killed in a suspected suicide attack on a building 
housing a Masonic lodge in Istanbul. 
2004 May - PKK says it plans to end a ceasefire because of what it calls annihilation 
operations against its forces. 
2004 June - State TV broadcasts first Kurdish-language programme. 
Four Kurdish activists, including former MP Leyla Zana, freed from jail. 
Nato heads of state gather for summit in Istanbul. 
2004 July - Three die in car bomb attack in southeastern town of Van. Authorities 
accuse the PKK of involvement which it denies. 
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2004 September - Parliament approves penal reforms introducing tougher measures 
to prevent torture and violence against women. Controversial proposal on 
criminalising adultery dropped. 
 
EU talks 
2004 December - EU leaders agree to open talks in 2005 on Turkey's EU accession. 
The decision, made at a summit in Brussels, follows a deal over an EU demand that 
Turkey recognise Cyprus as an EU member. 
2005 January - New lira currency introduced as six zeroes are stripped from old lira, 
ending an era in which banknotes were denominated in millions. 
2005 May - Parliament approves amendments to new penal code after complaints 
that the previous version restricted media freedom. The EU welcomes the move but 
says the code still fails to meet all its concerns on human rights. 
2005 June - Parliament overturns veto by secularist President Sezer on government-
backed amendment easing restrictions on teaching of Koran. 
2005 July - Six killed in bomb attack on a train in the east. Officials blame the PKK. 
2005 October - EU membership negotiations officially launched after intense 
bargaining. 
2005 November - Multi-billion-dollar Blue Stream pipeline carrying Russian gas 
under the Black Sea to Turkey opens in the port of Samsun. 
2006 April - At least a dozen people are killed in clashes between Kurdish protesters 
and security forces in the south-east. Several people are killed in related unrest in 
Istanbul. 
2006 May - Gunman opens fire in Turkey's highest court, killing a prominent judge 
and wounding four others. Thousands protest against what they perceive as an 
Islamic fundamentalist attack. 
2006 June - Parliament passes new anti-terror law which worries the EU and which 
rights groups criticise as an invitation to torture. 
2006 July - Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline opened at ceremony in Turkey. 
2006 August-September - Bombers target resorts and Istanbul. Shadowy separatist 
group Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAC) claims responsibility for some attacks and 
warns it will turn "Turkey into hell". 
2006 30 September - Kurdish separatist group, the PKK, declares a unilateral 
ceasefire in operations against the military. 
2006 December - EU partially freezes Turkey's membership talks because of 
Ankara's failure to open its ports and airports to Cypriot traffic. 
2007 January - Journalist and Armenian community leader Hrant Dink is 
assassinated. The murder provokes outrage in Turkey and Armenia. Prime Minister 
Erdogan says a bullet has been fired at democracy and freedom of expression. 
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Secularist protests 
2007 April - Tens of thousands of supporters of secularism rally in Ankara, aiming to 
pressure Prime Minister Erdogan not to run in presidential elections because of his 
Islamist background. 
Ruling AK party puts forward Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as its candidate after 
Mr Erdogan decides not to stand. He narrowly fails to win in the first round. 
2007 May - Parliament brings forward national elections to 22 July to try end the 
standoff between secularists and Islamists over the choice of the next president. 
Parliament gives initial approval to a constitutional change allowing the president to 
be elected by a popular vote, but the amendment is vetoed by President Sezer. 
Tension mounts on Turkey-Iraq border amid speculation that Turkey may launch an 
incursion to tackle Kurdish rebels. 
Bomb blast in Ankara kills six and injures 100. PKK denies responsibility. 
2007 July - AK Party wins parliamentary elections. 
2007 August - Abdullah Gul is elected president. 
2007 October - Diplomatic row with United States after a US congressional 
committee recognises the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as 
genocide. 
Parliament gives go-ahead for military operations in Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish rebels. 
Voters in a referendum back plans to have future presidents elected by the people 
instead of by parliament. 
2007 December - Turkey launches a series of air strikes on fighters from the Kurdish 
PKK movement inside Iraq. 
Headscarf dispute 
2008 February - Thousands protest at plans to allow women to wear the Islamic 
headscarf to university. 
Parliament approves constitutional amendments which will pave the way for women 
to be allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities. 
2008 July - Petition to the constitutional court to have the governing AK Party 
banned for allegedly undermining the secular constitution fails by a narrow margin. 
2008 October - Trial starts of 86 suspected members of a shadowy ultra-nationalist 
Ergenekon group, which is accused of plotting a series of attacks and provoking a 
military coup against the government. 
2009 February - Protesters marking the 10th anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah 
Ocalan, the leader of the banned Kurdish PKK movement, clash with police in south-
east Turkey. 
Prominent Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk defies Turkish law by giving speech to 
parliament in his native Kurdish. State TV cuts live broadcast, as the language is 
banned in parliament. 
2009 June - Trial starts of a further 56 people in connection with the alleged ultra-
nationalist Ergenekon plot to bring down the government. 
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2009 July - President Abdullah Gul approves legislation proposed by the ruling AK 
Party giving civilian courts the power to try military personnel for threatening 
national security or involvement in organised crime. 
PM Tayyip Erdogan holds a rare meeting with the leader of the pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party, Ahmet Turk, as part of efforts to solve the Kurdish 
problem politically. 
 
Rapprochement 
2009 October - The governments of Turkey and Armenia agree to normalise 
relations at a meeting in Switzerland. Both parliaments will need to ratify the accord. 
Turkey says opening the border will depend on progress on resolving the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
2009 December - The government introduces measures in parliament to increase 
Kurdish language rights and reduce the military presence in the mainly-Kurdish 
southeast as part of its "Kurdish initiative". The Constitutional Court considers 
whether to ban the Democratic Society Party over alleged links to the PKK, in a 
move that could derail the initiative. 
2010 January - Newspaper carries report on alleged 2003 "Sledgehammer" plot to 
destabilise country and justify military coup. Head of armed forces, Gen Ilker 
Basbug, insists that coups are a thing of the past. 
2010 February - Nearly 70 members of the military are arrested over alleged 
"Sledgehammer" plot. Thirty-three officers are charged with conspiring to overthrow 
government. 
2010 March - US House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee passes 
resolution describing killing of Armenians by Turkish forces in World War I as 
genocide, prompting Ankara to recall its ambassador briefly. 
Constitutional reform 
2010 April - Parliament begins debating constitutional changes proposed by the 
government with the stated aim of making Turkey more democratic. The opposition 
Republican People's Party says the Islamist ruling party is seeking more control over 
the secular judiciary with some of the proposals. 
2010 May - Relations with Israel come under severe strain after nine Turkish 
activists are killed in an Israeli commando raid on an aid flotilla attempting to reach 
blockaded Gaza. 
2010 July - Istanbul court indicts 196 people, including serving and former senior 
military officers, accused of plotting to overthrow the government as part of the 
alleged anti-Islamist Ergenekon organisation. 
PKK leader Murat Karayilan says it is willing to disarm in return for greater political 
and cultural rights for Turkey's Kurds. Turkey refuses to comment. 
2010 September - Referendum on constitutional reform backs amendments to 
increase parliamentary control over the army and judiciary. Critics see it as attempt 
by the pro-Islamic government to appoint sympathetic judges. 
2010 October - Trial of 151 people accused of links to the Kurdish Workers' Party 
(PKK) begins in south-eastern city of Diyarbakir. 
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2010 November - The whistle-blowing website Wikileaks publishes confidential 
cables revealing that France and Austria have been deliberately blocking Turkey's 
EU membership negotiations. 
2011 January - The EU's Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele voices frustration 
at slow pace of talks on Turkish membership. 
2011 June - Ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins resounding victory in 
general election. PM Erdogan embarks on third term in office. 
Thousands of refugees fleeing unrest in Syria stream into Turkey. Ankara demands 
reform in Syria. 
2011 August - President Gul appoints top military leaders after their predecessors 
resign en masse. This is the first time a civilian government has decided who 
commands the powerful armed forces. 
Turkey launches retaliatory military strikes against alleged Kurdish rebels in the 
mountains of northern Iraq. 
2011 October - PKK rebels kill 24 Turkish troops near the Iraqi border, the deadliest 
attack against the military since the 1990s. 
Iran, Turkey agree to co-operate to defeat Kurdish militants. 
Tensions with France 
2011 December - Relations with Paris are soured after French MPs pass bill making 
it a criminal offence to deny that the mass killings of Armenians during the Ottoman 
Empire amounted to genocide. Though the bill has the backing of President Sarkozy 
and is approved by the French Senate, it is later struck down by France's 
Constitutional Court, which rules that it infringes on freedom of expression. 
2012 January - A court jails three people for incitement over the 2007 killing of 
prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, one of them for life. The verdict 
prompts protests that no one has been convicted of the killing and allegations of state 
collusion in Mr Dink's death. 
2012 March - Former armed forces chief Gen Ilker Basbug goes on trial on charges 
of attempting to overthrow the government. 
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APPENDIX B: The Different Meanings of  “Europe” in the Discourse on the 
European Idea
36
  
 
 
1) Europe as a word with a distinct etymology: Through the original meaning 
of the word “Europe” is not clear, it is often thought that it comes from the 
Greek words “euros” (meaning “broad”) and “opsis” or “optikos” (meaning 
“eye” “sight” or “face”) 
 
2) Europe as a geographical concept: In Antiquity, “Europe” was mainly used 
as a geographical concept. According to the Greeks, the world consisted of 
Europe, Asia and Libya (later called Africa). 
 
3) Europe as a concept in mythology: According to Hesiod, Europe was a 
beautiful princess who Zeus took a fancy to. In the shape of a bull, he lured 
Europe away to Crete (Europe and the Bull). 
 
4) Europe in the thought of Medieval Christianity: During the Middle Ages 
the two concepts of Christianity and Europe started to merge. In the 1600s the 
terms were often used interchangeably. 
 
5) Charlemagne as the Father of Europe: Charlemagne’s empire in the 8th and 
9
th
 century is seen as an early incarnation of a united Europe. The famous 
epitath that a court poet bestowed on Charlemagne (“Rex pater Europae”) is 
often approvingly cited. 
 
6) Europe in the peace plans of the 17th and 18th century: The famous peace 
plans by such people as Henry IV (Sully), Abbé de Saint-Pierre and William 
Penn are seen as early attempts to unify Europe. 
 
7) Cosmopolitan Europe: Cosmopolitanism is seen as associated with les 
philosophes, especially Voltaire (“I see with joy that an immense republic of 
cultivated minds is being formed in today’s Europe”). 
 
8) Napoleon’s attempt to unify Europe: Some people argue that Napoleon’s 
realm aim was to unify Europe – including Metternich according to whom 
Napoleon wanted to create an empire like that ıf Charlemagne. 
 
9) The Concert of Europe: Some of the statesmen who met in the Congress of 
Vieanna in 1814-1815 were positive to some kind of united Europe, such as 
Castlereigh who spoke of the need to create a European Commonwealth. 
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10) Europe and Nationalism (“The United States of Europe”): While the rise 
of nationalism threatened the ideal of a united Europe, some literary figures 
(e.g. Victır Hugo) tried to fuse nationalism and Europeanism (The United 
States of Europe”). 
 
11) Movements for a united Europe during the interwar period: The interwar 
period was very difficult for the European ideal. Nonetheless, there were 
some attempts to unite Europe, such as those by Aristide Briand and Count 
Coudenhave-Kalergi. 
 
12) Hitler’s New Europe: In the early 1940s the Nazis started to use the notion 
of “Europe” as part of their anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Hitler, however, said 
that what matters is blood, not if one is born in Europe. 
 
13) The plans for a federal Europe in the resistance movements during 
World War II: In practically all of continental Europe the resistance 
movements had a united Europe as their ideal. At a conference in Switzerland 
in 1944 the unification of Europe was discussed. 
 
14) The revived European movement after World War II: There existed 
strong sentiments for a united Europe during the years just after World War 
II. High points include Churchill’s plea for a United Europe in 1946 and the 
founding of the Council of Europe in 1949. 
 
15) The creation of the European Union (the European Coal and Steel 
Community, Euratom, The European Common Market, the Single 
Market, the European Union): In 1950-1951 Jean Monnet began the 
creation of today’s European Union by helping to form the European Coal 
and Steel Community. Despite various ups and downs during the years after 
the early 1950s, the European Union has continued to advance.  
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